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ABSTRACT 
The seminal market efficiency paradigm in finance is being increasingly challenged 
by evidence apparently inconsistent with its predictions. Such "anomalies" tend to 
show that the market does not fully incorporate information upon its release in an 
unbiased way. Recent literature in finance identifies two potential types of anomalous 
market reaction to news disclosuresl overreaction, and underreaction. The 
overreaction phenomenon does not find much empirical support but market 
underreaction, on the other hand, appears quite robust, particularly in the case of bad 
news which the market appears to take time to process in many situations. My PhD 
explores these issues. 
The first part of my thesis tests the hypothesis that if investors rationally incorporate 
new pessimistic (optimistic) information then after controlling for risk, bad (good) 
news firms will not under- (over-) react. I test this hypothesis in the going-concern 
modified audit report disclosure domain. Going-concern opinions offer an appropriate 
test for the underreaction model as such information releases are associated with acute 
psychological stress and where a clear distinction between bad and good news can 
easily be made by considering the parallel case of going-concern withdrawal events. 
The second part of my thesis extends my work to investigate the market underreaction 
phenomenon conditional on the underlying bankruptcy regime of the institutional 
environment. Specifically, I explore the market response to the information content of 
closely related going-concem modified audit report disclosures (bad news) 
conditional on the underlying bankruptcy codes in very similar institutional and 
market environments differing only in the nature of bankruptcy regimes. More 
specifically, I work with the debtor-friendly U. S. and the creditor- friendly U. K. legal 
regimes. I hypothesize that investors in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime (the 
U. K. ) will react more adversely to the publication of first-time going-concem 
modified audit report indicating increased risk of loss than do investors in a debtor- 
friendly bankruptcy regime (the U. S. ). This is because of a remarkable divergence 
across the bankruptcy codes of the two different countries with regards to the rights of 
claimholders in the event of a default on debt contracts. The idea is to test whether 
there is any difference in investor response to similar bad news signals highlighting 
financial distress across different institutional environments. 
In the first part of my thesis, I find that there is asymmetric market response to first- 
time going-concern modified audit report disclosures (bad news) and withdrawal of 
the going-concern modified audit report disclosure (good news). Using a large sample 
of 845 U. S. firms from 1994-2002,1 find that the market underreacts to going-concern 
modified audit report disclosures (bad news), resulting in a downward drift of around 
-16% over the one-year period subsequent to the publication of going-concern 
modified audit opinion, but treats its withdrawal (good news) consistent with theory 
with no subsequent abnormal returns. To ensure that my empirical results are robust I 
employ various methodologies and also conduct additional tests to control for 
alternative explanations to my market underreaction story such as post-earnings 
announcement drift, momentum etc. My main results on market underreaction to 
going-concern modified audit report disclosures remain unchanged. I also test if there 
is an opportunity to eam profits by trading on this underreaction anomaly but find that 
any profit opportunity is illusory and highly risky. I conduct additional analyses that 
ix 
explore the trading behaviour of different classes of investors in my sample firms. 
This analysis is important as it could highlight whether institutional investors and 
retail investors exhibit similar trading biases. Results reveal that institutional investors 
reduce their holdings in such stocks on a timely basis in contrast to retail investors 
who appear to increase their holdings in such distressed stocks. The evidence is even 
clearer when such analysis is conducted by splitting my going-concern sample by 
subsequent outcomes. 
I conclude that de. spite clear adverse signals about the firm's continuing financial 
viability being conveyed to investors by the publication of the going-concem 
modified audit report, this information is not being fully impounded by the market, in 
contrast to the good news conveyed by going-concern withdrawals. My findings add 
to the existing literature calling into question the ability of the market to rationally 
price stocks in the case of acute public-domain bad news disclosures, as opposed to 
good news releases. My results suggest that my evidence of stock mispricing and 
extended post-goi ng-c once rn drift might then be explained by a limits to arbitrage 
argument with naYve (retail) investors keeping stock prices artificially high by trading 
inappropriately in these stocks due to behavioural biases identified in the literature 
and skilled investors (professional arbitrageurs) having limited incentive to trade in 
these small firms because of high costs. 
In terms of the second main theme of my thesis, my empirical analysis comparing the 
market response to going-concern modified opinions in the U. S. and the U. K. shows 
that, as hypothesized, investors in a creditor-friendly regime (the U. K. ) react more 
adversely, -3 1 %, than investors in a debtor-friendly regime (the U. S. ), - 18%, in the 
eight year time-period (1995-2002). One particular reason is that the U. S. bankruptcy 
regime is biased more towards the rights of' debtors, whereas the U. K. regime is 
biased more towards the rights of creditors and once a firrn enters bankruptcy 
proceedings in the U. K., it is unlikely that stockholders' equity has any residual value. 
These results provide evidence of the important role of legal regimes on the 
informativeness of accounting inforination. My results suggest that as standard-setters 
pursue uniform accounting and auditing standards across the world, they need to take 
into account how such standards interact with local legal regimes and consequently 
their informativeness to investors and other financial statement users. As such, these 
results present crucial empirical evidence that adds to the ongoing debate about the 
relevance of global standards among standard- setters, regulators and academics. 
Overall, my thesis makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to the 





The efficient market hypothesis [EMHI has been the central paradigm of finance over 
the last three decades. This suggests that when markets are efficient stock prices 
always "fully reflect" all available information (Fama, 1970). Fama (1970) further 
describes three forms of market efficiency (weak form, semi-strong form, and strong 
form) and concludes that the evidence contradictory to EMH is rather sparse. Fama 
(1991), in his sequel to his 1970 paper, updates his review of the literature on market 
efficiency. In his new version of the EMH he changes the three forms of market 
efficiency to a) tests for return predictability, b) event studies, and c) tests for private 
information. In this paper he admits that the evidence for market efficiency for tests of 
return predictability is controversial. For event studies it is high supportive and for 
tests of private information it is murky, clouded by the Joint hypothesis problem. 
However, recent empirical research has uncovered further evidence, which has made 
the EMH paradigm controversial in all its forms. Even with event studies, which in 
Fama's opinion presented the cleanest support, evidence against market efficiency is 
now also exposed. Recent literature in finance identifies two potential types of 
anomalous market reaction to news disclosures - overreaction, and underreaction. The 
overreaction phenomenon does not find much empirical support but market 
underreaction, on the other hand, appears quite robust. Existing research in accounting 
and finance suggest incomplete market response to various news events leading to a 
post-event drift persisting for several months. This market underreaction phenomenon 
relates to slow assimilation of infon-nation revealed by these news events into stock 
prices. A key empirical finding of studies in this area is that the market is particularly 
biased in recognising the full implications of adverse news disclosures as opposed to 
events conveying optimistic news. The classic case is that of the post-earnings 
announcement drift (Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas, 1989,1990). 
Berriard and Thomas (1999) show that their low SUE (standardized unexpected 
earnings) portfolio (bad news) has abnormally low returns compared with their high 
SUE portfolio (good news). Similarly, there is evidence of analyst underreaction to 
negative information (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999 and Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003). 
Other events/disclosures include market reaction to stock recommendations 
(Womack, 1996), dividend initiations/increases and omissions/reductions (Michaely, 
Thaler and Womack, 1995; Asquith and Mullins, 1983) and the disclosure of 
favourable and unfavourable news (Chan, 2003). Important point to note is that in all 
these studies results are largely driven by bad news stocks/portfolios. 
However, most of these studies fall prey to one of the two key problems in exploring 
market underreaction to bad news. First, many of these studies use events that are 
management's voluntary decision choices with non-homogenous motivations. Second, 
such disclosures generally do not relate to extreme events such as financial distress. 
Thus, existing studies use events which are ambiguous in terms of their information 
content making it difficult to directly associate them with changes in firm viability or 
portraying clean bad news signals uniformly across all firms. Therefore, I argue that 
events in the financial distress domain are most suitable for my empirical 
investigation as they are very clear and unambiguous in terms of their information 
releases. For instance, firms that move towards the financial distress domain clearly 
portray bad news making it difficult for investors to deal with this appropriately 
because of the associated psychological pain. Conversely, firms that turnaround 
1) 
provide good news leading to psychological "gain". Apart from Dichev and Plotroski 
(2001) there are not many studies that examine market reaction to news events in this 
domain. Even Dichev and Piotroski (2001), who focus on the impact of bond rating 
changes on stock returns, work with only a noisy estimate of a firm's likelihood of 
default (Vassulou and Xing, 2004). 
In this thesis, I explicitly and thoroughly examine the market underreaction anomaly 
conditional on the nature of the news in the U. S. by using the going-concem opinion 
as my news event. Going-concern audit disclosures offer an excellent test for the 
behavioural finance model of market underreaction because such disclosures are in 
the financial distress domain and thus of potentially acute impact on investors. More 
importantly the information conveyed by the going-concern event is clear and 
unambiguous. A going-concern modification (bad news) highlights the increase in the 
uncertainty of a firm's operations which, in essence, increases financial distress risk. 
Whereas, in comparison, a withdrawal of a modified opinion (good news) highlights a 
decrease in a firm's financial distress risk. Furthermore, I extend my analysis to 
explore how different classes of stockholders change their holdings around the bad 
news event in my sample ot'going-concem modified firms. Since I am investigating a 
behavioural finance issue through a very important accounting system disclosure; my 
thesis contributes to both the behavioural finance and accounting areas. 
The going-concern assumption is one of the basic principles underlying the 
preparation of financial statements. Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 59 - 
The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to Continue as a Going-Concern 
(AICPA, 1988) stresses that the going-concern report is an important signal for 
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financial statement users. No consensus, however, exists about its utility to investors 
or its relevance in market pricing. Previous market-based research is limited to 
examining stock price reactions to going-concem opinions around the announcement 
date only (e. g., Firth, 1978; Chow and Rice, 1982; Dodd, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 
1986. Jones. 1996; Carlson, Glezen, and Benefield, 1998) and with various research 
design issues arising (Bailey, 1982). No U. S. study has explored this issue on a 
longer-term basis apart from the specialised studies of Willenborg and McKeown 
(2001) and Weber and Willenborg (2003), who explore the post-listing performance 
of micro-cap IPOs with going-concern audit opinions in their pre-listing financial 
statements. 
Additionally, there is no direct evidence on the market reaction to going-concern 
opinion withdrawals (good news), although an early study (Field and Wilkins, 1991) 
does explore the short-term market reaction to withdrawn audit qualifications in 
general. The only study with direct relevance to my thesis is that of Taffler, Lu, and 
Kausar (2004). This, however, is restricted to the analysis of' one-year post-going- 
concern returns only for a small sample of U. K. firms operating under a creditor- 
friendly bankruptcy regime in contrast to the debtor-friendly insolvency code 
operating in the U. S. (La Porta, Lopez-de-S i lanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Franks, 
Nyborg, and Torous, 1996). 
Interestingly, the divergent bankruptcy codes in the two institutional criviron-ments 
and similar information cue in the financial distress domain (i. e. going-concern 
opinion) further enable me to extend my thesis to study the market underreaction 
anomaly conditional on the bankruptcy regime underpinning the firms in question. 
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The motivation behind such an investigation comes from the fact that under the two 
bankruptcy regimcs there is differential treatment of the rights of the claimholders in 
the event of default on debt contracts, (e. g., see Franks et al., 1996-, La Porta et al., 
1997). Once a firm enters bankruptcy proceedings in the U. K., it is unlikely that 
stockholders' equity has any residual value, whereas this is very rare in the U. S. 
Consequently, it is possible that a going-concern opinion in the U. K., which signals 
increased default risk, will have a more negative market response than a going- 
concern opinion in the U. S. In the U. K., the going-concem auditing regime under 
SAS 600 (APB, 199-33) and SAS 130 (APB, 1994) is based on, and is very similar to, 
SAS No. 58 (AICPA, 1988a) and SAS No. 59 (AICPA, 1988b) with equivalent 
auditing standards and procedures. Furthermore, various studies in the corporate 
governance area point out that the U. S. and the U. K. have very similar capital market 
structures. Therefore. I suggest that, despite the relative uniformity of the auditor's 
going-concern opinion across the two countries, investors place differential 
importance on this information cue and this is largely a result of differences in the 
underlying bankruptcy regimes. 
In summary, this thesis aims to explore the medium-term stock price behaviour of 
firms with first-time going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinions and to examine 
the different market responses to the GCM event itself (bad news) and for those cases 
where the going-concem opinion is subsequently withdrawn (good news). Therefore, 
going-concern opinions constitute mandatory unambiguous public-domain bad news 
events offering a clean test for studying market reaction to such bad and good news 
disclosures. I additionally explore the different trading behaviours of the three classes 
of stockholder (institutions, insiders, and retail investors) for the full GCM sample 
5 
and conditional on GCM firms' ex post outcome to provide insight into how these 
different types of market participant react to this bad news. Such analysis could 
further educate us about investor behaviour in this financial distress domain. 
In the second part of this thesis, I proceed to explore the market response to the 
information content of the going-concern modified audit report disclosures (bad news) 
conditional on the underlying bankruptcy codes in the debtor-friendly U. S. and the 
creditor- friendly U. K. regimes. The idea is to see whether there is any difference in 
investor response to similar bad news signals highlighting financial distress across the 
two institutional environments. In particular, do investors place different weights in 
their stock price response to firms with going-concern modified auditor opinion in the 
U. S. and the U. K.? 
Spccifically, the aims and objectives of my study are: 
1. To test the market underreaction hypothesis in the domain of financialiv 
distressed firms where the information conveyed by the event is unambiguous, 
clearly representing "loss" in a psychological context. 
2. To investigate the market underreaction hypothesis conditional on the nature 
of the news (good or bad) revealed by the event in the context of firms which 
experience a shift in their bankruptcy risk. This test is primarily based on the 
existing empirical evidence suggesting weak evidence of abnormal market 
response, if at all, after the good news release event, whereas, much stronger 
results indicating the robustness of the market underreaction anomaly. 
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3. To test each of the three theoretical behavioural finance models of Daniel. 
Hershleifer, and Subrahmanyarn (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998), and liong and Stein (1999). Such an investigation allows me to 
empirically test the explanations offered by these models for the market 
underreaction phenomenon and also assess ex ante validity of these models. 
4. To test any abnormal returns against mispricing arguments by controlling for, 
and/or to potentially uncover, additional factor(s) that might underlie the 
underreaction phenomenon. 
5. To test any abnormal returns for limits to arbitrage arguments. Lesmond, 
Schill, and Zhou (2004) in the case of momentum trading and Taffler, Lu, and 
Kausar (2004) for U. K. going-concern modified opinions, find that profit 
opportunities are illusory and after incorporating most of the trading costs 
involved in the arbitrage process, no profits can be made. 
6. Taffler, Lu. and Kausar (2004) in their study of U. K. GCM firins speculate 
that institutional investors are also prone to behavioural biases. I investigate 
trading patterns of different classes of investors to provide specific evidence 
on this issue. 
7. To test for differences in market response to first-time going-concern modified 
audit opinions conditional on the underlying bankruptcy regime of the 
institutional environment. The idea is to provide evidence on the effect of the 
interaction of local bankruptcy codes with a similar information signal 
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indicating increase in financial distress on security prices in the U. S., a debtor- 
friendly regime, and the U. K., a creditor-friendly regime. 
8. To conduct additional tests by controlling for other factors that might explain 
any difference in investor response to the GCM signal in the U. S. and the U. K. 
environments. 
9. Last but not least, to provide a possible alternative explanation to limits to 
arbitrage for the market underreaction phenomenon drawing on both extant 
behavioural finance as well as complementary psychoanalytic perspectives. 
I form appropriate hypotheses in my exploration of my above-mentioned research 
questions and then use different performance measurement and performance 
evaluation methodologies to test these. Specifically, for my main analyses, I rely on 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns derived using the control firm method (Barber and 
1-yon, 1996). As with any empirical study, results should bc robust to alternative 
approaches; I also employ other methodologies present in the literature. To test for 
other confounding/alternative explanations cross-sectional regressions are also run. 
Main findings of my thesis are: 
There is differential market reaction to going-concern modified audit opinions (bad 
news) and going-concern modified withdrawn audit opinions (bad news). I find 
negative stock price reaction following a GCM announcement lasts for a year, and is 
around -16%, indicating clear market underreaction to this bad news event. 
Conversely, no similar abnormal return pattern is found after GCM withdrawals (good 
8 
news), and is consistent with theory. I also provide evidence that good news about my 
GCM firms' future prospects, as highlighted by a withdrawri going-concern opinion, 
is correctly anticipated by the market in the period leading up to the following audit 
report date. Additionally, the underperformance of my sample firms is restricted to 
GCM firms with negative earnings surprise, consistent with market focusing on 
earnings while ignoring the full implications of the GCM signal. 
On the other hand, I find high transaction costs associated with trading in my sample 
stocks render arbitrage opportunities unprofitable and very risky for rational investors. 
Furthermore, by exploring trading patterns of different investors in response to the 
going-concem opinion, I find that institutional investors reduce their holding in such 
stocks, especially in the most distressed of stocks in my GCM sample. Also, by 
deduction, these results show that it is the retail investors who are trading 
inappropriately in these stocks and keeping prices artificially high. Another key 
finding of my thesis is that investors react more adversely to the first-time going- 
concern modified audit report in a creditor- friendly regime (i. e. U. K. ) as opposed to a 
debtor-friendly regime (i. e. U. S. ). These findings have not been documented in the 
literature before. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows: chapter two surveys the existing 
literature, chapter three presents my research framework, discusses the 
even ts/di sc I osures to be investigated and develops the hypotheses to be tested, chapter 
four provides the details of data and methodology to be employed, chapter five reports 
the results of market reaction to good and bad news, chapter six tests for explanations 
already documented in the literature, chapter seven investigates a limits to arbitrage 
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story and also presents evidence on holding patterns and trading activities of different 
investor classes, chapter eight presents the results of market response to bad news 
conditional on the underlying bankruptcy code of the institutional environment, and 
chapter nine draws conclusions from the research, discusses limitations and explores 





In this chapter I review the literature on anomalous market reaction to news 
events/disclosures. The existing literature on anomalous market reaction is split into 
market over- and underreaction studies. A review of each of these areas follows. 
2.2. Market Overreaction 
Overreaction is observed when asset prices initially rise above/beloNA their 
fundamental values following a news release and gradually revert to fundamental 
value over a long period of time. This phenomenon was initially identified by 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and again confirmed by them in 1987. 
In their 1985 study they show that when stocks are ranked on their three- to five-year 
past returns, firms with prior extreme negative stock returns (losers) seem to 
outperform those with prior extreme positive returns (winners). They attribute these 
long-term return reversals to investor overreaction. This portfolio fon-nation strategy 
and the evidence of'subscquent long-term return reversals is essentially the key test of 
overreaction in the accounting and finance literature. 
In their 1987 study they investigate the same issue taking into account the possibility 
of overreaction to earnings releases. In support of the possibility that their earlier 
results could be driven by overreaction to earnings news, DeBondt and Thaler point to 
evidence that indicates a pattern in earnings similar to that found in returns. That is, 
after losers (winners) experience earnings declines (increases) during the portfolio 
formation period, earnings move in the opposite direction in the subsequent test 
period. This evidence was consistent with a failure of stock prices to reflect the fact 
that annual earnings do not strictly follow a random walk, but show some mean 
reversion in the distribution tails (Brooks and Buckmaster, 1976). 
The evidence presented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) posed a serious threat to the 
market efficiency paradigm and was therefore subject to serious criticism. Ball and 
Kothan (1989) suggest that prior winners (losers) experience decreases (increases) in 
beta that are sufficiently large to explain nearly all of the estimated abnormal returns 
to the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) strategy. Specifically, Ball and Kothari (1989) 
document that when one controls for beta shifts, the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 
strategy generates abnormal returns that are never statistically significant in any of the 
five post-ranking years. 
Zarowin (1989) also presents evidence against the overreaction hypothesis of 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985). Most notably, he matches the DeBondt and Thaler 
sample by size and examines whether, when controlling for size, the anomaly reported 
by DeBondt and Thaler remains. Zarowin finds the very converse to be the case. For 
size matched portfolios there is no sign ot'any gains from buying losers and selling 
winners 
Zarowin (1990) conducts further research on company size and overreaction and 
draws the following conclusion: 
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"The crucial point is that such a size discrepancy indicates the need to controlfor size 
when comparing the return performances of winners vs. losers, because it is well 
known that smallerfirms outperform largerfirms. Without such a control, we cannot 
know, whether differential size or investor overreaction is responsible. for the tendency 
of prior period losers to outperfi)rm prior period winners in the subsequent period' 
(7-arowin, 1990, p. 118). 
However, subsequent to Zarowin's work Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) again 
present evidence of market overreaction using the same sample as Ball and Kothari 
(1989). They uncover the problem of survivorship bias in the Ball and Kothari (1989) 
study. They report that 22% of extreme losers are delisted, while only 8% of extreme 
winners are delisted. Since mean reversion is concentrated in loser companies Chopra, 
Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) suggest the Ball and Kothari (1989) estimates of the 
degree of overreaction are likely to be a substantial underestimate due to sample 
selection bias. Another fundamental difference between the two studies is that 
Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) use empirical estimates of beta while Ball and 
Kothari (1989) use assumed values implied by the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). 
Any definite conclusions about the proper interpretation of the DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985,1987) results are difficult to draw at this stage, however the following more 
recent evidence should help us draw certain conclusions. Conrad and Kaul (1993) 
undertake a replication of the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) study, but employ buy and 
hold returns as a measure of contrarian profits or abnormal returns. On doing so. they 
discover that the evidence of contrarian profits vanishes, with the exception of low 
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price firms. Therefore, they conclude that such returns are mostly attributable to 
mcasurement error in computing long-term returns. This renders evidence in favour of 
the overreaction hypothesis tenuous at best. Ball, Kothari and Wansley (1993), and 
later on Conrad and Kau] (1997), show that profits from overreaction are largely 
generated by bid-ask bounce in transaction prices and accounting for this bounce 
eliminates all the profits from price reversals. 
Other studies of this overreaction hypothesis (e. g. Jones, 1993; Ball, Shanken and 
Kothari, 1995 and Loughran and Ritter, 1996) also uncover additional return 
measurement errors including the microstructure effects of small stocks, portfolio 
formation date issues, differences in returns in up and down markets and virtually all 
abnormal returns being concentrated in January. Measurement problems are thus 
apparent in contrarian portfolio returns and therefore any empirical results consistent 
with overreaction should be viewed with some scepticism. Finally, Fama and French 
(1996) find that a rational asset-pricing model generates the long-ten-n reversals of 
DeBondt and Thaler, which are captured by Fama and French's (1993) multifactor 
asset-pricing model. Fama further explains that: 
"In a nutshell, return covariation among long-term losers seems to be associated with 
a risk premium that can explain why they have higher. future average returns than 
long-term winners. " (Fama, 1998, p. 287) 
In parallel, and more recently, Kadiyala and Rau (2004) examine four corporate 
events (stock-financed acquisitions, cash-financed acquisitions, tender offers, and 
open-market share repurchases) and find no evidence to support the overreaction 
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model in their study. Finally, Ang and Zhang (2004) conduct a large-scale simulation 
study to address several issues that are related to testing long-horizon abnormal 
returns. What they find is that the power of tests for long-horizon abnormal returns (3 
to 5 years) falls considerably and it is even worse for small firms. This means that one 
cannot be completely sure of whether long-horizon abnormal returns are due to 
measurement errors, an unknown risk factor, or overreaction. 
2.3. Market Underreaction 
Market underreaction, on the other hand is still a robust phenomenon. It is a 
phenomenon in which new information (event/disclosure) when released is not 
assimilated quickly into the stock price resulting in post-event drift, suggesting slow 
adjustment to fundamental value over a period of time. In the last decade, empirical 
research in finance and accounting has uncovered a whole range of corporate 
events/disclosures, which present evidence of market underreaction. I review the 
empirical evidence on these events/disclosures in the following section. 
2.3.1. Empirical evidence of market underreaction 
Empirical evidence of market underreaction has grown substantially in the last 
decade. The drift anomaly was initially discovered by Ball and Brown (1968) in their 
study on earnings announcements. They were the first to document that, subsequent to 
the announcement of earnings, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) continue to drift 
up for "good news (earnings increase)" and down for "bad news (earnings decrease)", 
suggesting a delay in infon-nation assimilation into stock prices. This 
underperformance seems to continue from an initial reaction on day I through to day 
180 and in some cases even longer than that. This seminal paper was quickly followed 
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by a whole range of studies documenting the same phenomena. ' However, these 
earlier studies on post-earnings announcement drift suffered from a variety of 
limitations which may have biased their results. 2 But even aftcr controlling for the 
known research design flaws, post-earnings announcement drift remained apparent. 
Among the more recent evidence on the possibility of an incomplete initial response 
to eamings announcements, the most striking evidence appears in Bernard and 
Thomas (1989,1990), Freeman and Tse (1989), and Mendenhall (1991). Each of 
these studies examines the possibility that post-earnings announcement drift is due to 
the fact that stock prices fail to reflect fully what current earnings imply, on average, 
about earnings in subsequent quarters suggesting investors underreact to earnings 
information. Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) test for the presence of post-eamings 
announcement drift in the U. K.. They also find evidence of significant post-eamings 
announcement drift which is robust to alternative controls for risk and market 
microstructure effects. 
Another event which has questioned the informational efficiency argument is the 
long-term market reaction to corporate offerings, which include initial public 
offerings (IPOs), seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and debt offerings. Ritter (1991) 
originally documented long-run underperformance of common stocks subsequent to 
initial public offering. He studied 1,526 1POs over a period of 10 years (1975-1984) 
and found that these issues underperform relative to a group of matched finns listed 
on the American and New York stock exchanges. The underperformance of IPOs was 
again confirmed by Loughran and Ritter in 1995 and then again in 2000. Ritter and 
Welch (2002) in their recent paper review empirical evidence on long-run 
1 E. g. Jones and Litzenberger (1970), Joy, Litzenberger and McEnally (1977), Rendleman, Jones, and 
Latane ( 1982) and Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984). 
2 See Bal 1 (1978), Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) and Bernard and Thomas (1989) for a discussion. 
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performance of 1110s. The authors generally find that the evidence is more consistent 
with poor long-run perfonnance of firrns following 1POs. Ritter and Welch (2002) 
also discuss potential reasons in the literature for this long-run underperformance, 
finally favouring the behavioural point of view as the potential explanation for the 
IPO long-run underperformance phenomenon. 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) study long-run stock returns following seasoned 
equity offerings to determine whether managers' ability to exploit overvaluation 
opportunities is a broadly based market phenomena, or merely due to the large 
information asymmetry in the IPO market. The evidence suggests that long run, post- 
offering underperformance is not unique to 1POs and managers do exploit these 
opportunities. However, irrational optimism or any unknown risk dimension cannot 
fully explain the magnitude and the robustness of the underperformance observed in 
the data. 
In another study Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) document economically and 
statistically significant long-run stock price under-perfon-nance following both 
straight and convertible debt offerings. However, their results are limited to smaller, 
younger and NASDAQ listed firms and among issues that are not investment grade. 
In addition, such underperfon-nance is also limited to offerings that occur in high 
volume periods. Generally, the results are more consistent with market underreaction 
to negative information conveyed at the time of the issue announcement. 
Market reaction to dividend policy changes, a major corporate finance issue, also 
presents evidence inconsistent with market efficiency. Michaely, Thaler and Womack 
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(1995) investigate immediate (3-day) reaction to dividend initiation and omission 
announcements and long-run post -anno uncem ent price perfon-nance. They also 
investigate systematic reaction to good (dividend initiations) and bad (dividend 
omissions) news. Results indicate that initiating (omitting) firms continue to generate 
positive (negative) abnormal returns from the event day till the end of the third year. 
But the results generally are more robust for the omissions sample and show 
significant drift regardless of the benchmark portfolio used. The drift after initiations, 
however, is significant only for some benchmarks and time intervals. In terms of 
market reaction this study presents evidence on asymmetric market reaction to good 
and bad news, being more pronounced for bad news particularly in the long run. The 
authors examine various reasons for such stock price behaviour and find evidence 
consistent with a market underreaction hypothesis. 
Research in the area of mergers and acquisitions also presents evidence consistent 
with long-term market underreaction. Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) summarise previous 
empirical evidence on long-run stock returns following acquisitions. These authors 
conclude that long-run perfon-nance is negative following mergers but non-negative 
(sometimes positive) following tender offers. 3 However, the results of various studies 
they review are economically and statistically significant for mergers but this is not 
the case for tender offers. Tender offers only offer a very weak evidence of positive 
abnon-nal returns. Agrawal and Jaffe (2000) also summarise the studies which offer 
potential explanations for underperformance following mergers. The empirical 
evidence in these studies does not find much support for slow adjustment to merger 
3 General offer made directly to the target firm's shareholders to buy their stock. 
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news or EPS myopia. 4 However, method of payment and performance extrapolation 
receive greater support but still fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for negative 
long-run market underperformance following mergers. 
Various other events/disclosures also add to the evidence on market underreaction. 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) in their paper hypothesise that the 
market treats share repurchases with scepticism, leading to prices adjusting slowly 
over time (Underreaction Hypothesis). They examine long-run firm performance 
following open market repurchase announcements in the decade 1980-90. Their 
results reveal that on average the market underreacts to open market share repurchase 
announcements. Similar results are found in the UK and Canada suggesting 
underreaction to share repurchases is a robust phenomena. -' 
Correspondingly, studies which examine the information content of insider trades and 
its market response do not find any major stock price changes around the time of 
trading or around reporting dates. " However, evidence suggests that insiders' trades 
are informative over a longer investment horizon, suggesting that the market 
underreacts to this information. In addition, informativeness of insiders' activities 
derives exclusively from purchases, while insider selling appears to have no 
predictive ability. Results show that the purchase portfolio outperforms the market by 
around 7% per year. 
4 Earnings per share myopia may be defined as a disproportionate emphasis or fixation on the 
immediate postmerger impact of a merger on earnings per share as opposed to a consideration of 
longer-term consequences (Block, 2002). 
1 See Lasfer (2000) for the UK and Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (2000) for Canada. 
6 See e. g. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (1999). 
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Stock splits also generate market reaction consistent with the idea of slow 
incorporation of new information into stock prices. Although being a cosmetic event 
(because it does not directly affect future cash flows or firm risk characteristics) the 
market reacts favourably to split announcements. Two studies (Ikenberry and 
Ramnath, 2002 and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice, 1996) provide evidence that 
splitting generates significant excess returns in the long-run. They also find that 
market reaction is greater for small firms, low book-to-market finus and firms 
splitting to low share prices. Overall, the results appear to be consistent with market 
underreaction as they provide evidence of incompleteness of the immediate market 
reaction to news. 
Empirical evidence on momentum is rather more interesting as one cannot attribute 
market underreaction or overreaction as caused by any specific firm event. The 
momentum anomaly initially documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) shows that 
when stocks are ranked on the basis of their past performance (usually I year), stocks 
that have performed extraordinarily well continue to perform well over the following 
12 months. Conversely, stocks with poor previous performance continue to perform 
poorly. This suggests that the market takes time in assimilating information about 
these stocks providing abnormal returns to investors over a period of up to one year. 
However, the empirical evidence on the sources of momentum effects is controversial. 
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find 
evidence consistent with the underreaction explanation. Lee and Swarninathan (2000) 
and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) look at long-horizon returns suggesting delayed 
overreaction is driving momentum. However, Nagel (2001) shows that long-term 
reversals of momentum profits are essentially a manifestation of the well-known 
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book-to-market effect and these reversals disappear when retums are adjusted for size 
and book-to-market. Eisclorfer (2004) shows that approximately 40% of the 
momentum profit is generated by delisted firms and these firms only account for 10% 
of the firms in momentum portfolio. This finding is more consistent with the 
underreaction models of the momentum. Therefore, it appears, we are lefi with few 
answers to the underreaction phenomenon. 
Another strand of the literature, involving financial intermediaries, has also presented 
evidence of underreaction. Specifically, financial analysts have shown a tendency to 
underreact to negative information while making earnings forecasts or revisions 
(Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Easterwood and Nutt, 1999, and Amir and Ganzack, 
1998). As my primary concern is investigating investor reaction to good and bad 
news, therefore market reaction to analyst recommendation changes should shed 
further light on this phenomenon. Womack (1996) analyses the effect of 
recommendation (buy/sell) changes of stocks by security analysts at major U. S. 
brokerage firms. He only examines changes to and from the extremes (added 
to/removed from buy or added to/removed from sell). The post-recommendation drift 
associated with a buy is significant but short-lived. The mean size adjusted return for 
the first post-event month beginning two days after the recorded date of buy 
recommendation is +2.4%. Sell recommendations, however, are associated with post- 
recommendation drift of -9.1% over a longer six-month post-event period. This 
phenomenon is also investigated and confirmed in the U. K. by Ryan and Taffler 
(2005). They find a significant post-recommendation drift lasting for at least six 
months after new sell recommendations but no significant drift subsequent to new buy 
recommendations. This suggests that share price is significantly influenced by 
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analysts' recommendation changes, not only at the time of recommendation change 
but also in subsequent months. These results suggest underreaction and asymmetric 
price response to buy and sell recommendation changes. 
Barber, Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman (2003) using a calendar-time portfolio 
approach for the period 1996-99 also find support for asymmetric market response for 
extreme recommendation changes. Their most highly recommended stocks earn a 
significant 3.97% average annual market adjusted return, while the average annual 
market-adjusted return on the least favourably rated stocks is a significant -9.06%. 
However, the opposite is true for the years 2000 and 2001. These results prevailed 
during most months of years 2000 and 2001, regardless of whether the market was 
rising or falling, and was observed for both technology and non-technology stocks. 
Their anomalous results for 2000 and 2001 appear to suggest strong 
underperformance for highly recommended stocks and vice versa for the least 
favorably recommended. However, this unexpected result disappears once size, 
book/market and momentum factors are controlled for (see their Table 6). This 
suggests that their results are then broadly similar to their earlier study (Barber, 
Lehavy, McNichols and Trueman, 2001) using data from 1985-1996, demonstrating a 
delay in reacting to recommendation changes. 
Finally, market response to bond rating changes also favours the underreaction 
hypothesis. There are several reasons to believe that bond-rating changes offer 
another powerful and interesting setting for investigation in long-term returns. First, 
bond-rating changes are common and well-disseminated information events. Second, 
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existing research suggests that bond-rating changes capture economically significant 
shifts in the firms' economic conditions. 
In their interesting study, Dichev and Piotroski (2001) find evidence of underreaction 
to downgrade announcements. They thoroughly investigate long-run returns following 
bond-rating changes. A comprehensive sample size (1970-97) is used allowing 
powerful statistical results to be derived. The authors use both cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) and buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) methodologies for 
measuring abnormal retums, controlled for size and book to market affect. Apart from 
portfolio-level analysis, Dichev and Piotroski also run cross-sectional regressions to 
uncover any dependency issues. Results confirm an economically large and 
statistically significant underperformance following downgrades but no reliable 
abnormal returns following upgrades. Most of the underperformance of downgrades 
occurs in the first year after the announcement, with negative abnormal returns of the 
magnitude of -10 to -14% a year. Panel A of Table IV in Dichev and Piotroski's 
(2001) study shows highly significant first year abnormal returns (CAR = -9.57% 
10.25) and BHAR =- 10.14% (t =- 10.47)) following bond downgrades whereas 
the opposite is not true following bond upgrades (CAR = -0.93% (t = -1.29) and 
BHAR = -0.33% (t = -0.39)). This underperformance, following bond downgrades also 
seems to extend to the second and third year after the announcement, but the size of 
the abnormal returns are substantially reduced. This study suggests that investors are 
biased in their reaction to bad news and remain so for long periods of time whereas 
good news is immediately reflected into share prices. 
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Dichev and Piotroski (2001) also test abnonnal returns conditional on firin size, credit 
quality and preceding quarterly earning surprises. Their results are generally robust-, 
however, the phenomenon of underreaction to bond downgrades is more pronounced 
for small firms with non-investment grade debt. This means that the negative effect is 
more severe for the most extreme cases (low credit quality or higher financial distress 
risk). Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Dichev (1998) also find similar results for their 
0-score/z-score based portfolio analysis of U. S. stocks in general. 
Dichev and Piotroski finally suggest three possible explanations for the unusually low 
long-term returns they discover, but present reasonable justification to discard the first 
two issues i. e., systematic risk factor and ex-ante insufficient information arguments. 
They finally make a case for market inefficiency by siding with behavioural biases 
being the possible explanation for underreaction. 
On the whole, findings of the above mentioned empirical studies appear to be robust 
to commonly adduced explanations such as systematic risk, period-specific return 
patterns, and long-term return measurement methodology problems. Proponents of 
market efficiency still dispute the idea of underreaction by calling such empirical 
regularities chance events and/or as falling prey to other robustness checks (e. g. Fama, 
1998). Nonetheless, even such critics are forced to admit on the basis of the 
compelling empirical evidence that the anomalous market reaction to post-eamings 
announcement drift and momentum are both robust phenomena. Fama (1998) calls 
these two anomalies above suspicion and Kothari (2001) commenting on the earnings 
phenomena says that "the survival of the anomaly 30 years after it was first 
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discovered leads me to believe that there is a rational explanation for it, but evidence 
consistent with rationality remains elusive" (p. 196). 
An important aspect of the empirical evidence suggesting long-term market 
underreaction is that it also highlights differential market responses to good and bad 
news. Table I shows the market reaction to the above-mentioned studies categorised 
as good and bad new events. The distinction between good and bad news provided in 
the table is based on market response only. By analysing table 2.1 we can see that 
market underreaction is more pronounced in the case of bad news events as compared 
to good news events. The question that now arises is "Why do market participants 
appear to have great difficulty in assimilating bad news on a timely basis in their 
investment decisions as compared to good news? " 
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Table 2.1 - Asymmetric Market Response to Good and Bad News Events 
Event Study Market ý Abnormal Returns 
Response 1 and Time Period 
Initial Public Offering Loughran & Ritter Negative -4% (1 year) 
(2000) 
Seasoned Equity Offering Spiess & Affleck Negative -5% (1 year) 
(1995) 
Debt Offerings Spiess & Affleck Negative 1 -4.8% (1 year) 
(1999) 
Bond Rating Changes Dichev & Piotroski 
a) Upgrades (2001) 
Positive Not significant 
b) Downgrades Negative -10% (1 year) 
Stock Splits Ikenberry & Positive 9% (1 year) 
Ramnath 
(2002) 
Share Repurchases Ikenberry et al. Positive 7.9% (1 year) 
(1996) 
Dividend Michaely, Thaler & 
a) Initiation Womack (1995) 
Positive 7.5% (1 year) 
b) Omission Negative -11% (1 year) 
Analyst Recommendations 
a) New Sell Womack (1996) Negative -9.1% (6 months) 
b) New Buy Positive 2.4% 0 month) 
Earnings Announcement7 (U. S. ) 
a) High SUE8 (Long Bernard & Thomas Positive 2.04% (9 months) 
position portfolio) (1989) 
b) Low SUE (Short Negative -6.03% (9months) 
position portfolio) 
Earnings Announcement (U. K. ) 
a) High Earnings Surprise Liu, Strong and Xu Positive Not significant 
b) Low Earnings Surprise (2003) Negative 6= -0.51 per month9 
Acquisitions 
a) Mergers Gregory (1997) Negative -11.8% to -18% 
(2 years) 
Loughran and Vijh 
(1997) Negative - 15.9 (5 years) 
b) Tender offers Loughran & Vijh Positive Not significant 
(1997) 
7 The abnormal returns shown here are the averages of cumulative abnormal returns on small, medium, 
and big stock portfolios. 
I Standardised unexpected earnings. 
9 They use Fama and French's (1993) three-factor time series model. See their Panel C of Table 1. 
26 
23.2. Possible explanationsfor market underreaction 
Over thirty years of research has been conducted and we still fail to have a 
satisfactory explanation for such anomalous market behaviour. Rational asset pricing 
modelslo based on systematic risk explanations or models based on volatility (e. g. 
Veronesi, 1999) all fail to account for such anomalous market behaviour. 
On the contrary, such apparent anomalous market reaction might be better explained 
by behavioural finance concepts drawing on cognitive psychology to explain investor 
decision-making processes. Behavioural finance seeks to predict systematic financial 
market implications of psychological decision processes without trying to define 
'rational' behaviour or label decision-making as faulty (Olsen, 1998). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) present the idea of application of heuristics or "rules 
of thumb" when people are faced with complex judgements and decisions. They argue 
that in many cases these short cuts yield very close approximations to the "optimal" 
solutions suggested by normative theories. The advantage of application of these 
heuristics is that they reduce time and effort required to make reasonably good 
judgements and decisions. Much of the behavioural finance literature is based on this 
idea. It presents the basic argument that investors are subject to certain information 
processing biases and do not rationally incorporate the information revealed by an 
event. Although there are a number of heuristics offered in the behavioural finance 
literature the most important examples specifically and potentially pertaining to 
market underreaction are: representativeness, anchoring and adjustment 
(conservatism), overconfidence, and loss aversion. 
'0 The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), Ross's (1976) 
arbitrage pricing theory, or Merton's (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model. 
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2.3.2.1. Representativeness 
The representativeness heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) involves assessing 
the probability of a state of the world based on the degree to which the evidence is 
perceived as similar or typical of the state of the world. This involves the concept of 
judgement based on stereotypes without relying on the underlying characteristics of a 
particular state of the world. Here people tend to ignore the laws of probability and 
base their judgements on how representative a particular state is to them. "A person 
who follows this heuristic evaluates the probability of an uncertain event, or a sample, 
by the degree to which it is (i) similar in its essential properties to the parent 
population, (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated" 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, p. 33). An important manifestation of the 
representativeness heuristic is that people think they see patterns in truly random 
sequences. For example, the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) findings discussed above, 
suggesting that past losers come to be undervalued and past winners come to be 
overvalued, could be explained on the basis of investors relying on the 
representativeness heuristic and become overly pessimistic about past losers and 
overly optimistic about past winners. DeBondt and Thaler (1989) present evidence in 
support of such a claim. Solt and Statman (1989) test the hypothesis that most 
investors prefer stocks of growth companies because they conclude that growth stocks 
are stocks of growth companies. But the authors in fact find that growth stocks 
actually provide inferior returns over the period of their study. Similarly, Shefrin and 
Statman (1995) present the argument that investors tend to identify good stocks as 
stocks of good companies, which may or may not be true. This idea supports the 
notion that investors suffer from the representative heuristic by projecting the pattern 
28 
of past performance into the future. Therefore, investors suffering from the 
representative heuristic will always think that winners will always outperform losers. 
A recent study by Chan, Frankel and Kothari (2004) tests the representative heuristic 
by using past trends and sequences in financial performance to predict future returns. 
They use growth rates in sales, net income, and operating income over the past five 
years (long-term) and one year (medium-term) to form portfolios of low and high 
growth firms. They also test the momentum anomaly by formulating portfolios based 
on past one year returns. Their results somewhat support the idea that investors, due to 
the operation of conservatism bias, extrapolate past performance (both financial and 
stock return) into future stock returns which produces underreaction in the medium- 
term (up to one year) while finding no support for longer-terin (up to five year) 
market overreaction (return reversals). They also test the representative heuristic 
based on consistency of past performance and on confirming or disconfin-ning growth 
rates. They do find some support for medium-term underreaction but, overall, they 
conclude that either representativeness or conservatism is unlikely to cause market 
inefficiencies. 
2.3.2.2. Anchoring andAdjustment, Conservatism 
Edwards (1968) identified the phenomenon of conservatism, which states that 
individuals are slow to update their beliefs in the face of new evidence. In his 
experiments, Edwards benchmarked a subject's reaction to new information against 
that of a rational Bayesian in which the true value of a piece of evidence is well 
defined. What he found is that individuals update their posteriors in the right 
direction, but by too little in magnitude relative to the rational benchmark. The degree 
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of conservatism is also more pronounced the more useful is the new evidence. 
Edwards, in his own words, summarises: 
"It turns out that the opinion change in very orderly and usually proportional to 
numbers calculated from the Bayes Theorem - but it is insufficient in amount. A 
conventional first approximation to the data would say that it takes anywhereftom 
two to five observations to do one observation's worth of work in inducing a subject 
to change his opinions. " (p. 359) 
Conservatism is also highly suggestive of the underreaction evidence presented above. 
Individuals subject to conservatism might disregard the full infon-nation content of 
some public announcement or an event only adjusting slowly, still tending to anchor 
to their prior estimates. This would be consistent with investors' tendency to 
underweight useful statistical evidence relative to their original less useful evidence. 
Another explanation might be that investors are overconfident about their prior 
information. 
2.3.2.3. Overcot? fidence 
In their summary of the microfoundations of behavioural finance, DeBondt and 
Thaler (1995) state, "perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgement 
is that people are overconfident. " It is a tendency to overestimate the exactness of 
one's knowledge. Applying this in the context of capital markets, investors 
overestimate the precision of their knowledge about the value of a financial security. 
They therefore overestimate the probability that their personal assessment of the value 
of a security is better than others (Barber and Odean, 2002). Thus, overconfident 
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investors believe more strongly in their own valuations and are not concerned much 
about the beliefs of other investors. Further, some evidence suggests that experts tend 
to be more overconfident than relatively less experienced individuals (Griffin and 
Tversky, 1992). Evidence also suggests that overconfidence is greatest for difficult 
and ambiguous tasks (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1977; Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff and Phillips, 1982; Yates, 1990; Griffin and Tversky, 1992). A number of 
studies highlight the role of overconfidence among investors while making investment 
decisions, giving rise to several observed financial market anomalies. Barber and 
Odean (2000) provide evidence that households, which hold about half of' U. S. 
equities, trade too much, on average. These findings, they say, are in line with the 
predictions of behavioural finance models, which incorporate investor 
overconfidence. " This is because they rely too much on their private information, 
causing them to trade too actively and, consequently, earn below-average returns. 
Barber and Odean (2001) test the "excessive trading" and "overconfidence" 
hypothesis by partitioning investors on gender. Psychological research demonstrates 
men are more overconfident than women. Barber and Odean's results reveal that the 
male investors in their sample tend to trade more aggressively than women investors 
and, as a result, earn lower returns. Finally, more recently, Barber and Odean (2002) 
examine the change in trading behaviour that takes place when investors go online. 
They find that, after going online, investors trade more actively, more speculatively, 
and less profitably than before. These findings are consistent with the theory that 
overconfidence leads to excessive trading and cannot be reconciled with rational 
behaviour. 
'' See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam (1998,2001), Odean (1998b) and Gervais and Odean 
(2000) for models based on overconfidence. 
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2.3.2.4. Loss Aversion 
Loss aversion is the phenomenon that people tend to be averse even to very small 
risks relative to a reference point, suggesting a kink in the utility function (Flirshleifer, 
2001, p. 1545). This idea originates from the experimental work of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) most famously known as prospect theory. The idea behind prospect 
theory is that it is defined on gains and losses rather than on levels of wealth; their 
utility function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. 
It is also steeper for losses than for gains, which implies that people are generally 
loss-averse (i. e. they are more sensitive to losses rather than gains). 
"Loss aversion is a crucial bias with major ramifications in all of our _financial 
decision making. The psychological reasons for the strength of this bias are that such 
a loss is associated not just with regret and shame hut also the feeling qf' 
responsibility and associated blame, all of which we inevitably seek to avoid. " 
(Taffler, 2001, p. 9). 
Odean (1998a) analyses the buying and selling behaviour of individual investors at a 
discount brokerage house in U. S. He finds that individuals hold on to losers while 
selling the winners too soon. Even after controlling for rebalancing and tax effects, the 
winning investments that investors choose to sell continue to outperform the losers 
they keep in subsequent months. The tendency to hold losers too long and sell winners 
too soon was also examined and labelled as the "disposition effect" by Shefrin and 
Statman (1985). This shows investors' unwillingness to accept loss in the hope of a 
turnaround and/or to avoid blame and regret. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) put this 
more eloquently: 
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"A person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that 
would be unacceptable to him otherwise. " (p. 28 7) 
This phenomenon also might help us explain market underreaction being more 
pronounced to bad news. However it is essentially a description of investor 
behaviour, not really an explanatory theory of the reasons for such behaviour. 
Having discussed some of the key cognitive biases drawn in behavioural finance we 
can see that they are not sufficient to specifically explain the phenomenon of market 
underreaction. For example, why do we sometimes observe underreaction to good 
news? Such heuristics and cognitive biases can only shed light on behavioural 
patterns in general and one can pick and choose a specific psychological bias and use 
it to explain a particular anomaly in a certain context ex post. Therefore, there is a 
need to look at more coherent explanations or develop formal, testable behavioural 
models, which can predict the anomalous market behaviour ex ante over time. The 
following section discusses some of the behavioural finance models influential in 
today's literature. 
Z3.3. Theoretical behaviouralfinance models 
Work on behavioural finance has grown considerably in the last few years and now 
one can find various theoretical models built on the literature of the psychology of 
decision-making. However, as my primary concern is market underreaction, I only 
discuss models which seek to explain this market anomaly. Three recent models that 
produce patterns of under- and overreaction have been proposed. Barberis, Shleifer 
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and Vishny (1998) build a model of the behaviour of a representative investor based 
on the concepts of representativeness and conservatism discussed above. In their 
terminology, "representativeness" means that investors ignore the laws of probability 
and behave as if the events they have recently observed are typical of the return (or 
earnings) generating process. "Conservatism" means that investors are slow to update 
their prior beliefs in response to new infon-nation. These two behavioural tendencies 
and a particular model structure combine to produce underreaction in some 
circumstances and overreaction in others. For example, they say that underreaction 
will tend to occur in signals of low strength (size of signal) and high weight 
(importance of signal) and overreaction will tend to occur in signals of high strength 
and low weight. They also mention the idea of regime shifting between two possible 
states of nature namely mean reversion and trending. It is the former that causes 
underreaction and takes around 1- 12 months of time for correction. 
Daniel, Hershleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) also rely on psychology for insights 
into the traits of a representative investor's decision-making process. In their model, 
investors are overconfident and exhibit biased self-attribution. "Overconfidence" 
means that investors believe too strongly in their own private information, which 
leads to systematic overreaction to private information and underreaction to public 
information. "Biased self-attribution" means that investors attach too much 
significance to signals that confirm their prior beliefs and too little significance to 
infon-nation signals that contradict them. Their model has somewhat different 
predictions to that of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). Daniel, Hershleifer and 
Subrahmanyan's (1998) model uses the idea that investors overreact to their private 
information and adjust only slowly when the public signal contradicts it. 
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Underreaction is not caused by the signal itself but is only a consequence of initial 
overreaction and then rectification of initial mispricing. ConverselY, If the signal 
confirms investors' beliefs, then overreaction will continue and the price will be 
further out of line with the rational value. In this setting, the drift following a public 
event/signal can be seen as either the continued overreaction or the subsequent 
reversal of the earlier mispricing. 
Finally, Hong and Stein (1999) model the phenomena of underreaction and 
overreaction by focusing on a market composed of heterogeneous investors rather 
than relying on the psychological traits of representative agents. They identify two 
types of investors: "newswatchers (infon-ned)" and "momentum traders 
(uninfon-ned). " Both types of investors suffer from bounded rationality in that they 
can only process a subset of publicly available information but make maximum use of 
the information they do process. The limitations the authors place on the behaviour of 
these two classes of investors are that newswatchers rely only on the signals they 
observe privately and do not use current or past prices, while momentum traders, in 
contrast, do condition on past prices changes but only make simple forecasts. Finally, 
they make one further assumption that private information diffuses gradually across 
the newswatcher population. Their infinite-horizon model predicts that stock prices 
will underreact to information in the short run but will overreact in the long run. For 
example, when newswatchers are active, prices adjust slowly to new information 
causing an underreaction but never an overreaction. Similarly, when momentum 
traders are active they trade on the basis of past price changes generating momentum 
and causing prices to overshoot in the longer run, generally after one year, arbitraging 
away any underreaction left behind by the newswatchers. 
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2.3.4. Shorffialls of the e-xtant models 
This section discusses theoretical shortcomings of the three behavioural finance 
models presented above. Recent empirical evidence is also reviewed to assess out-of- 
sample validity of these models. 
2.3.4.1. Theoretical critique 
In this section I comment on the theoretical underpinnings of these models and 
present the empirical evidence on their application in the following section. The 
above-mentioned models are called behavioural finance models in the finance 
literature today because they use psychological bits and pieces to put together a theory 
which is supposed to predict investor behaviour. However, the main thrust of these 
theoretical models remains mathematical in nature. Although each study seems to be 
motivated by behavioural concepts, they all differ in the predictions the), make about 
the investor behaviour which causes medium-tenn underreaction. In the Daniel, 
Hershleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) model, underreaction is a conscqucnce of 
overreaction followed by return reversals. Conversely, in Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998), underreaction stems from investors wrongly extrapolating past 
performance into the future and in Hong and Stein (1999) it results from gradual 
diffusion of private information among "newswatchers" because in the medium-tenn 
it is hypothesised that only they are active. In addition, as Shefrin (2000, p. 102) points 
out, the key aspect of the differences in investor behaviour causing market 
underreaction in these three models is that the behavioural traits hypothesized in these 
papers have not been documented in psychological studies. It is essentially due to 
these reasons that these behavioural models have been viewed with scepticism to date. 
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Further, an important point to note is that these models present a very simplistic view 
of capital market structure and investor behaviour. These models either rely on two 
cognitive biases affecting investors or there are only two classes of investor. One can 
surely say that in real life scenarios there can never be two distinct classes of investor 
or only two biases affecting investor behaviour, as these models portray, but in fact 
the markets are composed of large numbers of very complex people having different 
values, beliefs, and preferences. Such simplification, i. e. abstraction completely from 
reality, may make the algebra tractable but then how meaningful can the models be? 
"nenever economists have developed behavioural models the result has been bad 
economics and bad psychology. " Shefrin (2000, p. 102) 
Finally, the intuition behind these models reflects the authors being more worried 
about getting the economics right and not being much bothered about irrational 
investor behaviour which, in my opinion, should be the driving factor in 
psychological models. As these models are based on the economic principle of 
rational arbitrage, Lee (2001) calls them rational behavioural models. Should we be 
more worried about getting the economics or psychology "right" or uncovering the 
true phenomena which underlie investor behaviour so we can offer more plausible 
explanations of a particular anomaly, even if we have to accept the domain of 
"irrational" human behaviour? 
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2.3.4.2. Empirical evidence 
Sadly, empirical evidence also does not validate the explanations provided by the 
above three models. 12 In fact, these models only address the anomalies they were 
designed to explain (Fama, 1998). For instance, these models predict that investors 
underreact to public information and/or information inconsistent with their prior 
beliefs and overreact to private infonnation or past trends. Kadiyala and Rau (2004) 
point out that these models are not able to reconcile why investors seemingly 
overreact to a corporate event such as a seasoned equity offerings, while underreact to 
an event such as a share repurchase. Similarly, Fama (1998) argues that behavioural 
models cannot explain the long-run abnormal return evidence since the overreaction 
of investors to some events and underreaction to others implies that on average, 
investors are unbiased in their reaction to information. Additionally, more recent 
evidence suggests long-term return continuation 13 and also differential market 
reaction to good and bad news, which these models also do not take into account (see 
Table 2.1). Hence, a key proposition qf my thesis is that models, which do not 
distinguish between good and bad news, are incomplete. 
In particular, Kadiyala and Rau (2004) test the underreaction and overreaction 
hypotheses on a sample of all firms announcing stock-financed acquisitions, cash- 
financed acquisitions/tender offers, or open-market share repurchases from January 
1980 to December 1994. They sort their samples on the basis of events conveying 
negative (seasoned equity offerings and stock-financed acquisitions) and positive 
(repurchases and cash-financed acquisitions) information. They then sort these two 
12 See Fama (1998), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Kadiyala and Rau (2004) and Chan, Frankel and 
Kothari (2004). 
13 Share repurchases (Ikenberry el al. (1995), stock splits (Ikenberry et al. (2002,1996) and dividends 
(M ichaely et al. (1995). 
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groups further into two subgroups based on whether there was good news or bad news 
released prior to the event announcement For instance, they use negative (positive) 
earnings surprise as a measure of bad (good) news prior to the event announcemenL 
Although their results are sensitive to the methodology they use, generally their 
results are more consistent with the underreaction hypothesis. A key finding of their 
study is that the underperformance of the negative surprise sub-sample persists across 
the entire 36-month horizon, suggesting a more pronounced investor bias towards bad 
news. Importantly, however, their evidence finds no support for the overreaction 
hypothesis as well as the predictions made by the above-mentioned, more 
sophisticated models. 
However, key criticisms of their study are that they neither define the event selection 
criteria they use nor mention why these events might portmy good or bad news in the 
first place. Tbey also do not attempt to explain the causes of market underreaction. 
In another study Chan (2003) examines subsequent performarice of portfolios using a 
one-month horizon strategy to distinguish between winner and loser firms. TU 
portfolios am formed in the following month after the publication of news identified 
as either good (winner) or bad (loser) or no-news. He finds that the market 
undermacts mainly after bad news and this result is very robust. However, this 
underreaction is driven by smaller, probably illiquid firms making it difficult for 
sophisticated investors to arbitrage away this pattern. Chan also explores dw 
overreaction model and finds weak results. Two issues arise fiom his paper which can 
be important in understanding the underreaction phenomenon. First, how liquid we 
stocks that usually underperforni? And second, who is actually responsible for most of 
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the trading in such stocks? Studies which can provide empirical evidence on these 
issues are needed to advance our understanding of the circumstances where the 
market underreaction anomaly is most likely to be found. My PhD thesis also focuses 
on these issues. 
23.5. Markd underreacdon and limits to arbkmge 
Rubinstein (2001) categorises market rationality into maximally rational, where all 
investors am rational, rational markets, where asset prices are set as if all investors are 
rational and finally, minimally rational. In this case markets are not rational; no 
abnormal profit opportunities exist for rational investors. The minimally rational 
capital markets paradigm suggests that it may be possible to find stock market 
anomalies but it is not possible to profit fiorn these opportunities as there are 
significant limits to arbitrage in such situations. Recent empirical studies are reporting 
evidence consistent with this idea. 
Lesmond, Schiff and Zhou (2004) examine the profitability of momentum strategies. 
They identify that biding costs facing an arbitrageur not only include the bid-ask 
spread but a range of other costs like short sales costs, brokerage commissions etc. 
They find that m order to generate abnormal returns frequent trading in 
disproportionately high cost securities is required which prevents profitable strategy 
execution. In further analyses, they find that those stocks diet generate large 
momentum returns are precisely those stocks with high biding costs. Based on this 
they conclude that abnormal returns associated with momentum invesung me just 
illusory and once we adjust for these costs no profit opportunities exisL Similar results 
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are documented by Taffler, Lu and Kausar (2004) in the U. K. for their GCM-based 
trading strategy. 
Chan, Frankel and Koduui (2004) argue that limits to arbitrage have become a 
somewhat necessary condition to ten behavioural hypothesis because, they argue that 
unless arbitrage is limited rational investors will trade on these opportunities and pull 
prices back to economic fundamentals. They briefly mention that future research 
should explore contexts that a priori exhibit limited arbitrage and generally, small 
stocks exhibit characteristics of firms with limited arbitrage because they are lea 
closely followed by analysts, they have lower institutional ownership, and higher 
trading costs, including higher bid-ask spreads (see, for e. g., Bushan, 1994). 1 seek to 
explore fimits to arbitrage argument as an alternative explanation for the market 
underreaction phenomenon in my thesis. 
23.6. Markd underreacdon, flnancial Awas and bankruptcy reghm 
The discussions in previous sections point out a very notable finding i. e., market 
undeffeaction is robust in bad news situations particularly when firms are in financial 
distress. In such situations the probability of bankruptcy is high and in the event of 
failure the final payout to the shareholders is usually dictated by the underlying 
bankruptcy regime in which the firm is operating. Examining the market 
underreaction anomaly to an unambiguous bad news signal (in the financial distress 
domain) also presents an ideal opportunity to extend such an investigation to 
institutional environments with divergent bankruptcy codes. Such an analysis win 
enable me to shed further light on whether or not investor behaviour is influenced by 
the underlying bankruptcy code of the institutional environment when responding to 
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bad news associated with increased financial distress. A perusal of the legal finance 
literature reveals a remarkable divergence across the bankruptcy codes of different 
countries with regard to the rights of claimholders in the event of a defitult on debt 
contracts, (e. g., see Franks et al., 1996; La Porta et al., 1997). Contrasts in legal 
regimes are important in explaining differences in how financial markets operate 
across countries (e. g., La Porta et al., 1997,2002). Comparing the U. S. and U. K. 
institutional fi-ameworks, legal scholars suggest that the U. S. is biased more towards 
the rights of debtors and thus preservation of the firm as a going-concern, is a priority, 
whereas the U. K. is biased more towards the rights of creditors and thus premature 
liquidation is more likely (Franks et al., 1996). Once a firm enters bankruptcy 
proceedings in the U. K., it is unlikely that stockholders' equity has any residual value. 
Consequently, it is possible that a bad news event in the U. K., which signals increased 
default risk, will have a more negative market response than a similar signal in the 
U. S. Furthermore, various studies in the corporate governance area point out that the 
U. S. and U. K. have very similar capital market structures (i. e., large number of public 
firms, dispersed ownership, important role of institutional investors and managers 
holding significant equity stakes with high discretionary power etc. ) and are classified 
as market-centered systems (see e. g., Allen and Gale, 2000). Hence, a U. S. -U. K. 
comparison provides a natural experiment to examine how a very similar information 
cue can have differential market impact because of differences in the underlymg 
bankruptcy regimes. Important in this setting is the information cue or signal which 
has to be similar in nature in the two environments to make the comparison justifiable. 
This is discussed in Chapter 3. To have some idea of the two very different 
bankruptcy regimes i. e., of the U. S. and the U. K., I discuss the respective bankruptcy 
codes in the following sections. 
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2.3.6.1. US bankruptcy code 
Under its Chapter II provisions, the U. S. Bankruptcy Code allows a financially- 
distressed firm to seek court protection ftorn its creditors from commencing or 
continuing to collect on their claims from the firm. Once a firm enters Chapter 11, an 
automatic 'stay' is invoked on the creditor which remains for the entirety of the 
bankruptcy proceedings, allowing the firm to reorganize and rehabilitate itself wid 
emerge from bankruptcy as a healthy going-concern. The debtor firm maintains 
control of the assets and the day-to-day operations of the firm as debtor-in-possession. 
Chapter II is unique in the world in that it gives the debtor firm, and in many cases 
incumbent management, control over determining the stnxture of the reorganised 
firm (Kaiser, 1996). To the extent that incumbent management ad in the interests of 
shareholders, they will maximise shareholder wealth and therefore the equity has 
some upside potential (White, 1989). In addition, Chapter II affords the debtor firm 
new opportunities for financing and limits the role of creditors in developing the 
reorganisation plan. 
Since Chapter II is favourably biased towards debtors, critics of the U. S. bankruptcy 
code suggest that this results in wealth being transferred from creditors to 
shareholders when a firm enters Chapter 11. For instance, the doctrine of Absolute 
Priority (APR), whereby senior creditors are paid in fidl before any junior claimants 
retrieve their claims, is often violated (Franks and Torous, 1989; Eberhart et al., 1990; 
Weiss, 1990; Betker, 1995). These studies suggest that APR is only strictly enforced 
in 25% of the cases. In addition, managers of debtor firms in Chapter II have 
incentives to over-invest in new projects at the expense of shareholders (Gertner and 
43 
Scharhtein, 1991). This maintains the upside potential of equity with minimal 
downside loss. A classic example of this is the case of the Eastern Airlines 
bankruptcy. Weiss and Wruck (1998) show that the Chapter II court-sponsored asset 
stripping activities of the airline promoted the gambling of creditors' claims on new, 
high-risk investments. Finally, because Chapter II affords the debtor firm relatively 
greater decision control rights during bankruptcy proceedings, it promotes the 
continuance of firms as going-concerns when in fiwt they should be liquidated (i. e., 
the liquidation value of the firm is greater than the going-concem value) (Acharya et 
al., 2004). 
2.3.6. Z UK bankruptcy co&. 14 
Insolvency proceedings in the U. K. by and large involve compulsory or creditors' 
voluntary liquidation of the firm in a piecemeal fashion. Under Part I of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986, the incumbent management of a distressed firm surrenders 
control over the firm to a court-appointed "licensed insolvency practitioner", often a 
member of a public accounting firm. 
Other than liquidation, distressed firms have access to four court-supervised 
proceedings: receivership, administrative receivership, administration and company 
voluntary arrangement. Under both receivership and administrittive receivership, the 
main goal of the court-appointed receiver is to realise the assets of the firm quickly 
and efficiently and distribute the proceeds from the side to creditors according to 
ranking interests. 
14 Strictly speaking, the use of the term bankruptcy in the U. K. is restricted to individuals. However, I 
adopt U. S. nomenclature to describe the U. K. firm insolvency event. 
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Admimstration and company voluntary arrangement me the closest bankruptcy 
proceedings to Chapter II in the U. K. The intention of these procedures is to allow 
financially viable firms to restructure their obligations in order to rehabilitate 
themselves. Main differences between these U. K. proceedings and a Chapter II 
work-out include: (1) control over the reorganisation process is transferred from the 
incumbent management to a court-appointed administrator, (2) creditors play a large 
role in formulating the reorganisation plan; (3) them are no new fins ing 
opportunities to aid the firm in its restructuring process; and (4) there is no automatic 
stay provision or any other form of relief from creditors. Although both administration 
and company voluntary arrangement are more favourably biased towards the 
rehabilitation of the debtor firm than receivership or administrative receivership, diese 
procedures are not often used by firms (approximately 2% of all insolvent firms that 
enter bankruptcy proceedings). This is because the interests of creditors remain a 
priority and thus managers often lose their jobs and equity holders am still unlikely to 
receive anything out of the procedures (Kaiser, 1996). 
One charge against the creditor-biased bankruptcy code in the U. K. is that, unlike 
Chapter II in the U. S., there is no automatic stay provision which prevents a 'creditor 
nee' (Brown, 1989; Aghion et al., 1994). Without this automatic stay, which provides 
temporary relief for the firm from its creditors, creditors have an incentive to clamour 
on top of each other to be the first in line to retrieve their claims as quickly as possible 
before other creditors can collect on their claims. This type of behaviour may initiate 
the premature liquidation of potentially economically viable firms (Acharya at al., 
2004). 
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It is clear from the preceding discussion that the U. S. and UJL bankruptcy codes 
assign differential decision control rights to creditors and debtors and differ on their 
preferential treatment of creditors and debtors. Differences in claimholder rights 
embedded in bankruptcy codes have a number of ex ante impacts on managers' 
corporate decisions. For instance, strict enforcement of creditor rights can enhance ex 
ante contractibility in debt contracts (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). In addition, if 
creditors are given priority over shareholders, then this should give management 
(acting on behalf of shareholders) incentives to avoid financial distress. T'he 
theoretical finance literature demonstrates the impact of bankruptcy codes on various 
corporate decisions (e. g., see %ite, 1994; Cornelli and Felli, 1997; Berkovitch and 
Israel, 1998; Bebchuk, 2002). More specifically, the recent study by Acharya at al. 
(2004) demonstrates that differences in the debtor-friendly U. S. and creditor-friendly 
UX. bankruptcy codes can explain differences in the capital structures of firms 
between the two countries. 
2.4. Key Findings of the Literature Review Section 
IMe main points of the above literature review section as they relate to my thesis are: 
* Investor overreaction finds little support in the empirical literature in accounting 
and finance. 
9 Investor underreaction is, however, a more robust phenomenon present across a 
range of events and has also stood up to a variety of robustness checks. 
46 
9 Investor undenmfion is more pronounced to bad news information releases i. e., 
asymmetric market response to the nature of the news (event/news disclosures). 
Empirical studies documenting market undeffeaction show that their results we 
most stable (economically and statistically) for firms in the high financial distrew 
category, e. g., non-investment grade assets. 
* Research within the traditional finance paradigm has Dot been able to provide a 
plausible explanation for causes of such anomalous market behaviour. 
* Recent studies discuss liquidity problems, limits to arbitrage argument, and dw 
issue of types of investors Wding in stocks that undeffeact However, no U. S. study 
tests these issues conditional on there being market underreaction. 
* Behavioural finance, which draws on the psychology of decision-making, has 
been able to offer some general explanations suggesting that investors suffer from 
cognitive biases which potentially produce anomalous stock price patterm. 
* Theoretical behaviound finance models, although analytical in nature, use 
behavioural biases to explain investor under- and overreaction but only offer a very 
nalve view of investor behaviour and are generally not supported by the growing 
empirical evidence. 
9 Differences in bankruptcy codes influence manager corporate decisions. 
Ilerefore, a clear gap is to study how stockholders respond to a clean bad news signal 
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which increases a firm's risk of failure i. e. taking the firm a step closer to banknqfty 
in the two divergent institutional environments of the U. S. and the UK. 
7lie above key findings suggest the need to investigate this anomaly further mid 
especially in the financial distress domain. Them is also a need to stWy the longer- 
term return behaviour contingent on the nature of the news released by the 
event/disclosure. 7berefore, it is important to select an event which can 
imambiguously be classified as good or bad and is comparable across the U. S. and the 
U. K. environments. 7be next chapter develops such a fi=ework. 
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CHAPTER 3 
'RESEARCH FRAMEWORK, EVENT SELECTION CRITERIA, 
AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I surveyed the relevant extant literature and summarised its 
key findings. In this chapter I develop my research framework which allows me to 
study the market underreaction anomaly comprehensively. IMe primary objective of 
this framework is to produce an event selection criteria which Will enable me to select 
a clean and unambiguous good and bad news event and develop hypotheses to 
empirically test the market underreaction phenomenon conditional on the nature of the 
news (i. e., good or bad). The purpose is to see if the market is rational (unbiased) in 
its reaction to both good and bad news. Tberefore, in order to select an event which 
could present stronger empirical evidence and further advance our of 
the market underreaction anomaly the following criteria are suggested: 
1. One key finding of the literature review suggests differential market reaction 
based on the nature of the event (good/bad) and has identified bad news as the key 
driver in the underreaction model. T'herefore, one needs to select events where it is 
easy to distinguish between good and bad news to study unambiguously the market 
underreaction anomaly to good and bad news events. 
2. Another key finding of my literature review section illustrAtes that the 
undeffewtion phenomenon is more robust in firms having a higher probability of 
financial distress. Firms in the financial distress domain have characteristics which 
clearly distinguish them in terms of extreme bad news and good news. As a result, 
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analysing events which are clean proxies of extreme firm financial distress can offer a 
very suitable test to examine market underrewtion. 
3. Information content released by the event itself i. e. can the event be logkdly 
labelled as good or bad in terms of shareholder wealth by analysing its impact on 
fiiture cash flows? 
4. Market-based approach i. e. the event (information release) is viewed as 
representing good or bad news on the basis of the market reaction to it, as reflected in 
its share price, and measured in terms of positive/negative post-event stock return 
being also consistent with criterion (3). 
5. Investigating those events which would contribute something new to the e)dsting 
empirical literature. This means that examining market reaction to new "clean! ' 
events/disclosures not previously studied, or to events when previous research 
findings have been ambiguous. 
6. Finally, as comparing market reaction to bad news event in two different 
bankruptcy regimes is a significant part of my thesis, it is also important that this bad 
news event has a similar meaning in the U. S. and U. IL institutional environments 
selected as representing extremes of debtor-friendly and creditor-friendly bankruptcy 
codes. 
The above-mentioned criteria help us to choose clean events, which do not present 
any ambiguity in their information content and subsequent Market rcactiOlL For 
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example, dividend omissions quevious research has used this as a proxy for finan ial 
distress) can be interpreted either way. Investors might, for instance, perceive 
dividend omissions as bad news but firm management might be biking such an action 
to be able to invest in a highly profitable investment opportunity having a positive 
impact on future cash flows. Similarly, bond downgrades is also not a very clean 
proxy for extreme financial distress as not all firms with bond downgrades can be 
considered as financially distressed. Additionally, not all publicly fisted firms have 
corporate bonds especially smaller firms which by definition are more risky and have 
a higher tendency of failure. 
On the basis of the above-mentioned criteria I have decided to use going-concern 
audit report disclosures, which in my opinion is the beg and the cleanest measure of 
firm financial distress, to investigate the market underreaction phenomenon. Going- 
concern assumption is the basic principle that establishes the basis for the valuations 
and allocations used in accounting (Asare, 1990). Tbe Statement on Auditing 
Standards (SAS) No. 59 - Tim Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's Ability to 
Continue as a Going-Concern (AICPA, 1988) stresses that the going-concem report is 
an important signal for financial statement users. 
Going-concem audit disclosures relate to where auditors give their opinion on the 
medium-term (i. e. up to one year only) viability of the fum in their audit reporL 
Auditors have the responsibility in every audit to assess their client's financial status 
and to modify their audit reports fbr uncertainties that may affect the company's 
ability to continue as a going-concern. An auditor's going-concem opinion in hk/her 
audit report is of particular importance because, if need be, the auditor has the option 
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to modify the going-concern assumption, a basic principle underlying the preparation 
of financial statements. Tberefore, the audit opinion is a key output of the accounting 
system. It is a mandatory, independent, and direct public-domain signal of firm 
financial distress. As part of the audit procedure for all publicly4isted firms, the 
auditor is required to assess the going-concern viability of the entity and communicate 
his/her assessment in the audit opinion which accompanies the financial statements. It 
thus constitutes a unique and an unambiguous extreme bad news event. Such a 
disclosure casts doubt over the ability of the firm to continue to operate in its present 
form in the medium-term, highlighting an increased risk of bankruptcy. Similarly, the 
opposite is true when such an opinion is lifted by the auditor (going-concern 
withdrawal) in a subsequent audit report Therefore, I argue that going-concern 
opinions are unambiguous public-domain bad news signals offering a clean test for 
investigating the market underreaction anomaly conditional on the nature of the news. 
Specifically, a going-concern modified (GCM) audit report portrays clear bad news 
and when such a modification is lifted (GCM withdrawal) by the auditor, it represents 
good news. 
Another very important dimension of my thesis is to investigate the market's reaction 
to a bad news signal in the financial distress domain conditional on the underlying 
bankruptcy regimes of the U. S. and the U. K. which the GCM opinion event 
appropriately fulfils. This is because a similar information cue, signalling an inmease 
in default risk, in the two regimes can take on a different meaning essentially because 
of divergence in the bankruptcy codes, dictating final payouts in the event of 
bankruptcy. In the U. K., the going-concern auditing regime under SAS 600 (APB, 
1993) and SAS 130 (APB, 1994) is based on and is very similar to SAS No. 58 
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(AICPA, 1988a) and SAS No. 50 (AICPA, 1988b) with equivalent auditing standards 
and procedures. 
Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to say that going-concern disclosures 
are the most appropriate events with which to examine the market urAerreaction 
anomaly conditional on the nature of the news (i. e., good or bad) as well as to 
investigate the impact of different bankruptcy regimes on the value of goitWooncem 
opinion to investors. In the next section, I review the literature on going-concern 
disclosures, mainly from a market reaction perspective. 
31. Going-concern Audit Disclosures and Stock Returns 
Previous market-based research examum* the informational content of gomg. 
concern audit disclosures is rather divided. I'here are studies which support the notion 
that mvestors find value in these disclosures, while other studies do not Thew 
inconclusive findings suggest severe methodological problems with all the extant 
research. Bailey (1982) points out that the key research design issue when examining 
the information content of the audit report is to control for contemporaneous 
information releases. He fiulher suggests that the information content of most "a of 
audit reports as investigated by security-price research methods used by these studies 
cannot contribute to our understanding of the issue of whether going-concern 
qualifications have information content because of potentially confounding concurrent 
information releases. 
One of the earliest studies undertaken by Firth (1978) on UK data examines the hwue 
of whether investors differentiate among the reasons for audit qualification. He 
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studies various types of audit qualification including going-concern disclosures. His 
sample consists of 247 qualified firms paired with unqualified fims. He essentially 
uses a control firm approach matched on the basis of year, industry, and size. On 
examining the daily stock returns of these firms for the 20-days surrounding the 
release of their published qualified annual reports he finds significant negative price 
adjustment for firms that received the going-concem, asset valuations, and adverse 
qualification. Thew results provide evidence that the going-concern audit disclosure 
has informational content. 
Chow and Rice (1982) investigate whether qualified opinions convey adverse 
information as revealed in stock prices. Their sample includes 90 qualified and 90 
matched unqualified firms also in financial distress (i. e. having similar characteristics 
as the qualified sample but without an audit qualification) on die basis of sales, 
industry and auditor type. They use the market model with an industry factor looking 
at firm specific stock m-turns for three months subsequent to the announcement period. 
Their study also explicitly controls for the impact of the earnings release around the 
time of the audit opinion. Their results indicate that firms having an unqualified 
opinion had a higher average three-month return than did the qualified opinion 
sample. 
Banks and Kinney (1982) and Dodd, Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) further support 
the notion that uncertainty qualifications are associated with stock price declines and 
average abnormal returns. A more recent study by Carlson, Glezen aW Benefield 
(1998) which controls for concurrent financial information disclosures using an 
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analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) approach, also suggests that investors find going. 
concern audit disclosures useful for firm valuation purposes. 
Chen and Church (1996) and Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) we also indirectly 
supportive of the above argument. Chen and Church (1996) investigate the association 
between going-concern opinions and the market's reaction to bankruptcy filings. They 
find that firms receiving going-concern qualifications experience less negative excess 
returns in the period around bankruptcy filing than those firms receiving unqualified 
opinions. Overall, their results are consistent with going-concern opinions having 
informational value. Holder-Webb and Wilkins (2000) evaluaft the expanded 
requirements of SAS No. 59 (AICPA, 1988), which requires auditors to actively 
evaluate and report on a client's going-concern status. Their results also show less 
negative price responses to bankruptcy announcements for firms receiving SAS No. 
59 going-concern opinions than fbr firms receiving clean opinions under SAS No. 59. 
More recently, two related specialised studies are those of Willenborg and McKeown 
(2001) and Weber and Willenborg (2003) who explore the ca of going-concern 
audit opinions in micro-cap IPOs. In particular, Willenborg and McKeown (2001) 
find EPOs with a GCM audit report on the private-company financial statements 
contained in their prospectus significantly underperform those with non-going- 
concern audit reports by around 25% in the first year post-IPO and by three times that 
on a 3-year horizon. The authors attribute their results to the private information 
conveyed by the going-concern opinion helping uninformed investors better estimate 
TO value in the secondary market. In a companion paper, Weber and Willenborg 
(2003) breakdown this analysis by type of audit firm mW find that I -year aftermarket 
performance is more negative for firms receiving going-concern opinions than those 
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with clean opinions for Big 6 and national firms but not for local firms. Then 
findings suggest that auditor opinion does add value. 
Finally, results from a study by Fields and Wilkins (1991) who examine market 
reaction to withdrawn "subject to" opinions lend weak support to the argument that 
withdrawn going-concem disclosures have information content They use an event 
study fi-amework to investigate common share price reactions to public 
announcements of withdrawn "subject to" opinions. They document a statistically 
significant positive average announcement period abnormal return. Furthermore, they 
show that withdrawals which are relatively less anticipated result in a stronger 
positive abnormal performance. These results suggest that withdrawn opinions in 
general are valuable to investors because they convey information which affects 
shareholder wealth. Jones (1996) investigates the market reaction to firms with going- 
concern opinions and to a sample of financially distressed firms receiving clean 
opinions. 11is results indicate negative mean abnormal returns for those firm which 
received going-concern opinions, while positive mean abnormal returns for 
financially distressed firms with clean opinions suggesting that the independent 
auditor's going-concern evaluation provides information to investors. 
However, as stated earlier, not all capital market research detects a stock price 
reaction to a going-concern audit disclosure. Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich 
(1984), employing a sample of 604 first year audit qualifications, examine the stock 
price reaction to these announcements. Their results, based on a small subset of going. 
concern opinion cases, suggest that there is little evidence of stock price reaction to 
going concern audit qualifications; a public domain disclosure. Similarly, results of no 
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association between stock price and going concern qualification disclosures have also 
been reported by Ball, Walker, and Whittred (1979), Davis (1982), Eliot (1982), and 
Levitan and Knoblett (1985). 
Mutchler (1985), on the other hand, uses a statistical model to examine the 
relationship between the auditor's going-concern opinion and publicly available 
information. She finds that publicly available information can be used to predict an 
auditor's opinion, which implies that the going-concern opinion is redundant 
information and is thus unlikely to convey new information in the pricing of 
securities. 
Craswell (1985) reviewing empirical research into qualified audit reports indicates 
that the differing results in several studies could relate to problems in research design. 
Similarly, Asare's (1990) review also points out several reasons for such conflicting 
results which are; a) announcement date uncertainty, b) event-study window horizon, 
and c) being unable to control for concurrent price sensitive information disclosures 
(Bailey, 1982). Citron, Taffler, and Uang (2004) also highlight the problems with 
using pair-matched samples and employ a different research design to overcome this 
problem. 11ey also highlight the importance of controlling for investors' prior 
expectations when assessing the incremental information content of going-concern 
audit reports and therefore only study first-time audit report going-concern 
uncertainty disclosures. 
To sinn up, the above discussion of the market reaction studies examining the value. 
relevant information contained in the auditor's going-concern opinion reveals mixed 
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findings. Much of the early literature examining this research question documents 
little or no market reaction to the going-concern opinion. Whereas, recent studies 
examining the market's reaction to the release of the auditor's opinion show that the 
going-concern does have informational value to investors. However, non-market 
reaction studies demonstrate that it is possible to model or predict the opinion using 
publicly available data, thus rendering the usefulness of the audit opinion to investors, 
per se, to be minimal. Taken together, the going-concern opinion literature does not 
unambiguously suggest that the going-concem opinion provides new infbrmation to 
investors. In their survey of the disclosure literature, Healy and Palepu (200 1) note the 
paucity of evidence on the value of the audit opinion to investors and welcome fiture 
research in this area. 
3.3. Research Gaps 
After reviewing the literature on market underreaction in the previous chapter and 
going-concern opinions above, it seems reasonable to say that going-concern audit 
disclosures provide us with an ideal opportunity to examine the market underreaction 
anomaly to extreme bad and good news events. As mentioned above, auditor's going- 
concern opinions are important accounting system disclosures. They am 
unambiguous, mandatory, independent and direct public-domain signals of firm 
financial distress. By exploiting the mandatory nature of this public information signal 
I provide a cleaner test of differential market reaction to good and bad news. This 
potentially overcomes the limitation of prior studies that face the issue of 
ambiguously attributing news signals to either good or bad and/or problems in clearly 
associating such signals to firm fi=cW distress. Additionally, the going-concern 
audit opinion event offers a very suitable platform to study how the local bankruptcy 
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codes interact with this accounting information, indicating increased risk of lowk 
across the two jurisdictions of the U. S. and the UK 
In the light of the literature discussed in this as well as in the preceding chapter, I 
explicitly state the motivations of and the research gaps that my thesis intends to fill 
as follows: 
1. Going-concern modified (GCM) opinions offer the most appropriate and 
probably the cleanest test to study the market underreaction anomaly because 
the information conveyed by this message is unambiguously bad, highlighting 
an increase in distress risk, whereas, GCM withdrawals highlight improving 
firm conditions and thus constitute a clean good news signal. No other such 
equivalent signals are available in the literature. 
2. No U. S. study has examined the phenomenon of market underreaction to 
GCM disclosures on a longer-term basis, although Taffler, Lu, mid Kausw 
(2004) use a small sample to investigate this issue in the U. K. and find that the 
market underreacts on average to the tune of -240/* to -31% over a one-year 
period. Studying this in the U. S. will provide further evidence on the 
robustness of this phenomenon internationally. Also the U. S. market is much 
larger and this is likely to increase the power of my tests. 
3. No study has examined medium-term market reaction to comparative GCM 
withdrawal disclosures. This investigation will enable me to comment on 
investor reaction to a clean good news signal. Taken together with point 2 
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above, I will be able to provide important empirical evidence on the market 
unden-eaction phenomenon conditional on the nature of the news. The results 
will educate us regarding the market's ability to rationally impound public- 
domain good and bad news in this financial distress context with important 
implications for market pricing theory, behavioural finance and the accounting 
literature. 
4. Conditional on finding market underreaction, I will investigate some of the 
reasons causing this phenomenon to persist over time. Particularly, I will 
investigate the limits to arbitrage arguments for my sample stocks to see if my 
results are consistent with Rubenstein's (2001) minimally rational markets 
paradigm. Additionally, I will discuss competing behavioural finance 
explanations for such a stock market behaviour. I will also examine tiding 
patterns of different stockholder classes. This will enable me to provide 
empirical evidence on who is actually trading in these bad news stocks. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that institutional investors have superior 
information-processing capabilities compared with retail investors. On the 
whole, such investigations are important to understand the circumstances 
surrounding the market underreaction anomaly and could potentially help us in 
identifying areas where one is most likely to find such stock market anomalies. 
Again, such evidence is lacking in the literature. 
5. Last, but not least, no study has ever compared market response to going- 
concern modified audit opinions in the U. S. and the U. K. immediately around 
the announcement day and over a longer-time horizon (up to one-year). Such 
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an investigation is important in identihying the role of divergent bankruptcy 
regimes which could give different meanings to a similar information signal in 
die two institutional environments with implications for standard-setters, 
regulators and academics. 
In summary, the going-concern opinion discussed above presents an ideal opportunity 
to explore the phenomenon of market underreaction, as it lies in the heart of the 
accounting system. These disclosures are in the financial disft= domain, a domain of 
acute psychological stress where one can easily distinguish between extreme bad 
news and good news. Secondly, it also enables us to study investor response to this 
signal in the U. S. and the U. K. where the message is essentially the same but can take 
on different meanings because of differences in their respective bankruptcy codes. 
The arguments presented in this chapter and in chapter 2 lead to the development of 
my hypotheses which are presented in the next section. 
3.4. Testable Hypotheses 
In this section I derive testable hypotheses that aim at addressing the gaps identified in 
section 3.3 above. Market behaviour, which we observe, is in fact based on how 
investors price equities in capital markets. 11wrefore, in essence, my research is aimed 
at drawing inferences about investor behaviour by investigating the market 
underreaction anomaly conditional on the nature of the news. More specifically, this 
study intends to provide direct evidence on how investors mict to the accounts-based 
solvency position of the firm and whether going-concefri modifications provide any 
additional price-sensitive information on swh market behaviour. This study will 
61 
contribute to the existing literature on market efficiency by analysing the 
informational efficiency argument on the basis of the extent to which investors 
rationally incorporate new information while making investment decisions. 
From the literature survey presented in Chapter 2 and above, thm diftererit stories 
emerge: one is what we observe empirically, second is the role of theoretical 
behavioural finance models and their suggestions about investor behaviour and the 
underreaction phenomenon, and the third is investor behaviour conditional on the 
underlying bankruptcy codes of the institutional environments. T'here seems to be 
some contradiction between the first two issues, that is, more recent empirical 
evidence on the market underreaction phenomenon is often inconsistent with the 
predictions of the extant behavioural finance models, which enables me to test the 
proposition "Does the market underreact to bad news and good newsr To explore 
this issue comprehensively and provide explanations I develop various testable 
hypotheses. Hypotheses I and 2 are generated directly from the empirical literature 
which highlights differential response to good and bad news. Hypotheses 3,4, and 5 
am developed from each of the three behavioural finance models discussed in section 
2.3.3 of this diesis. To be meaningful these hypotheses are developed in line with the 
predictions of these models but stated as conventional null hypotheses of no abnormal 
market response. Hypotheses 7,8,9,10, and II are designed to capture the role of 
other factors which could potentially explain the market Underreaction phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 12 is formed to test for a limits to arbitrage explanation for the market 
underreaction anomaly and hypothesis 13 tests how different stockholders respond to 
bad news events by changing their holding patterns in such stocks over time. It is 
important to note that hypotheses 7 to 13 are conditional on first finding resmits which 
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demonstrate the existence of the underreaction phenomenon in my going-concem 
context i. e., with respect to hypotheses I and 2. Finally, hypotheses 14 and 15 test tbr 
differences in investor response to the publication of the going-concern modified 
opinions in the U. S. and the U. K. I'liese hypotheses explore market responses to the 
GC signal, both in the short-term and longer-term, conditional on the bankruptcy code 
of the institutional environment. 
Next, I describe the hypotheses to be tested. 
3.4. L Market reacdon to bad and good neon events 
The efficient market hypothesis [EMH] suggests that when markets are efficient stock 
prices always 'Uly reflece' all available information, (Fama, 1970). However, recent 
empirical evidence, reviewed in Chapter 2 above, uncovers certain events which have 
led to the EMH now being considered controversial. This evidence shows asymmetric 
market response, that is, market reaction to now negative information is slow and 
persists over time, whereas, the market responds in a timely manner to now, positive 
information. However, if investors rationally incorporate now pessimistic (optimistic) 
information while making their investment decisions then after controlling fbr risk, 
bad (good) news firms will not under (over) perform. I thus establish null hypotheses 
I and 2: 
HI: There h no difference in the performwer of fam that receive GCM audit 
opinions (bad new) rdalm to an appropriam bencknwA 
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H2. - There k no difference in the performance of flmns tkat receive GCM 
withdrawal audit opinions (good new) relative to an appropriate benchmarL 
3.4.2 Tesdng Me behavioural flnance modd of Barberls, Shelkfer and Vlskxy 
(1998) 
Barberis, Shelifer and Vishay's (1998) (BSV) model predicts underreaction when the 
signal is of low strength (size of signal) and high weight (importance of signal). This 
framework is adopted by BSV from Griffin and Tversky (1992) who also tried to 
reconcile the bias of conservatism with that of representativeness. In Griffin and 
Tversky's framework, people are unimpressed by the low strength and react mildly to 
the evidence, even though its weight calls for a larger reaction. To illustnft dww 
concepts, Griffin and Tversky use the example of a recommendation letter. TU 
'strength' of the letter refers to how positive and warm its content is; 'weight' on the 
other hand, measures the credibility and the stature of the letter writer. This concept 
can directly be applied to auditors issiuing going-concern statements. A modified 
report will represent the strength of the auditor's statement while how credible the 
auditor is would be its weight. So, taking other factors into account, underreaction 
after a GCM could also possibly mean that investors do not perceive auditors as very 
credible. To develop a hypothesis to test BSV's model, I rely on one of the key 
assumptions behind their model that investors am expected to be in a mean-reverting 
regime, that is, they believe that future news shock will be in an opposite direction to 
the current one. But if they do not see what they expect then they are surprised and act 
on the news shock in the right direction but with conservatism. This leads to the 
development of the null hypothesis 3. 
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H3: Irrespeedve of Me mature of the new, sampleftwu wkk a poskive (negadw) 
skock prior to the event foUowed by another posifive (negadve) skock (on tke 
announcement date) skould not underreact to new Informadon and no 
underperformance skould be observed in tkepost announcementperiod 
3.4.3. Tesdng the behavioural ftnance modd of Dank4 Hbyhkyer, and 
Subrahnwnyam (1998) 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) (DHS), in their behavioural finance 
model, make two propositions regarding the market reaction to non-selective events 
which I presume auditor going-concern disclosures are. The first predicts no 
systematic post-announcement drift following the event because it is not related to 
prior market mispricing as opposed to a selective event which would be. Their second 
proposition, which I use to generate the following hypothesis, intuitively means that 
investor underreaction only occurs if there is an opposition of sips between pre-event 
returns and the event itself. This is because of investors being overconfident about 
their private information, and when the subsequent public news contradicts this they 
do not react fully to the new information due to biased self-attribution. This leads to 
the development of null hypothesis 4. 
H4: If overconfident investors observe a non-selective event thenjbwa with positive 
(negadve) pre-event returns should not underread to announcement period 
negm4im (posidw) news and should not underperform In thepost-eventperkA 
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3.4.4. Testing the bekaviouralfinance madd ofHong and Stein (1999) 
Hong and Stein's (1999) key assumption is gradual dffwion of information among a 
specific class of investors which basically explains the underreaction effect in the 
medium term. However, this is a fairly general assumption. More important is to test 
their theory by developing a hypothesis based on the exact details of their models 
regarding how investors would behave if their model represented reality. Based on 
this premise I develop the following null hypothesis 5. 
H5. - Even #'privale Information diffusa gradually among newswatchdrs and 
sampk flrms exhibit underreacdon prior to the event being released in the public 
domain then thae flrms should not underread In the skorf-run after Ike 
announcement and momentum-traders should not be able to cause longewun 
overreacdom 
3.4.5. Market underreacdon andpost-earninp announcement drt# 
The publication of the audit report is usually accompanied by odier concurrent news 
releases including accounting numbers. One of the most significant of these releases is 
the earnings release. It is well documented that extreme negative earnings changes an 
followed by abnormally low returns, an aspect of the post-earnings announcemon 
drift (e. g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Bernard and Thomas 1999,1990). Therefore, any 
underperformance of GCM firms may simply be due to the effect of correlated 
earnings changes. To explicitly control for any swh potential post-earnings 
announcement drift I establish null hypotheses 6a and 6b: 
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H6a: There Is no dfference in Me subsequent returns of GCMflnm wilk poskive 
earnings change and negadve earnings change. 
H6b: Tkere is no dfference In Me subsequent returns of GCMflrnu and non-GCM 
flrms with simUar carnmp ckange. 
3.4.6. Market underreaction andfbm size 
Dichev and Piotriski (2001) find that the underperformance to bond downgrades is 
more pronounced for small, low-credit-quality firms. To see if such an effect is 
present in my going-concern context I develop hypothesis 7: 
H7. - There Is no difference in the rdurns of GCM flrim of small flnx size od 
mkdvdy largefbm size. 
3.4. Z Markd underreacdon and db-tras risk 
Dichev (1998), in his study, finds that higher bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by 
higher returns. TIds means that highly distressed firms underperform less distressed 
ones, an idea inconsistent with risk-based explanations. Dichev (1999) then argues 
that the underperformance of these highly distressed firms is due to market mispricing 
since most distressed firms continue to cam below average returns for four years after 
portfolio formation indicating a slow and delayed market response to the available 
information. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also find support for the mispricing 
argument presented by Dichev (1998) and present evidence that investors may have 
great difficulty in dealing with bad news especially among the highly distressed 
sample by not incorporating the pessimistic information conveyed by high O-wores in 
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their decision-making. If this is the case then, by controlling for distress risk, I should 
be able to explain part of the undeffeaction effect I thus develop the null hypotheses 
ga and 8b. 
H8a: There 6 no dWerence In Me returns of Ins flnandaUy db*med GCMflnm 
and kigklyflnanciafly dhftssed GCMflrms. 
H8b: There b no dfference in the returns of GCMflrim and non-GCMflrim with 
shnUarflnanckd db&ess kwJs. 
3.44 Market underreacdon andprice momentum 
JeWeesh and Titman (1993,2001) show that past trends in returns continue, that is, 
firms with low prior returns continue to underperform and firms with high prior 
rewrns continue to outperform. To test for such a momentum explanation I establish 
hypotheses 9a and 9b. 
H9a: Tkere Is no dWerence in Me returns of low momentum GCMfbw and klSk 
momentum GCMjb7tm 
H9b: Tkere Is no dfference In Me returns of GCMflrm and non-GCMflnm wkk 
sbnUarprke momentum 
3.4.9. Market underreacdon and the penny stock bias 
By nature GCM firms are financially distressed, usually having low nuirket 
capitalisation and associated low stock prices. Such stocks coWd well lead to return 
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measurement problems through trading frictions (large bid-ask spreads, poor liquidity 
etc). Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Ball, Kodutri, and Shanken (1995) suggest apparent 
long-term market overreaction may be driven by computational problem associated 
with the returns on low price "loser" stocks. To see if the penny stock status is the 
cause of market underreaction in my GCM firm context I formulate hypothesis 10. 
HIO. - Tkere is no dWerence in Me returns of GCMflrxv and non-GCMflrms wid 
sbnUar penny stock smus. 
3.4.10. Markd undemacdon and Industry spec(fic egPlanadon 
Conditional on finding abnormal poformance for my GCM firms it would be 
reasonable to investigate whether or not any industry-specific efficts drive such a 
performance. Womack (1996) used industry-adjusted returns as an additional return 
measurement benchmark to test the robustness of his post-recommendation drift. This 
leads to the development of hypotheses 11: 
HII: 7Were k no dWerence in the rdurns of GCMflrom and non-GCMjbm 
operating In the same Industry. 
3AIL Markd underreacdon and Und& to arbbvwge 
Rubinstein (2001) has put forward a new market paradigm which he terms minimally 
rational capital markets. This means that although the market is not rational, no 
abnormal profit opportunities exist for arbitrageurs. Recent empirical papers, for 
example, Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) in the case of momentum profits and 
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Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) for U. K. GCM fims, report resWts consistent with this 
idea. To test this issue for my U. S. GCM fums I establish hypothesis 12: 
H12: Arbitrageurs should not be able to projkfrom GCMflrm underperfornw= 
after adjustingfor h=sacdon cos9L 
3.4. IZ Market underreacdon and trading advity 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) find that institutional investors do not reduce their 
holdings in their GCM (bad news) stock over a period of one year following the 
publication of the audit report. Based on this they speculate that institutional investors 
also exhibit trading biases (behavioural) similar to retail investors (noise traders). 
However, studies investigating investor trading behaviour in the Finnish stock market 
suggest that sophisticated investors (mainly institutions) are less biased and their 
portfolios generally outperform the portfolios of unsophisticated investors (see 
Grinblatt and KeloWu, 2000,2001 a, 200 1 b). Bhattacharya (200 1) and Bhattacharya, 
Black, Christensen, and Allee (2003) in the U. S. also find that large traders 
(institutions) are more informed and therefore more rational. To investigate this issue 
for my U. S. GCM firms I formulate null hypothesis 13: 
H13: There should be no difference In holding pafterms of mfour stockholder 
classes in GCM (bad new) stocks over dwa 
3.4.13. Market reaction to going-concern disclosum 
Auditors issue a going-concern opinion when they believe thitt there is substantW 
doubt regarding the entity's ability to continue as a going-concern for a period of time 
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not exceeding one year beyond the date of the financial statements being audited. In 
addition to negative trends in financial statement information, auditors should also 
consider non-publicly-available information such as management's plans to 
restructure operations, specific loan arrangements and covenant restrictions, and work 
stoppages, to mention but a few (SAS No. 59; AICPA, 1999b). To the extent that 
auditors consider non-publicly-available information in their going-concern 
assessment of the firm, and that this non-publicly-available information is not 
correlated with publicly available information, then the going-concern opinion may 
provide new information to investors. Hence, if market expectations of the auditor's 
going-concern opinion are adequately controlled for and the date of the opinion can be 
specifically identified, one would expect a negative market reaction to the unexpected 
component of the going-concern opinion at the time of its announcement in the U. S. 
and the U. K. This leads to null hypothesis 14: 
Hl4. - There ft no negative market reaction to the auditor's going-concern neod#kd 
opinion at the dme Me opinion h announced 
3.4.14. Markd reacdon to GCM d6closures condkional on Me U. S. and Me UX 
IMS&Wdonal envbvnments 
Conditional on there being a negative capital market reaction, I examine whether the 
magnitude of this negative capital market reaction varies between the U. S. and the 
U. K. institutional settings. As previously discussed, the bankruptcy codes between 
the two countries vary in their preferential treatment of debtors and creditors. Jim 
U. S. bankruptcy code favours the interests of debtor firms at the expense of its 
creditors. Hence, it is likely that equity value is maintained when a firm enten 
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Chapter 11. Conversely, the UK. bankruptcy code favours cre4ditors at the expense of 
stockholders. It is likely that the value of equity is diminished significantly when a 
firm enters bankruptcy proceedings (usually liquidation). 
Although the going-concern opinion has similar meanings in both the U. S. and in the 
U. K. (that is, there is substantial doubt that the firm will continue as a going-concern 
for a reasonable period of time), differences in how the U. S. and U. K. bankruptcy 
codes treat claimholders may impact how this signal is received by the equity-holders 
in these capital markets. The going-concem opinion signals an increase in the risk of 
bankruptcy for firms as shown in section 2.3.5 of chapter 2. Since there is little or no 
value left in the equity of firms entering bankruptcy in the U. K., compared to the U. S. 
where there is more likely to be preservation of equity value, the pessimistic 
information contained in the going-concern opinion may be viewed as more severe in 
the U. K. than in the U-S-15 In addition, since auditors may wish to avoid the self- 
fidfilling prophecy of the going-concem opinion (that is, the issuance of the going- 
concern opinion may precipitate panic amongst creditors, suppliers, customers etc., 
who then withdraw support from the firm, thereby contributing to the overall demise 
of the firm, or accelerating its entrance into formal bankruptcy proceedings), they may 
be more reluctant to issue going-concern opinions unless the firm is clearly a 
bankruptcy candidate (see Citron and Taffier, 2001). Hence, because of the potential 
adverse consequences of this opinion, it is possible that the negative implication of 
this opinion is more severe in the U. K. than in the U. S. This leads to null hypothesis 
15: 
Is in fact, it is very rare indeed for equity holders of U. K. public fims to receive mmoeing at all aft a 
fim enters into bankruptcy proccedings. 
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H15-- The negative marAd reaction to the auditor Is going-concern modykd opinion 
Is no greater In the U. L than in Me U. & 
3.5. Summary 
In this chapter I developed a research fi-amework which provided a rationale for 
selecting going-concern opinions as the most unambiguous and clean extreme bad and 
good news events for investigating the market underreaction anomaly. I then furaw 
developed testable hypotheses to empirically examine this anomaly and make an 
attempt to fill important gaps in the existing behavioural finance and accounting 
literature identified in chapter 2 and above. I first derive the hypotheses that test the 
market underreaction anomaly in the financial distress domain using going-concern 
audit report disclosures and then develop associated hypotheses to test whether 
explanations already documented in the literature explain this phenomenon. I also 
derive hypotheses to see if any potential arbitrage opportunities exist to exploit this 
anomaly and how holding patterns of different stockholders change around the 
publication of the GCM audit report. Finally, I develop hypotheses to test the impact 
of legal regimes on the market underreaction phenomenon in the U. S. and the UIL 
In the next chapter I describe the data and methodology that I use in order to formally 
test the hypotheses developed in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I laid out the hypotheses that are to be tested in this thesis. In 
this chapter I describe the data used and the methodology employed in order to test 
these hypotheses. Broadly speaking my thesis addresses two important issues in 
accounting and finance. First is the thorough examination of the market underreaction 
anomaly to acute bad and good news using U. S. firms that published their first-time 
going-concern modified audit reports from 01.01.1994 to 31.12.2002. Second, is the 
empirical investigation of whether there is any differential market response to first- 
time going-concern modified audit opinion firms in the U. S. and the UJL. Here the 
. pact of different legal regimes on the informativeness of accounting information is 
explored. To test the second issue, I use firms that publish their first-time going- 
concern modified audit report in the U. S. a: W the U. K. from 01.01-1995 to 
31.12.2002. This sample period is used to maintain maximum homogeneity between 
the U. S. and the U. K., and commences at the start of the calendar year subsequent to 
the effective implementation date of the new U. K. going-concern auditing regime. 
Going-concern reporting behaviours diftered significantly under the previous auditing 
guidelines (Citron, Taffler and Uang, 2004). 
The chapter is organised as fbHows: section 2 describes the data used in this study, 
section 3 describes the methodology employed and section 4 summarises the chWer. 
74 
TABLE 4.1 
Sample Selection for Going-concern Market Reaction Analysis 
T'his table shows how my population of 845 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ which published first-time going-concern modified audit reports 
(GCMs) between 0 1.0 1.1994 and 31.12.2002 is derived. 
The sample is obtained by using Thompson Research's EDGAR free-text search facility. Ilia 
main combination of keywords used for identifying my going concern cases is "raise 
substantial doubt" and "ability to continue as a going concern". Conditional on a firm having data in CRSP, each firm-year observation's actual audit opinion for the years t- -1,0,1,2, 
where t=0 is the GCM fiscal year, is then checked manually via SEC's EDGAR database. If 
a firm's previous year's audit report is not available on SEC's EDGAR database, Thompson 
Research's web search facility is used. If a firm's previous year could not be verified as non- GCM then that firm is dropped from fitrther analysis. Firms receiving non-GCM opinions 
subsequent to their first-time going-concern modified audit opinion are used for GCM 
withdrawal analysis. For my entire sample the 10-K or 10-K/A filing date is the first date of 
publication of the audit report and hence is used as my event date. The only time I rely on the 
10-K/A is if the audit opinion was amended with a going-concern modification added and 
reported in the subsequent 10-K/A filing. However, this only applies to low than 5% of my 
sample firms. 
Firm-year observations identified through EDGAR free text search 
No. 
14761 
Firm-year observations not found in CRSP -9896 Firm-year observations where previous year is not clew -3026 Firm-year observations with non-GCM opinions -90 Firm-year observations filing Chapter II before audit report publication date -33 Firm-year observations delisted before or in the GCM month -663 Firm-year observations classified as foreign -38 Firm-year observations classified as a development stage enterprise -52 Utilities and financial services firms -103 Firm-year observations suspended at the end of the GCM month -11 Firm-year observations with insufficient data in CONVUSTAT -4 Firm-year observations (sample size) for GCM market reaction analysis 945 
Firm-year observations with clean opinions subsequent to modified audit opinion 136 
Firm-year observations with no event-period stock return data in CRSP -14 Firm-year observations (sample size) for GCM withdrawal analysis _Ua. 
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4.2. Data, Sources and Sample Selection 
In this section, I describe the data, its sources and the sample selection procedure for 
identifying first-time going-concern modified audit report firms in &e U. S. and the 
UK 
4.2L U. S. GCMflrms 
Using a web-based application for refining COWUSTAT's modified auditor opinion 
classification, Butler, Leone, and Willenborg (2004) find that from 1994 to 1999,16% 
of modified opinions are in fact clean but coded incorrectly. To overcome this 
problem I use Thomson Financial's EDGAR five text search to identify firms with 
going-concern modified audit reports fiam 1994 to 2002. The main combinatim of 
keywords used is "raise substantial doube' and "ability to continue as a going 
concern". This search essentially gives us 14,761 going-concern modified opinions 
published in 10-K fibgs. Table 4.1 summarises my sample construction. 
I locate the searched companies on the CRSP database as investigating stock price 
performance is my primary objective. Of the 14,761 firm-years, 9,896 are not found in 
the CRSP database. I then search each company on the SEC's EDGAR database. 
From the remaining 4,865 firm-years, I fiwther eliminate firms if their previous year is 
not clean or if they are financials, utilities, in a development stage, filed Chapter II 
prior to GCM publication date, are foreign or have insufficient data in 
CRSP/COWUSTAT. My final U. S. sample consists of 845 non-finanoe, non-utility, 
industry firms with first-time gomg-concern modified (GCM) audit reports published 
between the beginning of 1994 and the end of 2002 with stocks listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ. Companies in this sample that survive and have their going. 
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concern modified opinion withdrawn in die subsequent year, with sufficient data in 
CRSP/COMIPUSTAT, are classified as my GCM withdrawal sample (the good news 
case). These 122 firms represent 15% of my initial GCM sample and around 30% of 
those surviving one year after a first-time GCM audit report. 
In most cases, I use the actual I O-K filing date taken from EDGAR as the first formal 
announcement date of the going-concem opinion and this represents my event date. 16 
Daily and monthly returns data, and market values are taken from the CRSP Database. 
All other financial data and z-scores, measuring bankruptcy risk (Altman, 1%9), are 
computed using data drawn from COMPUSTAT analyst coverage from IBES. 
Institutional and insider holding data is collected from Thomson Financka Network's 
institutional holding and insider trading data files. U. S. bankruptcy data is from the 
SDC Bankruptcy database. Following Shurnway (1997) and Shumway and Wardier 
(1999), delisting returns are included in monthly returns. Monthly returns subsequent 
to delistings are represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small 
Cap. Index as most of my GCM firms are small firms. 
4. ZZ U. L GCMflrnu 
My U. K. data covers the complete set of 127 non-finance industry firms with first- 
time GCM audit reports published between the beginning of 1995 and the end of 2002 
with stocks fully listed on the London Stock Exchange or trading on the Unlisted 
Securities Market (USK. 17 USM market closed at the end of 1996 and only four of 
my 127 firms traded on USM. GCMs are identified by word search of the KR On DW 
16 Fewer than 5% of my U. S. GCM firms published their first-time GCM audit report in a IO-K/A 
filing. In such cases the I O-K/A Ming date is used as the event date. 
17 There me only four utilities flrms in my U. K. GCM sample. Utilitift MW Cherectedift do not 
differ a significantly in the U. K. in contrast to the U. S. 
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UK Company Facifinder monthly CDROM supplied by Dialog. The specific joint 
phrase searches used are 'going-concern' and 'our opinion not qualified'. Returns data 
is taken from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) and Datastream. Monthly 
natural logarithmic returns adjusted for capital changes and dividends are taken 
directly from LSPD and converted to monthly arithmetic returns, whereas daily data is 
taken from Datastrem. Daily returns, adjusted for dividends, are defined as RN - (Pit 
+ Dft) / (Pft. 1), where, Pit - the closing price for firm i on day t, and Dit - net dividend 
on the ex-dividend day t. For dead firms, the last trading month return is set to -100%. 
For acquired firms, subsequent monthly returns are represented by the equivalent 
monthly return on the FTSE Small Cap. Index. Financial data, and U. K. -based z- 
scores, measuring bankruptcy risk (Taffler, 1994), akin to Altman (1%8) for the U. S., 
are computed using U. K. data drawn from the Tbompson Financial Company Analysis 
database. Firm news is taken from the Regulatory News Service section of Reuters 
Business Briefings, Lexis-Nexis Executive and/or Factiva. Data on U. K. bankniptcies 
is compiled using a num of sources, namely, M Financial Times COT Capital 
Losses publication, Tbomson Financial, Lexis-Nexis Executive, Factiva and the 
Regulatory News Service. 
In the UK, management in effect has the choice of either disclosing die fbrthcoming 
GCM at the preliminary announcement of annual earnings stage or waiting until the 
annual report date (see Citron et al., 2004). " If the publication date of the audit report 
is the same as the annual report date, I use the date when this report is first available 
for inspection at the London Stock Exchange Company Announcements Offlce as the 
event date. Otherwise, the date of the preliminary announcement as provided by the 
18 In the U. K. the firm's preliminary announcement during the period under study contains most of dw 
infbrmation published shortly after in the audited accounts (see Citron et al., 2004). 
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Regulatory News Service is used as the GCM event date. Ibe use of U. K. GCM firm 
data is only restricted to Chapter 8, where my motive is to explore any differential 
market response to first-time going-concern modified audit opinion firms in the U. S. 
and the U. K. due to differences in the underlying bankniptcy regimes. 
To minimese the influence of extreme outliers, observations for all the financial 
variables (excluding stock returns and tnarket values) are set at the I" and the 990 
percentiles respectively. 
4.3. Methodology 
I discuss the methodologies used in my thesis in three separate sub-sections below. 
'Me fim section describes the methodology of exploring the market undeffeaction, 
anomaly in the longer-nm. The second section outlines the methodologies to test 
whether going-concem modified audit reports have information content i. e. short-term 
study. The third part explains the methodologies employed a) to distinguish the good 
news (GC withdmwal) firms from the bad news (GCM firms) at the initial GCM stage 
and b) to test any differences in the informativeness of the OCM signal to investors in 
the U. S. and the UX. 
4.3.1. Methodology to w market underreadlon-based kjVoAezeX 
TIe main focus of my thesis is to explore the longer-run market reaction fbHowing the 
publication of GCM and GCM withdrawal audit reports in the U. S. and to see whether 
such price-relevant information is impounded fiffly by or around the information 
release date or takes time to be assimilated in market prices once it is fully in the 
public domain. T'herefore, I collect monthly returns for 25 months, 12-months pre. 
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and 12-months post-annual report publication month. I term the annual report 
publication month as the announcement month (t-0) and exclude it from the analysm. 
If anything, this biases against finding abnormal returns as any initial market reaction 
to the GCM (GCM withdrawal) is ignored. The returns for both events 
(announcement of a GCM audit report and announcement of a GCM withdrawn audit 
report) are studied in pamllel on an event-time basis. This means that my GCM 
withdrawal firms are rebased, in event time according to their GCM withdrawn audit 
report publication date. I use the 10-K filing date taken from SEC's EDGAR database 
as the first formal announcement date of a going-concern opinion. 19 
For UK. GCM firms, I collect monthly returns for 12-mondis post-annual report 
publication month. I term the annual report publication month as the announcement 
month (t-0) of the going-concern modified (GCM) audit report and exclude it fiom 
the analyses. As mentioned above, I use the annual report publication date or the 
preliminary announcement date, whichever is emlier, as my event date. 
4.3.1.1. Return generating methodology 
Two approaches have commonly been used in the literature for generating returns 
over variable time horizons, BHAR (buy-and-hold abnormal return) and CAR 
(cumulative abnormal return). However, there is some disagreement in the recent 
methodological studies on the best method. Barber and Lyon (1997) fkvour BHARs as 
it involves compounding returns and reflects actual investor experience. On the other 
hand, Fama (1998) argues for summing short-term abnormal returns and recommends 
CARs due to their desirable statistical properties which permit for cleaner tests of 
19 Textual search of press articles using Factiva provided only six casoe of prior publication of now of 
forthcoming GCMs in my sample firms. 
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mispricing. I argue that if mispricing is strong then both the methods can be 
considered as complementary approaches for computing abnormal returns. 
Nonetheless, long-run abnormal return measurement problems using BHARs umlly 
occur in a 3-5 year time horizon (Kothari and Warner, 1997, and Barber and Lyon, 
1997), whereas, I restrict myself to a one-year time period only. As such, my main 
results employ the BHAR measurement metric; my CAR results are substantively 
identical to my main results and are presented in appendices to this thesis. 
The return (Rit) on a buy-and-hold investment in sample firm i less the return on a 
buy-and-hold investment in an asset/portfolio with an appropriate expected return 
E(Rit) known as the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) is given by: 




To fiulher corroborate the BHAR methodology, I also report buy-and-hold raw 
returns (BBRRs) which can be viewed as a more stringent test of market miVdcing 
and could also highlight mis-measurement problems associated with my benchmark. 
BBRRs are calculated as follows: 
R 
BHRRs. - rj [I + Rv 1 (2) 
1-1 
where F6 is the return on a buy-and-hold investment in firm i in period t. 
Due to the small average firm size of my sample, I only consider equally weighted 
returns as value-weighting could inflate standard errors and would result in low power 
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to detect abnormal peiformance (Loughran and Ritter, 2000). However, the effect of 
firm size for U. S. GCM firms is also considered in chapter 7 below. 
Parametric MeM and non-parametric sign, Wilcoxon rank-sinn, and Mann-Whitney 
tests we employed to test the significance of (abnormal/mw) return one-year before 
and one-year after the publication of the GCM and GCM withdrawal audit reporL 
Then tests are also applied when investigating the difference in longer-term abnormal 
returns between the U. S. and U. K. GCM firms. 
4.3.1.2. Performance evaluation 
To determine my expected returns, I primarily use a control firm approach (Barber 
and Lyon, 1997). However, for robustness purposes, I use two other models, namely, 
an extended three factor matched portfolio approach and the fbur-factor model. 7U 
two additional models are applied to the U. S. GCM firm analysis only and the 
associated results presented in the appendices. For the robustness of U. K. GCM firm 
results please refer to Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004). 
4.3.1. Z 1. The controlflrm method 
Sample firms are matched to a control firm on the basis of specified firm 
characteristics. Barber and Lyon (1997) point out the control firm approach eliminates 
the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, and the skewness problem. This is because 
the sample and the control firm must both be listed in the identified event month, 
sample and control firm returns we calculated without rebalancing and both the 
sample and control firm are equally likely to e)q)erience Inge positive returns. It also 
yields well-specified test statistics in virtually all the situations they consider. Ang and 
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Zhang (2004) additionally argue that the control firm method overcomes another 
important problem which is associated with the event firm not being near the centroid 
of the respective matched portfolio in the reference portfolio approach. This leads to 
the matched portfolio return not providing a good estimate of expected firm reftirn. 
Ilicy also demonstrate this problem is more acute with small firms which my GCM 
population comprises. I identify a control firm by matching each of my GCM and 
GCM withdrawal firms with that non-financial, non-utility non-GCM firm which is 
most similar in size and book-to-market Mtio. 20 More specifically, I first iden* all 
firms with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of the market value of 
equity of the sample firm at the end of the GCM (GCM withdrawal) month-, from this 
set of firms I choose the firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the 
sample firm. It is not possible additionally to control for momentum because of lack 
of observations, although I explicitly test for such effects for U. S. GCM firms in 
chapter 5. 
4.3. LZI The threefactor matched reference ponfolio approach 
Reference portfolios are constructed from the CASP Database rettum files fbr an 
non-financial stocks fully listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. All firms 
having market capitalisation (month-end closing prices times shares outstanding) on 
CASP and book value on COMPUSTAT are included. To ensure that accounting data 
are available, a six month lag is considered for all variables from CONVUSTAT used 
in portfolio formation. For example, a 31 December fiscal yew-end firm will match 
CONVUSTAT data for 1994 with CRSP monthly returns from I July, 1995 through 
to 30 June, 1996. 
"I include utilities fims' in my U. K. GCM firm analysis. Utilities firm chmactwistics do rot difibr a 
significantly in the U. K. in conaim to the U. S. 
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My benchmark portfolios are derived using three firm characteristics: size, book-to- 
market and momentum. 21 In line with Carhart (1997) 1 form 64 portfolios based upon 
four size groupings, four book-to-market groupings and four momentum groupings. 
Portfolios are formed each calendar month starting in January IM to December 
2002, all portfolio firms are independently ranked on size (market capitalisation), 
book-to-market, and momentum into quartiles. TU size quartile break-points an 
based on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms. n 
To calculate the abnormal returns of my sample firms, I assign each sample fum to 
one of the 64 matched portfolios formed previously for the appropriate month. Using 
the market capitalisation, book-to-market ratio and momentum for the sample Em at 
the end of the GCM month, I compare these values to the break points for the matched 
portfolios of that period. The abnormal returns for each sample firm we then 
calculated by comparing the returns of the sample firm from the start of the calendar 
month after the GCM date with that of the matched portfolio on a monthly basis. 
4.3. ]. Z3. Thefour-factor model 
The four-factor model that I use is the Fama-French dum-factor model augmented by 
Carhart's (1997) momentum fkctor. The model is presented as follows: - 
R& - RA -a+ b(Pw -RA) + sSMBs + hHMLt + VUAMi + cot (3) 
21 1 augment the conventional sizelbook-to-market return benchmark (see Barber and Lyon, M, 
Table 3) with the Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) prior one-year momentum measure following Carhart 
(M). Ang and Zhang (2004) demonstrate inclusion of beta as an additional factor to size and book. 
to-market provides little additional benefit. 
22 Using NYSE size breakpoints, test results are similar to dim reported later. 
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where (RrRft) is the market factor, constructed by subtracting the t-bill return fiom 
the value-weighted market returns. SMB (Small minus Big) is the size fictor, 
constructed by taking the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a 
portfolio of big stocks. HMIL (High minus Low) is the book-to-market factor, formed 
by taking the return on a portfolio of value stocks (with high book-to-market ratios) 
and subtracting the return on a portfolio of growth stocks (with low book-to-market 
ratios). UMD (Up minus Down) is the average retum on the two high prior return 
portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. m4 is the 
intercept, bl, si, 1ý, uj are the coefficients and el is the stochastic emr term. R. -Rf, 
SMB, HMIL, and UMD are obtained from Kenneth R. French's online data library on 
U. S. equity returns. 
The application of the four-factor model that I consider is analogous to a traditional 
market model approach. This approach estimates four coefficients on the market risk 
premium, size factor, book-to-market factor and momentum factor using pre-evat 
window returns. Expected returns are then calculated using these estimated 
coefficients for the post-event period. Post-event abnormal returns are calculated 
using a sample firm's realised return less the expected return. One drawback of this 
approach is that in order to obtain stable coefficient estimates it requires aii um 
of 24-months contiguous pre-event returns. Many firms in my sample do not fidfil this 
requirement; therefore, I work with the reduced sample. 
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43.1 Metbodology to test the informadon content of the GCM signal 
I use short-term windows to test for any abnormal returns around the publication of 
the GCM audit report. Ile return generating models for the short-term horizon is 
described below. 
4.3.2 1. Return generating model and short-term price reaction tests 
Ilie market-adjusted model and outlier truncation is employed to measure abnormal 
returns (AR) for each security in this study calculated as follows: 23.24 
AR, v - Rv - Rw (4) 
where: 
Rit - return for firm i on day t, and 
It" = return for the equivalent small cap. return Index on day t. 25 
To test null hypothesis H14 and provide initial evidence on H15, the cumulative 
abnormal return for firm i (CAPQ is calculated by summing the daffy abnormal 
returns (ARit) over a two day period (t - -1,0), three day period (t - -1,1), and twelve 
day period (t = -1,10), where day 0 is the relevant GCM disclosure event date. Both 
parametric t-tests and non-parametric sip, Wilcoxon rank-surn and Marm-Whitney 
tests are employed to test for the difference in abnormal returns between U. S. and 
U. K. sample firms. 
13 To determine the sensitivity of my results to model specification issues, I also conduct parallel 
analyses using winsorised market adjusted returns and with no outlier adjustment. Results are generally 
insensitive to model formulation so only the market-adjusted model truncated results are reported here. 
24 The use of the market-adjusted model is preferred as not leading to potential loss of cases through 
lack of sufficient pre-estimation period returns. Brown and Warner (1985) also show that the market- 
adjusted model is well-specified and the power of the tests is not enhanced by risk adjustment using 
OLS risk-adjusted market model estimates. 
23 1 use the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index for U. S. firms while the equivalent FTSE Small Cap. index is 
used for my U. K. sample. Small cap. indices are employed in preference to other more general indices 
because of the generally small market capitalisation of the firms in both my samples. 
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4.3.3. Muldpk regression analysis 
Logistic and ordinary least-squares multivariate regression models are employed a) to 
distinguish the good news (GC withdrawal) firms from the bad news (GCK firms at 
the initial GCM stage, and b) to test any differences in the informativeness of the 
GCM signal to investors in the U. S. debtor-friendly and the U. K. creditor-friendly 
regimes. 
4.3.3.1. Logistic regression model 
In order to see whether one can predict the OC withdrawal event using GCM firm 
characteristics I conduct a multivariate logistic regression tesL My logistic regression 
model takes the following form with dependent variable GCWt-I if the GC audit 
report is withdrawn in next year's audit report for firm i, and 0 otherwise: 
Pr (GCWI = 1) = eýt /(I + eýq, where 
zi = Ao + AIAROj + A2 ROAj + 13CRI + A4LEVI + A5DIVIDj + A6Z-SCOREj 
A7LIV(SrZE), + A8BMj + A-9 MOM, + AloSUEj + IIIA UDITOR, + ul (5) 
ARO = OC month abnormal return is used as a market expectations variable. I expect 
withdrawal firms to have less negative reaction to the GC event ROA - return on 
assets (net income/total assets) measuring any differences attributable to variation in 
operating performance of the two groups. CR - current ratio (current assets/current 
liabilities) is a proxy for liquidity. LEV - leverage proxy defined as total debtttotal 
assets, DIVID dividend paid dummy (I if dividend paid, 0 if nominal or omission), 
and Z-SCORE Altman's (1968) z-score, are all proxies for distress risk. LN(SIZE) 
- natural log of market value, measured by market capitalisation in $ million at the 
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end of the calendar month of audit report publication date, considers the effect of firm 
size. I expect higher market capitalisation firms to be less distressed and thus likely to 
have their GC subsequently withdrawn. BM, the book-to-market ratio, measured by 
book value of assets divided by market capitalisation at the end of the calendar month 
of audit report publication date, is used to account for fifture market expectations. 
Generally, I would expect lower values of BM to be associated with withdrawal cases. 
MOM = prior year returns (momentum) is derived as the monthly average of prior II 
months (t-12 to t-2) raw returns. I expect momentum to be positively related to the 
probability of withdruwal. SUE - standardised unexpected earnings for the last 
quarter of the fiscal year to which the going-concern opinion relates. I expect earnings 
expectations to be positively related to the GC withdrawal event. AUDITOR - audit 
quality proxy diunmy (I if Big5/Big6,0 otherwise). ke are the regression 
parameter estimates and ui is a mean zero stochastic error term. 
4.3.3.2 Ordina? y least-squares regression model 
Multiple ordinary least-squares regression analysis is used to test for any excess return 
differences between U. S. and U. K. GCM fims in the short- and longer-run, where 
short-term CARs, or longer-term BHARs, are the dependent variables for firm L 'Me 
ordinary least-squares multiple regression model used to test null hypothesis 15 
relating to the differential market reaction at the date of first disclosure of the GCM in 
the two regimes is then given by: 
CARj (BHARd = Xo + XIREGB4Fi + A, 2(PRTAN + X3BK + A4MOK +, %sPRCHEARI 
+ A4pREDCq + X7DrVIDj +)4PR74 + IoLNCHPR74 + X, oLNC]HPRLEVi 
XIIDELISTi+; Ll2BKTI+; Ll3AUDi + ul 
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The key variable of interest is the independent variable (denoted REGBAEO which 
indicates the bankruptcy regime associated with GCM firm i. REGI]ME -I if the 
GCM firm is operating in the U. K. and -0 if it is in the U. S. If the market reacts more 
adversely to the GCM event for a firm in the U. K., than in the U. S., I would expect 
the REGIME variable coefficient to have a significant negative sign if null hypothesis 
HIS is to be rejected at conventional levels. My methodology is designed to test 
whether REGWE captures the effect of institutional differences on security prices 
once the GCM audit report is released in the two environments. I suggest that if there 
is differential market reaction to the GCM event across the two countries then this is 
likely to be because of stark divergence in the respective bankruptcy regimes as 
opposed to other institutional differences which arguably are minimal in this finan ial 
distress setting (see section 2.3.5 above). 
I control for factors that may explain the market's response to the GCM disclosures in 
the U. S. aDd the U. K. Since these GCM firms are likely to be in distress and thus 
experiencing severely depressed stock prices, I use population relative total assets 
(PRTA) as a proxy for firm SiM. 26 Results from Mutchler (1986) suggest that auditors 
will more often issue going-concern modifications to smaller firms. Additionally, 
Mutchler et al. (1997) suggest that it is quite possible that auditors are more confident 
that larger firms can weather financial difficulties or, as argued by Bell (1991), 
auditors may have greater concern about the bankruptcy of a larger company when 
this might have been at least partially caused by the going-concern modification itself. 
3' 1 rerun my regressions using market value as a proxy for firm size. Results am qualitatively similar to 
those presented in chapter 8. Inclusion of both PRTA and market value in my regression model induces 
multicollinearity as the two variables are highly correlated. The correlation coefficient 
between PRTA 
and market value is 0.47 (p-0.000). 
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Tbus, I expect, that the larger the company, the more negative the abnormal returns 
around the GCM announcement date. PRTA is derived by transforming the total 
assets figure for each of my GCM firms into a perceritile based population relative 
num . PRTA ranges from 0 to 100, the larger the firm the higher the PRTA num . 
Another important variable which might explain cross-sectional abnormal return 
differences between the U. S. and U. K. is the book-to-market (BM) ratio. BM is used 
to account for any returns dissimilarities associated with lower (higher) expectcd 
future stock returns. Past evidence suggests that high book-to-market firms have 
higher returns, therefore, I expect the sip to be positive. Momentum (MOM) is used 
to control for price momentum prior to the issuance of the audit report. 27 Market 
expectations of GCM audit report issuance would be higher for firms with low 
(negative) momentum; therefore, the sign is expected to be negative. 
Another important aspect to control fbr is earnings expectations. Bernard and Thomas 
(1989) document that extreme negative earnings surprises are followed by abnormally 
low stock returns. I proxy earnings expectation by population relative annual earnings 
change (PRCHEAR) in the one year leading up to the GCM announcement and expect 
the coefficient on this variable to be positive. 21 GCM firms with positive earnings 
surprise are expected to have higher stock returns and vice versa. 
My nw set of control variables relates to firm financial stress. I include a going 
conoern report expectation variable (PREDGQ in my regression model based oil the 
multiple discmninant model used by Mutchler (1993) for U. S. GCM fums and a logit 
27 MOM is defined as prior II -month (t- 12 to t-2) average raw return; t-0 is the GCM event month. " PRCHEAR is calculated by transforming the annual change in earnings (CHEAR) calculated using 
model I of Foster, Olsen, and Sheviin (1984) into a percentile based population relative score ranging 
from 0 to 100. The lower the score the more negative the earnings change ratio. 
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model used by Citron and Taffler (2001) for U. K. firms. As the two models we very 
different, I let PREDGC be a dichotomous indicator variable. 29 I expect the Sip of 
this variable to be positive, that is, less negative returns if GCM expected. In the case 
of dividend payment (DIVID) (- I if dividend paid; 0 if nominal/omission), which 
also controls for the market's expectation of the GCM announcement, I expect DIM 
to be negative since the GCM conveys bad news (and is more surprising) for firms 
that previously paid dividends. 
Population relative z-score (PRZ) proxy bankruptcy risk mid I expect a positive 
relation between firm PRZ and stock returns in my GCM firm context. 30 This is 
because firms with higher PRZ are expected to be associated with a greater 
probability of a modified opinion (Mutchler et al., 1997). 17herefore, market 
expectations for the issuance of a GCM audit report will also be higher fbr such firms. 
However, it is important to note that the PRZ variable is derived using financial 
statement information issued concurrently with the audit report and does not control 
for unexpected changes in the market's assessment of bankruptcy risk caused by 
changes in a firm's financial condition. Hence, I use natural log of change in 
population relative z-score (LNCIHPRZ) to control for changes in bankruptcy risk. 311 
expect the coefficient on LNCHPRZ to be negative since a firm that becomes more 
financially distressed in the year leading up to the GCM announcement will 
experience more negative returns at the time of the GCM announcement Similar to 
29 Consistent with prior research (Fleak and Wilson (1"4)), 1 use 0.01 as the cut-off for U. S. GCM 
firms. However, for U. K. firms, I split the sample into high/low expectations based on ft median 
value derived from the logit model. 
30 PRZ is derived by transforming each GCM firm z-score into the respective U. S. M. K. population. 
relative z-score (PRZ) based on population z-score percentiles. Thus PRZ ranges from 0 to 1; the 
higher the score, the higher is the probability of bankruptcy. This is done to make the z-scores directly 
comparable across the two countries as Altman (1 %8) and Taftler (1984) have different z-score scalas 
and cut-off points. 
31 1 take the natural log of the change in PRZ (I + (PRZt - PR41) / PR7-1.1)), whom t- CJCM 
publication date) in order to control for the market's expectation of changes in distress risk. 
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LNCHPRZ, I also control for changes in the leverage of the firm in the year preceding 
the GCM announcement to control for default risk (LNCIIPRLEV). 32 
Next, I use subsequent delistings and bankruptcies to measure the actual realisations 
of the market's expectations of bankruptcy risk. Ilie two dummy variables which I 
use are a delisting dummy (DELIST equals I if a GCM firm is delisted due to 
pmformance reasons, 0 otherwise) and a bankruptcy dummy (BKT equals I if a GCM 
firm goes bankrupt, 0 otherwise). These ex post variables will clearly bring out any 
possible relation between stock returns and bankruptcy risk. I expect a neptive 
relation between stock returns and bankruptcy risk and hypothesise that GCM firms 
that subsequently delist or go bankrupt in the one-yea period after the publication of 
going-concern modified audit opinion, indicating higher levels of financial siress, 
would have lower (i. e., more negative) stock returns compared with GCM firms that 
neither delist nor go bankrupt. 
Finally, AUDUOR is a dummy variable that equals I if the firm appointed a quality 
auditor (BIG5/BIG6) and 0 otherwise. Prior research (DeAngelo, 1991; Francis and 
Krishnan, 1999) suggests that BlG5/BlG6 auditors provide higher quality audits. 
Similarly, application of the Griffin and Tversky (1992) to the auditors report (see 
section 3.4.2 of my thesis) along with the existing evidence of higher quality audits 
might suggest that BlG5/BlG6 auditors are more credible. IMus, I speculate that as 
BlG5/BlG6 auditors are associated with quality audits, issuance of a GCM audit 
report will relatively be more timely and less expected as compared with non-big 5/6 
32 This measure also proxies for debt covenant breaches which are not automatically disclosed in the 
U. K. Natural log of change in population relative leverage (LNCHPRLEV) is derived similar to 
LNCHPRZ but PRLEV (population relative leverage) ranges from 0 to 100. Higher score is associated 
with higher leverage. 
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auditors. Therefore, I expect the sign of AUDITOR variable to be negative. 10 .... M3 
are the regression parameter estimates and ul is a mean zero stochastic error term. 
4.4. Summary 
Building on the literature review and the research fi-amework outlined in chaptm 2 
and 3, chapter 3 then establishes the fifteen hypotheses my thesis seb out to test. This 
chapter outlines the methodology and data I employ. Four empirical studies am 
conducted to examine these hypotheses. My first empirical study seeks to investigate 
the market underreaction phenomenon to going-concern disclosures conditional on the 
nature of the news. This is presented in chapter 6. The second study tests the 
robustness of market underreaction to bad news for explanations already documented 
in the literature and is presented in chapter 7. In my third empirical investigation, I 
examine limits to arbitrage issues and stockholder trading patterns for my 845 U. S. 
going-concern modified audit report sample firms. This is presented in chapter& My 
final study explores the impact of different legal regimes on the informativeness of the 
information content of the going-concern modified audit report disclosures in the U. S. 
and the U. K. T"his research is reported in chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER5 
DIFFERENTIAL AfARKET REACTION TO 
GOOD AND BAD NEWS 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I described my data and outlined the methodologies to be used 
in my thesis. In this first empirical study, I test whether the market incorporates new 
(good or bad) information rationally or in a biased manner is a very important inue 
for market pricing theory. Existing empirical evidence shows that the market is 
delayed in its response to bad news events as opposed to good news events (see 
chapter 2). However, such events generally do not relate to extreme events such as 
financial distress and therefore it becomes difficult to cleanly classify them as either 
good or bad. Even those studies, which broadly am in the financial distress domain 
have a noisy proxy problem. 
In this chapter, I test the key proposition of my thesis relafing to whether the market 
underreacts to bad and/or good news events in the form of a going-concern modified 
audit report disclosure and its subsequent withdrawal? Tbe auditor's going-concern 
opinion in his/her audit report is of particular importance because it is a mandatory, 
independent, and a direct public domain signal of firm financial distress. It thus 
constitutes a unique and an imarnbiguous extreme bad news event in the financial 
distress domain. Such a disclosure casts doubt over the ability of the firm to continue 
to operate in its present form in the medium-term, highlighting an increased risk of 
bankruptcy. Similarly, the opposite is true when such an opinion is lifted by the 
auditor (going-concern withdrawal) in a subsequent audit reporL Using these two 
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contrasting events I am able to explore the differential market reaction to then 
important accounting releases conditional on the nature of the news. 
Additionally, no study in the U. S. has explored this issue in the longer-run. Such an 
investigation would also enable me to comment on the information content of the 
going-concem audit report disclosure and whether such disclosures are valuable to the 
users of accounting information as my longer-term approach circumvents the 
methodological problems experienced by prior short-term market reaction studies. 
The chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents descriptive statistics of my 
U. S. GCM sample, and section 3 investigates the longer-term market reaction to first. 
time going-concern opinions. First, I present evidence on how the market anticipates 
changes in a firm's distress risk highlighted by the publication of a going-concern 
audit report opinion and then its subsequent withdrawal. Tben, I investigate whether 
the market is rational in anticipating bad (good) news My, or whether it underreacts 
(overreacts) to such news disclosure in the 12-month period after the GCM (GCM 
withdrawn) audit report release month (HI and H2). Section 4 then explores whether 
the characteristics of the subset of GCM firms with their going-concern modified 
opinions lifted in their following year audit reports differ from the non-withdrawal 
cases, and section 5 explicitly tau the three behavioural finance models (H3, H4, and 
H5). Section 6 munTnarises the results of the chapter. 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics of the U. S. GCM Sample 
My data consist of 945 non-finance, non-utility, industry finns with first-time going. 
concern modified (GCM) audit reports published between the beginning of 1994 and 
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the end of 2002 with stocks fidly fisted on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. These 
companies have 62 different 2-digit SIC codes (231 different 3-digit SIC codes) 
indicating no significant degree of industry clustering. Returns data, market value, 
trading volume and bid-ask spread data are taken from the Centerfor Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Database. All other financial data are from COMPUST14T and 
analyst coverage from EBES. Institutional and insider holding data is from 77iompson 
Financial Network's institutional holding and insider trading data files. Z-scores, 
measuring bankruptcy risk (Altman (1968)), are computed using data drawn from 
COMPUSTAT. Following Shumway (1997) and Shumway and Warther (1999) 
delisting returns are included in monthly returns. To abstract from the influence of 
outliers, extreme observations for the book-to-market ratio and z-scores are set at the 
I't and the 99* percentiles respectively. These percentiles are derived from population 
statistics and not from sample statistics. 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics. As can be seen from Panel A, not 
surprisingly, my firms which, by definition, are in financial distren, have low market 
capitalisation (mean size = $34m) and are highly loss makin (mean return on assets - 
-77%). Low current ratio (mean - 1.36) and high mean ratio of total interest bearing 
debt to total assets (38%) together with average z-scom - -1.7, where z <1.9 mom a 
high probability of failure, equally demonstrate the high risk profile of the firm 
sample. Average insider (board) holdings are 15% and mean institutional holdings are 
12%. As might be expected analyst coverage is limited (mean (median) -2 (1)) with 
74% of firms for which IBES data am available followed by no analyst at all around 
the GCM date. However, the average firm trades on 236 days out of 252 trading days 
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in the year following the GCM month and mean annualised ftding volume over the 
same period is 179%. 
TABLE 5.1 
Data Summary Statbtics 
This table presents summary statistics relating to my population of 845 non-finance, non- 
utility industry firms listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ receiving first-time going-concern 
modified audit reports between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2002. Panel A reports continuous 
financial variables and Panel B other firm clukra teristics. 
Panel A: Continuous financial variables 
Variable Mean Median St. dev. 
SIZE 33.79 12.25 133.28 
SALES 147.41 19.79 970.23 
TA 176.18 24.15 1300.78 
ROA -0.77 -0.48 0.95 Z-SCORE -1.70 -0.47 7.70 CR 1.36 0.95 1.42 
LEV 0.38 0.32 0.38 
INSID 0.15 0.10 0.15 
INSTIT 0.12 0.07 0.13 
ANAL 2.03 1.00 2.24 
PRICE 1.92 1.12 4.65 
TRVOL 179.28 86.05 291.80 
BMASK 10.7 8.5 9.2 
TRDAYS 236 252 34 
SIZE = market value measured by market capitalisation in $ million at the end of the calendar 
month of audit report publication date, SALES = sales in $ million, TA - total assets in $ 
million, ROA = return on assets (net income/total assets), Z-SCORE = financial distress z- 
score (Altman (1968)), CR = current ratio (current assets/cuffent liabilities), LEV - leverage 
proxy defined as total debt/total assets, INSID = percentage of equity held by insiders at the 
end of the calendar month of annual report publication date, INSTIT = percentage of equity 
held by institutions at the end of the audit report publication quarter, ANAL - number of 
analysts providing earnings estimates in months t= -1,0,1, where t=0 is the audit report 
publication month for firms in my population covered by IBES (n= 142), PRICE = stock price 
in S at the end of the calendar month of the audit report publication date, TRVOL - equity 
trading volume expressed as the number of shares traded in the year subsequent to the 
GCM month as a percentage of the number of shares in issue at the end of the GCM month. 
Where a firm is delisting trading activity to that date is annualised, BIDASK = month-end 
bid-ask spread as percentage of stock price averaged over the year following the GCM month 
for firms in my population with data available on CRSP (n=584), and TRDAYS - number of 
days on which trading takes place in the year (252 trading days) following the GCM month. 
Where the stock listing is suspended or cancelled the proportion of days on which the stock 
was traded prior to this date is annualised. 
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Table 5.1 cont 
Panel B: Other characteristics 
Variable Number of positive cases % of sample 
EQUITY 687 81.3 
EPS 21 2.5 
DIVID 213 25.2 
DEAD 43 5.1 
DELIST 332 39.3 
ACQU 51 6.0 
AUDITOR 637 75.4 
EQUITY = book value of equity dummy (I if positive, 0 otherwise), EPS = EPS dummy (I if 
positive EPS, 0 otherwise), DrVrD = dividend paid dummy (I if dividend paid, 0 if nominal 
or omission), DEAD = bankruptcy dummy (I if the firm enters into Chapter 7, Chapter 11, 
voluntary liquidation, or is wound up within one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise), 
DELIST = delist dummy (I if the firm is delisted due to any other reason within one year of 
the audit report date, 0 otherwise), ACQU = acquired dummy (I if the firm is acquired within 
one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise), and AUDITOR = audit quality proxy dummy 
(I if Big5/Big6,0 otherwise). 
Panel B shows that fewer than 2(r/o of my population have negative book value of 
equity. However, only 2.5% have positive earnings and just over I in 5 are paying 
dividends. Five percent enter into bankruptcy/liquidation (delisting codes: 400,572, 
574) within one year of the audit report date and a Ruther 6% are acquired. 
Interestingly, an additional 39% of my sample is delisted due to performance reasons 
(delisting codes: 550 to 585). Dichev (1998) uses performance delistings as a broader 
measure of distress. Other than bankruptcy, performance delistings include 
insufficient capital or market-makers, price too low, delinquency in filing, failure to 
meet equity requirements etc. Seventy five percent of firms are audited by large audit 
firms (Big 5/Big 6). 
53. Market Reaction to Going-concern Modified (bad news) and Going-concern 
Modified Withdrawn (good news) Audit Report Disclosures 
In this section, I conduct formal tests on my null hypotheses I and 2 repeated from 
chapter 3 below. Fama (1998) points out that many long-term anomalies tend to 
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disappeu with a reasonable change in abnormal return measurement techniques. I 
therefore employ various benchmark methods and return measurement metrics to 
check the robustness of my finclings. 33 
HI: There is no dfference in the performance of flrms that receive GCM audit 
opinions (bad news) relative to an appropriate benchmarL 
H2: There Is no difference in the performance of flrms that receive GCM 
withdrawal audit opinions (good news) rdadve to an appropriate benchmark. 
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section confims the fitct that these 
firms are going through a period of financial distress. To throw additional fight on this 
issue I examine one-year pre-event returns for both bad and good news. I expect a 
decrease (increase) in stock prices prior to the publication of bad (good) news, as it 
would confirm the distressed (improved) state of the GCM (GCM withdrawal) firm. 
Table 5.2 presents prior 12-month mean and median BHRR and BHAR results. As 
can be seen, first-time GCM firms exhibit large stock price declines in the one-year 
period prior to the release of this bad news into the public domain. In contrast, the 
subset of GCM withdrawal firms experiences a large stock price increase in the 
equivalent one-year period leading up to the publication of their subsequent non-GCM 
audit reports. Panel A shows the mean (median) BHRR results for the 12-month prior 
period for my GCM and GCM withdrawal samples to be -50% (-64%) and 102% 
(22%) respectively. All results are significant at conventional levels. A similar story is 
reflected in the more reliable BHAR results, which am adjusted for risk, presented in 
33 GCM post-event results computed using cumulative abnormal returns, matched re&rence portfolio 
approach and the four factor model are substantively similar to my main results and we presented in 
appendices 1,2 and 3. 
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panel B of the same table with mean (median) 12-month prior period BHARs for 
GCM and GCM withdrawal firms of -58% (48%) and 71% (34%). The substantial 
decline in the value of these firms leading up to their first-time going-concem opinion 
confirms the fact that they are going through a period of increased financial distress 
(bad news). On the other hand, following the abnormal stock price rise, GCM 
withdrawals, on average, can clearly be associated with good news. These results are 
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I next explore if this market anticipation of bad and good news is complete, or 
whether the market underreacts (overreacts) to first-time GCM (withdrawn OCM) 
audit report disclosures, resulting in a subsequent downward (upward) driI% implying 
incomplete market reaction to the respective news events. Panel A of table 5.3 
provides the mean and median post-going-concern opinion announcement month 
BHRRs over the following 12-month period. As can be seen, results are consistent 
Twelve-month (6-month) mean BHRRs following the GCM and GCM widWrawn 
audit opinions are -3% (-15%) and 25% (-5%). Equivalent median results are -33% 
(40%) and -2(YYo (-20%). All the results for my GCM sample (bad news) are 
significant at better than 1% levels, save the 12-month mean results. 34 Whereas, 
neither mean result is significant for my GCM withdrawal sample (good news). 
However, the median results are both significant at better than the I No level. As such, 
the results for the GCM withdrawal sample are difficult to interpret on this raw return 
basis. 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns, presented in panel B of the same table, portray a 
similar story to my GCM results in the bad news case. Twelve-month mean (median) 
results are -16% (-17%), significant at conventional levels. 
35 However, when I risk 
adjust my GCM withdrawal firms using control firm BHARs, none of the mean or 
median results are distinguishable from zero; there is no evidence of any market 
mispricing over the following 12 months or for any sub-period. after the withdrawn 
34 Market 12-month (6-month) BHRRs on the equivalent market index-based portfolio (employing the 
S&P 600 Small Cap. Index) are 8% (-0.5%) with median results 11% (2%); only the 12-month results 
are significant. However, the 12-month trend shows that the market, on average, is rising during my 
study period and it is hard to imagine any asset pricing model suggesting negative returns in up 
markets. 
35 An alternative treatment to reinvesting the notional proceeds from selling delisted stocks in do 
market index is to use the monthly returns of the continuing listed GCM firm sample. Twelve-month 
mean (median) BHARs on this basis are unaffected. 
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GCM audit report. These results may not be surprising given these returns are 
conditional on the fims in question surviving for a full year post-GCM. Nonetheless, 
the above results highlight two key findings. First, there am no significant abnormal 
returns following GCM withdrawals (the good news case). Second, first-time GCM 
audit report disclosures (the bad news case) are followed by substantial negative 
abnormal returns; market reaction to bad news is incomplete and this drift persists for 
up to one year after the audit report announcement. 
Figures 5.1 and figure 5.2 graph the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 25 
months pre- and post-going-concern opinion announcement events for both my GCM 
(bad news) and GCM withdrawal (good news) Ems separately, for illustrative 
purposes. Figure 5.1 highlights incomplete market anticipation of bad news, resulting 
in a post-event announcement month drift, whereas, figure 5.2 demonstrates that the 
market anticipates good news fully with no significant market reaction following the 
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Due to problems of extreme skewness in longer horizon studies (e. g. Fama, 1999), 
which can be very acute in the cue of small firms (Ball, Kothari and Shanken, 1995), 
1 also report sign test results in table 5.3. Ang and Zhang (2004), in their large 
simulation study, find that single matching firm benchmarks employed togedwr with 
the simple Fisher sip test produce some of their most robust results. Importandy, 
they demonstrate this is the only test without significant loss of power in the case of 
small firms. As can be seen, these results also corroborate the evidence presented 
above. 
The results of this sub-section show that there is no apparent abnormal market 
reaction in the 12-month period following the GCM withdrawal announcement event. 
11iis means that the market is efficient in dealing with this positive news event. On the 
other hand, the market underreacts to the bad news event i. e., issuance of the GCM 
audit report, resulting in a subsequent downward drift after the announcement of 
GCM audit reporL Overall, my findings are clearly inconsistent with the market 
efficiency paradigm. It is difficult to think of any theoretical reason which supports 
the notion of firms straying away from their fundamental values in the case of bad 
news which is already in the public domain, for such an extended time period, 
whereas there is no abnormal response to good news. Based on my results, I thus 
conclude that the market responds asymmetrically to good and bad news in the 
financial distress domain, good news is anticipated completely while bad W" is not. 
Thew results strongly reject the null hypothesis HI, whereas, null hypothesis IH2 
cannot be rejected. 
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5.4. Do GCM Withdrawal Firm Characteristics Differ? 
Table 5.2 shows how good news, as represented by subsequent going-concern opinion 
lifting, is fully anticipated with such firms experiencing a steady increase in their 
stock price right from the initial GCM announcement month until the publication of 
their next audit report. 36 However, returns for the non-withdrawal can continue to 
decline over the same period. Removing the 122 GCM withdrawal firms from my fiiu 
GCM sample, I find that the 12-month mean (median) post-GCM announcement 
month BHARs for the remaining 723 non-GCM lifting firms are -34% (-22%) in 
contrast to - 16% (47%) for the full Sample. 
37 Ibis clearly shows that the two subsets 
have very different subsequent return patterns following the publication of the GCM 
audit report. Is it possible to distinguish futwe GCM withdrawal cases from non- 
withdrawals at the time of the first-time GCM audit report publication? 
To answer this question, I first look at the 12-month BHARs prior to GCM audit 
report issuance for the two groups separately and then, additionally, conduct a 
multivariate analysis in the forra of a binary logistic regression model. Prior 12-month 
(t-12 to W) mean (median) BHARs for the GCM non-withdrawal sample (n-723) are 
-59% (48%) and for the GCM withdrawal sample (n-122) are -500/9 (45%). Neither 
difference is significant at any conventional level, suggesting similar prior return 
patterns across the two sub-samples. Next, I run the logistic regression model 
equation (5), presented and discussed in chapter 4, to ex ante predict subsequent GCM 
withdrawals from the GCM sample. T"he results are presented in table 5.4. 
36 Month zero mean (median) abnormal returns for the OCM non-withdrawal (n-723) and GCM 
withdrawal firms (n=122) are -5% (-8%) and 10% (4%) respectively, all significant at 
bow than the 
1% level. Mean (median) differences are also significant at the same level. 
" These cases include those firms delisted (n-426) as well as those still listed (n-297) but whh a 
continuing GCM audit report in their following year 10-Ks. 
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TABLE5.4 
Multivariate Analysis of the Characteristics Distinguishing GCM Withdrawal and GCM 
Non-withdrawal Cases 
This table presents the results of a multivariate analysis comparing the characteristics of the 
122 firms in my population of 845 non-finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ which published a going-concern audit report (GC) for the first time 
between 01.01.94 and 31.12.2002 at the time of their GC announcement, and which had this 
lifted in their next year's 10-Ks (GC withdrawal cases), and the remaining 723 firnis (GC 
non-withdrawal cases). Panel A provides the results of running the following binary logistic 
regression model where the dependent variable GCW=1 when GC firm i has its going. 
concern audit report withdrawn, and 0 otherwise: Pr(GCWj = 1) = e" /(I + e'd), where Z,. - AO + 
AIAR01 + A2 ROA, + A3CRI + A4LEVj + A. 5DIVIDj + 14Z-SCOREj + A7LN(SIZE), + 4BM, + 
A9MOM, + AloSUE, + AIIAUDITOR, + up Panel B provides the classification matrix using a 
probability cut-off of 0.15 representing the approximate ex post probability of a subsequent 
going-concern lifting case (122/845). 
Panel A@ B*n= logistic lei WjAwis 
Independent variable Expected sign Coefficient Wald p-value 
Intercept -2.582 42.329 . 000 
ARO + . 524 
6.933 . 008 
ROA + . 140 . 434 . 510 
CR + -. 071 . 598 . 439 
LEV . 137 . 110 . 741 
DIVID + . 007 . 001 . 978 
Z-SCORE + . 029 1.010 . 315 
LN(SIZE) + . 376 19.183 . 000 
BM -. 045 . 774 . 379 
mom + -1.536 1.304 . 253 
SUE + . 073 
1.219 . 270 
AUDITOR ? -. 001 . 000 . 998 
Model)? (d. f, -I I)= 38.64 with p- 0.000 
ARO = GC month abnormal return, ROA = return on assets (net income/total assets), CR 
current ratio (current assets/current liabilities), LEV = leverage proxy defined as total 
debt/total assets, DIVID = dividend paid dummy (I if dividend paid, 0 if nominal or 
omission), Z-SCORE = financial distress z-score (Altman (1968)), LN(SIZE) - natural log of 
market value measured by market capitalisation in S million at the end of the calendar month 
of audit report publication date, BM = book value of assets divided by market capitalisation at 
the end of the calendar month of audit report publication date, MOM - monthly average of 
prior II months (t-12 to t-2) raw returns, SUE = standardised unexpected earnings for the last 
quarter of the fiscal year to which the going-concern opinion relates, AUDITOR = audit 
quality proxy dummy (I if Big5/Big6,0 otherwise), A0 .... 
X11 am the regression paramew 
estimates and 14 is a mean zero stochastic effor tem. 
Panel B: Classification table 
Observed Predicted 
GCM GCM % correct 
N Withdrawal non-withdrawal chissification 
GCM withdrawal 122 7 65 57 53.3 
GCM non-withdrawal M 239 494 
1 
0.2 
Overall 845 65.0 
III 
Panel A of table 5.4 shows the logistic regression model to be highly significant on a 
statistical basis (Wald e- 38.6, p-value = 0.000) although only size (LN(SIZE)) and 
GCM month abnormal returns (ARO) differ significantly between the GCM non- 
withdrawal and GCM withdrawal firMS. 38 However, panel B shows that the model has 
poor predictive ability with an overall correct classification rate of only 65%. As such, 
it is not possible to distinguish meaningfully between the two groups on this basit 
Overall the results of my two sets of analyses suggest that the characteristics of GCM 
withdrawal firms are not reliably different to non-withdrawal cases at the initial GCM 
stap. 
S. S. Tests of the Behavioural Finance Models 
In this section, I try to relate the empirical evidence, presented in tables 52 wW 53 
above, to the three behavioural finance models of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1999), and Hong and Stein (1999) 
and test the null hypotheses 3,4, and 5 presented below. TU idea is to we how the 
behavioural finance models perform. Chan, Frankel and Kothad (2004) point out that 
assessing the predictive ability of behavioural hypotheses using new data or events is 
important and my U. S. GCM sample provides an ideal opportunity fbr such tem. 
H3 (BSF9: Iffespeedw of the nature of the new, samipk flrxw w&k a posA*v 
(negadve) skock prior to Me eventfoffowed by another PwMW (Rega") skock (on 
Me announcement date) skould not undeffead to xM Wormadba and X0 
underperformance skould be observed In Me PM announcement period 
" The correlation coefficient between GCM firm month zero abnormal returns and post-(Kw 12. 
month BHARs for all firms is only -0.02, not significantly different to zero at any conventional Imis. 
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H4 (DHS): If overconfldent Investors observe a non-sekcdw event then ftrim wid 
positive (negadve) pre-event returns should not underread to announcementperiod 
negadve (posidme) new and should not underperform In the post-eventperiod 
H5 (HS): Even Jfprivate Information dffuses gradually among newwarchers and 
sample jb7m exhibit underreaction prior to the event being released In the public 
domain then these flrms should not underread In the short-run after tke 
announcement and momentum-traders should not be able to cause longer-run 
overreaction. 
If these behavioural finance models correctly describe investor behaviour and any of 
the alternatives of the above hypotheses hold, I would expect the pattern of pre- and 
post-GCM announcement abnormal returns as presented in tables 5.2 and 5.3 to be in 
line with the prediction of these models. The primary criticism of these three models 
is that they do not condition abnormal price behaviour on the nature of the news and 
therefore do not predict differential response to good and bad news which is exactly 
what I find in my data. However, if we only look at the bad news case then BSV's and 
HS's models perform relatively better than DHS. DHS predicts a positive (negative) 
price rtm up before a bad (good) news event followed by underreation which is 
refirted by my data. DHS model's key to the drift after an event results Oom the 
combination of underreaction (due to overconfidence of private information and 
biased self-attribution of public signals) and event selection based on market 
mispticing. So hypothesis 4 is not at all supported by the data. 
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BSV's model (hypothesis 3) predicts firms with a positive (negative) shock prior to 
the event followed by another positive (negative) shock (on the announcement date) 
should underreact to new information and continue to in the post 
announcement period. The problem with this hypothesis is an appropriate measure of 
prior shock. BSV developed this specific version of their model to capture post- 
earnings announcement drifL So if one chooses earnings as a criterion for shocks then 
it has to be consistent across two time periods, the announcement date shock and 
shock on a date prior to the announcement date. Applying this to the going-concern 
framework, a GCM audit report followed by another GCM audit report could be one 
possible test of their model. By implication this means that their model does not 
predict underreaction if prior period shock is not consistent with event date/month 
shock, which is what my GCM sample constitutes ot a clean report followed by a 
modified report. More consistent is the explanation of Griffin and Tversky (1992) 
ftmework adopted by BSV (1998) which predicts underreaction because investors 
am unimpressed by the low strength of the signal (publication of the GCM audit 
report) and react mildly to the evidence, even though its weight (in this financial 
distress context) calls for a larger reaction. An analogy of Griffin and Tversky's 
example of a recommendation letter was previously related to the auditor report. A 
modified report will represent the strength of the auditor's statement while how 
credible the auditor is would be its weight. Therefore, one possible explanation could 
be that investors react mildly to the strength of the audit report i. e. a modified audit 
report because they have doubts about the credibility of the auditor. 
Now turning towards the HS (1999) model (hypothesis 5). which predicts a gradual 
diffusion of private information. My pre-event results gencrallY support their 
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argument because we see a gradual anticipation of news before the event daft. Hong, 
Lim and Stein (2000), in the case of momentum, report re4nilts which an supportive 
of the HS (1999) model. Ilicy ape that negative firm-specific information diffuses 
only gradually across the investing public particularly in the case of small poorly 
followed firms, which applies in my cue, as managers have less incentive to bring 
investors up to date quickly. 7beir argument was based on explaining the caw of 
momentum for losers firms. However, this explanation is doubtful in my OCM firm 
context because the news (publication of the GCM audit report) is disclosed in the 
public domain and investors' inability to assimilate public domain negative 
information maintains for a subsequent period of a whole year. 71kis argument does 
question the applicability of the HS (1999) model to the longer horizon event study 
fismework in the case of the underreaction anomaly. 
My empirical evidence presented above, a also demonstrated by other studick is 
clearly inconsistent with all three theoretical behavioural finance models. To sum up, 
these models only fit (theoretically) the anomalies they wen designed to explain 
(Fama, 1998) and generally fall short in the flice of now empirical evidence in an out- 
of-sample context. 
5.6. Summary 
A number of studies suggest that the stock price reaction to various news events is 
often incomplete. Generally, these studies find that the market underreacts to now 
resulting in a post-event drift lasting for several months. Most of these studies " 
demonstrate that the market underreaction phenomenon is more pronounced to bad 
news situations (see chapter 2). However, Fama (1998) argues that the market 
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undenvaction to certain news events is due to chance. I demonstrate, however, fliat if 
we have an event where the distinction between bad and good news is very clear, by 
using such an event we can offer an appropriate test for the market underreaction 
phenomenon. 
I'his chapter examines the market underreaction hypodiesis using the going-concern 
audit report disclosure event which is a key output of the accounting system. JU 
auditor's going-concern opinion in his/ber audit report is of particular importance 
because it is a mandatory, independent and direct public-domain signal of firm 
financial distress. As part of the audit procedure for all publicly-listed fam, the 
auditor is required to assess the going-concern viability of the entity and communicate 
his/her assessment in the audit opinion which accompanies the financial statements. It 
thus constitutes a unique and an unambiguous extreme bad news event. Such a 
disclosure casts doubt over the ability of the firm to continue to operate in its present 
form in the medium-term, highlighting an increased risk of bankruptcy. Similarly, the 
opposite is true when such an opinion is lifted by the auditor (going-concern 
wi*Admwal) in a subsequent audit report. T'herefore, going-concern opinions offer a 
clean test for studying medium-term market reaction to such bad and good news 
disclosures, providing important empirical evidence on the market undetTeaction 
phenomenon conditional on the nature of the news. 
I study 12-month pre- and post-event monthly returns following the publication of the 
GCM audit report (bad news) and its withdrawal (good news) in their 10-Ks by firms 
traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ. In particular, I investigate whether the 
market fidly impounds all the price relevant information by or around the information 
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release date or whether it subsequently underreacts (ovenvwts) to the bad (good) 
news event My results show that GCM opinion (GCM withdrawal) firms' stocks 
experience a substantial decline (rise) in the 12-months prior to the GCM 
announcement month. Mean (median) buy-and-hold abnormal returns for GCM 
opinions and GCM withdrawn opinions for the prior 12-month period am -59% (- 
48%) and 71% (34%). In the 12-months subsequent to the GCM month, when such 
information is released into the public domain, I find that my OCM mean (median) 
sample firm underperforms by -16% (-17%), whereas, a year later, firms that have 
their GCM withdrawn experience no significant further market reaction. These results 
suggest that the market fiffly anticipates good news while underrmcts to bad news, 
resulting in a subsequent downward drift over the one-year penod following the 
going-concern opinion. These latter findings are anomalous as they conUadict the 
traditional market efficiency paradigm. 
I also test the three behavioural finance models of BSV (1999), DHS (1999) and HS 
(1999). The results of my empirical tests do not support then models. Although, thew 
models pick and choose two cognitive biases or rely on two sets of traders to generate 
market behaviour in line with the anomalous empirical evidence prevalent at the time 
these models were developed, they fail to recognise die different potential 
implications of good new and bad news events. Dichev mid Piotroski (2001) point out 
that a potential research question that emerges is whether the abnormal returns on the 
"downside" are more extreme because there are different information implications of 
good versus bad news, and investors fail to recognise this fact. The empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter addresses this question and finds that returns on the 
downside are in fact more extreme because of the different implications of bad news 
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and good news. ne downside risk in the case of my GCM sample firms is a very high 
risk of potential bankruptcy and that is what I find in my sample. Over 44% of my 
first-time GCM firms either file for bankruptcy or are delisted due to performance 
reasons, providing evidence consistent with their proposition. In fkct between 1994 
and 2002,14.7% of non-finance industry, non-utility firms listed on the NYSF, 
AMEX or NASDAQ with first-time going-concern opinions entered into bankruptcy 
proceedings in the following year. This compares with a population base rate of 1.6% 
(difference p-value - 0.000). 
Additionally, my results support those short-term event studies suggesting that the 
going-concern opinion event itself is valuable to investors because it conveys 
information which affects stockholder wealth. My results also have clear public policy 
lications since I have shown that despite clear messages being conveyed by 
auditors to investors, their information is not being fully impounded by the market on 
a timely basis leading to trades taking place at prices apparently inconsistent with fair 
value. 
This first empirical chapter confirms the market underreaction hypothesis and shows 
that the market response is more pronounced to bad news (publication of GCM audit 
report) than good news (publication of GCM withdrawn audit report) and reveals the 
inability of the market to deal with this pessimistic information on a timely basis as 
opposed to good news. In chapter 6,1 conduct additional tests to seek other possible 
explanations for investor underreaction to bad news phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 6 
IS THE POST-GCM DRIFT DISTINCT FROM EXISTING 
EXPLANATIONS? 
6.1. Introduction 
The last chapter demonstrates that the market undeffeacts to bad news disclosures, 
whereas good news is assimilated in a timely manner into stock prices. I conduct a 
range of additional tests to see if the post-going-concern modified audit report 
announcement drift in stock returns is due to alternative explanations already 
documented in the literature. I do not examine GCM withdrawals further as their 
market reaction is consistent with the market efficiency paradigm. In the bad nm 
case, it is possible that the anomalous response by firms to the GCM announcement 
event could be due to a "correlated omitted variable", or a missing risk factor. in this 
chapter, I explicitly test for other possible explanations already documented in the 
literature. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 tests hypotheses 6 to II presented in 
chapter 3. These hypotheses am designed to tea for earnings surprise. i, 
momentum, distress risk, low price stocks, and industry. Section 3 presan the 
summary and discusses the results. 
6.2 Test of Hypotheses 
In this chapter I conduct formal tests of hypotheses 6 to II discussed in chapter 3. 
These hypotheses, as mentioned above, are desiped to test fbr other explanations of 
the market underreaction phenomenon documented in the previous chapter. 
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6.11 Earnings surprise and she post-GCM drift 
It is quite possible that the post-GCM drift merely proxies for earnings surprise, since 
most GCM firms in my sample also experience contemporaneous negative 
surprises. Bernard and Thomas (1989,1990) document that extrme negative 
changes are followed by abnormally low returns. Therefore, it is important to 
investigate the possibility of a post-earnings announcement drift effect in my results. I 
thus test the following null hypotheses: 
H6a. - Tkere b no difference In Me returns of GCMflrjm witk posftive eaminp 
ckange and negadve earnings ckanga 
H6b. - There Is no dWerence in the returns of GCMflrim and non-GCMflrm wid 
shnflar earnings change. 
I attempt to distinguish between the two drifts (post-GCM announcement and post- 
comings announcement) in two ways. Following Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 1 split 
my sample based on the sip of the quarterly earnings change (comings surprise). I 
then separately match my sample firms on a one-to-one basis with firms with die 
same size and similar comings surprise element but with no audit going-concern 
modification. Firstly, for each calendar year during my sample period fiom 1994- 
2002 inclusive, I identify the population of non-financial, non-utility NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ firms with quarterly earnings figures, excluding all firms with GCMs 
from the data used in the control firm approach analysis outlined in section 11 above. I 
then identify all firms with a market value of equity of between 701/6 and 1309/6 of the 
market value of equity of the sample firm at the end of the GCM month; from this set 
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of firms I choose the firm with the closest earnings change to the sample firms 
quarterly earnings change. A non-GCM firm is only excludedfirom, the population in a 
particular quarter if it does not have an earnings change ratio in that quarter. I assume 
a two-month accounting lag for firms with missing quarterly announcement datm in 
the COWUSTAT file. 
In this way I am able to separate out the post-GCM abnormal return after controlling 
for any post-earnings change drift effects, since the matched firms have the same 
earnings changes as the sample firms but without a GCM audit report. The abnormal 
return of the sample firm in each case is calculated as the buy-and-hold raw return of 
the sample firm minus the buy-and-hold raw return of the matched firm. 
Following existing post-earnings-announcement drift research (e. g., Foster, Oben, 
and Shevlin, 1984 and Bernard and IMomas, 1989,1990), 1 define quarterly earnings 
change as income before extraordinary items (COWUSTAT item 9) less income 
from the same quarter in the previous year. More specifically, earnings change 
(surprise) is defined as current quarterly earnings (quarter q) - last year's same 
quarter earnings (quarter q-4) i. e. ANý - NIq - NI,. 4. The denominator is the absolute 
value of firm's current quarterly earnings figure R-141.39 
In the first part of my analysis I investigate if them is any difference in abnormal 
returns between firms with positive earnings surprise and negative earnings surprise 
among my GCM sample. I use the abnormal returns derived from the size and book. 
to-market matched control firms procedure and split the sample conditional on the 
" This definition of unexpected earnings is the same as in model I of FOSW, OWN NW Shaviin (1994) 
and is conventionally known as standardised unexpected earnings (SUE). 
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sip of the earnings surprise ratio. I find that the drift is limited to negative earnings 
surprise fmns. Table 6.1 presents these results. 
TABLE 6.1 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Month Buy-and- 
hold Abnormal Returns Conditional on Sign of Quarterly Eamings Change Surprise 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 845 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 01.01.1994 
and 31.12.2002 conditional on the sign of the quarterly earnings change ratio. Returns earned 
by delisted firms are represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. 
Index. The 12-month period reported commences on the first day of the month immediately 
following the going-concern modified audit report release month. This table provides mean 
and median BHARs derived from matching each GCM firm with a 'clean' control firm of 
same size and book-to-market. The GCM sample is further split based on its earnings change 
sign as at the most recent quarter prior to the publication of the GCM audit report. Quarterly 
earnings change is defined as income before extraordinary items (COMPUSTAT Item 8) less 
income from the previous year in the same quarter expressed as a percentage of the absolute 
value of current quarterly earnings, conventionally known as standardised unexpected 
earnings (SUE). 
Each GCM firm in my population is matched with that non-financial, non-utility, non-GCM 
firm with most similar size and book-to-market ratios. Specifically, all non-financial, non- 
utility firms without GCM audit reports listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ are first 
identified with a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. 
Ile control firm is then selected as that firm with book-to-market ratio closest to that of the 
sample firm. 
Negative earnings surprise 
GCM firms (n=595) 
Positive earnings surprise 
GCM finrns; (n=250) Differ.. 
6-month 12-month 6-month 12-month 6-month 12-month 
Mean BHAR -0.21 -0.26 0.04 
0.07 -0.24 -0.32 
-value 4.65 -3.52 0.58 
0.54 -3.05 -2.35 
Median BHAR -0.21 -0.22 -0.04 -0.04 . 
0.17 -0.18 
Wilcoxon z-value -6.10 -5.89 -0.47 -0.02 
Sign test z-value -6.81 -5.25 -0.57 -0.44 
Mann-Whitney Z -2. " -3.33 
As can be seen, the 12-month mean (median) abnormal returns for my GCM sample 
with negative earnings surprise are -260/c (-22%) and equivalent abnormal returns at 
the 6-month stage are -21% (-2 1 %), all significant at better than the I% level. On the 
odier hand, 12-month mean (median) abnormal returns for positive earnings surprise 
firms are 7% (-4%) with the equivalent statistics at the 6-month stage 4% (-4, Yo), none 
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being distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. The differences between group 
statistics are also significant at conventional levels for both the 6-month and 12-month 
stage. These results suggest that there is no evidence of market underreaction for 
GCM firms with positive earnings surprise ratio and the null hypothesis H6a is 
re'ected. This means that earnings expectations play an important role and the going- 
concern opinion only has an adverse impact on market prices if the GCM firm also 
has a negative earnings surprise ratio. 
From the above results, it is not clear whether the GCM drift is distinct from the 
post-eamings announcement drift as negative earnings changes are also followed 
by low abnormal returns (Bernard and Thomas, 1999,1990). 1 make a further 
attempt to control for any potential post-earnings announcement drift in my OCM 
sample by using the second approach mentioned above. These new analyses show 
that my GCM sample firms still exhibit strong post-GCM abnormal return drift. 40 
Table 6.2 provides the quarterly earnings change ratio results. Twelve-month (6- 
month) mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns are -17% (-90/6) and 12-month (6- 
month) median buy-and-hold abnormal returns are -16% (-1 No). All are significam 
at the 1% level, or better, as are the simple Fisher sip-test results reported in the 
penultimate column of the table. Based on these results I reject the null hypothesis 
H6b. 
40 Mean (median) sample and control firm quarterly earnings change (SUE) ratios am -11% (. so%) and 








'r= g-E mý 
li-, 4) 
, 0. e =7., --ý, 8 . -, re 20 











0 c: 0 
0 r- Z -5 00 c 0 wrý. 
. b- vl ic- ,= 4) .2P4 *C oe -5 : 0: Co in Z. 4, 
w0b: @ i 
.A-Z r- ý-. 0 cw 0 C-0 *B q eý 
, ull 83 um 282EXZ, 
c , 0 
40p0g O> r cw 
c2 ei tr. v ., 0 
2 t -: s E .2 Lý 0" g -0 =J, i 1e ge E! E ýä > Eý0 x03-, 0 , r= 0 y 





r. Um Z) 
50 
cy < M. S 
> 
ý Z< 1 r: c22.1 
bo 8 
i 1. U -0e: CY 2 









>, 2) =j 
,99 
-'s', ýZ2 c 440- cr cd v 4) r_ 0 ým :0 
fj Gn 8, 
tz 0 *; 0 Z 
L's A U0 
-B Zs 12 ý e- X, MA J-- < 
rA -0. S 'ö ý- 4, e51cr., 0,2, 
Je 'T Z 
Er 
,eJ ýa f 8 cn- .5Z. 5 U0 -5 -E «s äg m, -ý 18 
,0r. u tr. . - 
oj 
se 
cc VON I 
s Or! %on, 
nRq 15 zle 
:j. ý: z 
I 
41; ý 
C4 0 eq en 
i7) 
14 
C-4 8 -W tý p C-4 ;s so aa ;ýt, 
cr SR . 







Cý Cý Cý Cý Cý Cý Cý 4q gq Cý o u 1-0 . W, It, Ia9p8 0', en CR IR ..... Wi N. C4. N. C. 4 C? C on Cý r In C. 4 
ý98m t- tý s$- en en 00 %D t- 




I conclude that my post-GCM drift documented in the previous chapter is not 
contaminated by any potential post-earnings announcement drift effect. Interestingly, 
the GCM underreaction effect is limited to negative earnings surprise firms only. Ibis 
indicates that the adverse GCM signal is somewhat mitigated when accompanied by a 
positive earnings surprise element. I speculate this behaviour is consistent with the 
market focusing on the earning surprise element rather more than the GCM per se. 
However, in terms of subsequent one-year poformance delisting status, the 
percentage of positive and negative earnings change GCM firms does not differ 
significantly (37% v 47%). 41.42 So, apparently, market mispricing is concentrated in 
GCM firms with negative earnings change, even though the two categories have more 
or less similar subsequent failure profiles. 
6.22 Fkm ske and Me past-GCM drift 
no mean market capitalisation of my GCM firms as shown in Table 5.1 is $33.8 
million, with median of only $12.3 million, highlighting the high degree of skewness 
in my firm size distribution. As such, it is not meaningfid to conduct value-weighted 
analysis as suggested by Farna (1998). Furthermore, existing research demonswes 
that abnormal returns are stronger for smaller firms (e. g., Bernard and Thomas (1989), 
Fama (1998)). 1, therefore, test the following null hypothesis: 
H7. - Tkere Is no dWerence ix the retAwns of GCMfirm of smaflm size exd 
Mktiwjy largefirm S" 
41 Mean (median) delisting returns fbr positive earninp surprise and negative earninp surprise GcM 
firms are -28% (-27%) and -32% (-34%), neither difference is sipificant at any conventional levels. 42 The standardised unexpected earnings (SUE) GCM firm decile distribution shows that my lack of 
ability to find negative abnormal returns in the case of GCM firms with positive earnings surprise is 
mainly due to the 119 firms that are in deciles 9 and 10. However, there is little difference in die 
subsequent failure profiles of these firms with a delisting rate of 37% and actual mom (median) 
delisting returns of -27% (-29%). 
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To test the sensitivity of my results to firm size I split my 845 cases into two 
portfolios based on market capitalisation below or above the median and then 
compare their abnormal returns. 43 GCM firms with market capitalisation below the 
median are classified as my small size portfolio (n=423) and GCM firms with market 
capitalisation above the median form my large size portfolio (n-422). Small portfolio 
mean (median) market capitalisation is $6.0 million ($5.6 million) compared with 
large firm portfolio mean (median) market capitalisation of $61.7 million ($29.4 
million). Table 6.3 presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns derived using a control 
firm benchmark for my two size portfolios separately, together with their differences. 
TABLE 6.3 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Month 
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns Conditional on Firm Size 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 845 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.0 1.1994 
and 31.12.2002. The table provides results separately for the portfolio of 423 firms with 
market capitalisation at the end of the audit report publication month below the population 
median ($12.25 million) and the parallel portfolio made up of the 422 firms with market 
capitalisation above the population median. Mean and median portfolio results are provided 
separately for the 6-month and 12-month periods commencing on the first day of the month 
immediately following the going-concern modified audit report release month. This table 
provides mean and median BHARs using a control firm benchmark for the two size based 
portfolios separately together with their differences. Control firms are selected as described in 
table 5.2. 
Small size (n-423) 
6-month 12-month 




Mean BHAR -0.14 -0.22 -0.13 -0.11 
0.01 0.11 
t-value -2.34 -2.43 -3.07 -1.24 
0.15 0.85 
Median BHAR -0.13 -0.16 -0.18 -0.18 
0.05 0.02 
Wilcoxon z-value -3.32 -3.17 4.35 -3.91 




43 Division of groups based on NYSE decile breakpoints as is conventionally done is not q)prWlw in 
my case as over 94% of my sample falls in the bottom NYSE size docile. 
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Twelve-month (6-month) mean BHARs for the below median size portfolio are 
-22% (44%) and for the above median size portfolio -11% (43%). Three of 
these four results differ significantly to zero at the 5% level or better. However, them 
is no significant difference in either the 12-month or the 6-month mean BHARs 
between the two size portfolios at conventional levels. Equivalent median BHAR 12- 
month (6-month) results for the below median portfolio are -16% (43%) and for the 
above median portfolio - 18% (- 19%) with all percentages significant at the 5% level 
or better. Mann-%itney test results similarly indicate no significant differences in the 
respective portfolio medians at conventional levels. 44 On this basis, then, the null 
hypothesis H7 cannot be rejected and I have no evidence consistent with market 
mispricing being more concentrated among the smaller firms in my GCM population. 
6.23. Financial diaras m; planadon of tkepost-GCM dr&? 
Table 5.1 demonstrates ffie, acutely financially distressed characteristics of my 945 
GCM firms. Dichev (1998) and (hiffin and Lemmon (2002) show that highly 
distressed firms underperform the less distressed ones. To test whether my 
underreaction to GCM disclosures can be explained by a financial distren factor I test 
the following null hypotheses: 
Ms. - Tkere Is no difference In Me returns of lessflnanckUy dk&med GCMjbm 
and highlyfinanciaMy db*wsed GCMflrmL 
" IMat the coffelation coefficients between firm size and 12-month (6-month) BHARa of 0.05 (O. w), 
we effectively zero, fialher coffobomte my findings. 
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H8b: There is no difference in the returns of GCMfirms and non-GCMflrms wA* 
Avdiarfmancial distress levels. 
I essentially follow the same procedures described above to test null hypotheses ga 
and 8b. That is, first I split my sample firms into a high distress risk portfolio (z-score 
<1.8) and a low distress risk portfolio (z-scom>1.8) to see if their abnormal returns 
differ. I use Altman (1969) z-score model for calculating a fumcial distress risk 
measure. T"he cut-off of 1.8 which I use is also based on Altman's (1968) criteria of 
distinguishing firms into varying degrees of probability of failure. Firms with a z- 
score of less than 1.8 have a very high probability of failure. 45 IbM in a Separate 
analysis, I match each of my GCM firms with a non-GCM non-finance, non-utifity 
control firm on size and z-score and compare subsequent returns. Results am 
presented in tables 6.4 and 6.5. 
45 Begley, Ming, and Watts (1997) suggest that a z-score cut-off of 1.8 might not be very meaningful, 
so I rerun my analysis using the median z-score of -0.47 to define high and low distress risk groups. 
The results are qualitatively no different to those reported above. The negligible correlation coefficients 
between z-score and 12-month (6-month) BHARs of -. 05 (-. 02), additionally reinforce the absence of a 
financial distress risk explanation for my findings. 
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TABLE 6.4 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Mouth 
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns Conditional on distress risk 
17his table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 845 non. 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.0 1.1994 
and 31.12.2002. The table provides results separately for the portfolio of 712 firms with z- 
scores below 1.8 and the parallel portfolio made up of the 133 firms with z-scores above I. S. 
Z-scores are derived from information published concurrently with the GCM audit report in 
the 10-K. Mean and median portfolio results are provided separately for the 6-month and 12- 
month periods commencing on the first day of the month immediately following the going. 
concern modified audit report release month. T'his table provides mean and median BHARs 
using a control firm benchmark for the two z-score based portfolios separately together with 
their differences. Control firms are selected as described in table 4.2. 
High distress risk 
(z < 1.8) (n=712) 
6-month 12-month 
Low distress risk 




Mean BHAR -0.10 -0.14 -0.30 -0.32 0.20 0.18 
t-value -2.45 -1.90 -4.50 -2.67 2.03 1.05 
Median BHAR -0.13 -0.16 -0.31 -0.22 0.18 0.06 
Wilcoxon z-value -3.92 -3.93 -4.59 -3.54 
Sign test z-value -4.61 -3.71 -4.51 . 3.12 
Mann-Whitney Z 2.7 1.38 
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TABLE 6.5 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Month Buy-and- 
hold Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Distress Risk Effects 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of $45 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.01.1994 
and 31.12.2002 adjusted for distress risk effects. Returns earned by delisted firms are 
represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index. The 12- 
month period reported commences on the first day of the month immediately following the 
going-concern modified audit report release month. This table provides mean and median 
BHARs derived from matching each GCM firm with a 'clean' control firm of same size and 
closest z-score. 
The table is derived on the following basis. Each GCM firm in my population is matched with 
that non-financial, non-utility, non-GCM firm with most similar size and z-score. 
Specifically, all non-financial, non-utility firms without GCM audit reports listed on the 
NTYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ are first identified with a market value of equity between 7(yyo 
and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that flunin with z- 
score closest to that of the sample firm. 
Month Mean BRAR t-value Median BHAR Wilcoxon z-value Sign test z-value 
1 -0.08 -3.54 -0.08 -4.84 -4.95 
2 -0.12 -5.05 -0.13 -6.75 -6.88 
3 -0.16 -4.71 -0.16 -7.23 -7.91 
4 -0.16 -4.85 -0.18 -7.51 -7.94 
5 -0.20 -5.22 -0.21 -7.82 -9.19 
6 -0.18 -5.05 -0.20 -7.56 -6.54 
7 -0.25 -5.31 -0.24 -8.09 -7.02 
8 -0.25 -5.90 -0.21 -7.62 -6.81 
9 -0.28 -5.64 -0.22 -7.68 -7.77 
10 -0.33 -5.73 -0.23 -7.81 -7.09 
11 -0.39 -5.66 -0.22 -7.65 -6.40 
12 -0.36 -5.17 -0.20 -7.35 -6.19 
To test null hypothesis 8a I investigate any abnormal return difference between my 
high distress risk portfolio and low distress risk portfolio. Table 6.4 shows that 
negative abnormal returns on my high distress risk and low distress risk portfolios are 
not very different In fact, the latter portfolio (n-133) appears to perform worse than 
the former (n=712) with 12-month mean (median) BHARs of -31% (-22%) compared 
with -14% (-160/6) but their differences are not significant Based on these results I 
cannot reject null hypothesis Hga. To test null hypothesis 8b, I use the control firm 
approach mentioned above. Table 6.5 shows mean (median) 12-month BHARs are 
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-36% (-20%), both highly significant at conventional levels, leading me to reject the 
null hypothesis H8b. These findings suggest that my post-GCM drift does not have a 
financial distrm risk explanation. 
6.2 4. Momentum and the post-GCM drift 
Figure 5.1 provides some evidence on a lace value basis consistent with the argument 
that all we are experiencing is continuation of negative returns as with Jegadeesh and 
Titinan (1993,2001). To test whether momentum is driving my results, I again adopt 
the same methodology as above and test the following two null hypotheses: 
H9a: There is no difference in the returns of low momentum GCMflnm and high 
momentum GCMflrmL 
H9b: There b no difference In the returns of GCMJ? rm and non-GCMflrnu with 
similar price momentum 
To test null hypothesis H9a I first split my sample into two portfolios based on prior 
positive (>O) and negative (<O) momentum and then investigate if abnormal returns 
differ. Momentum is defined as the monthly average of the prior I I-months (t-. 12, 
t--2) raw returns. To test my null hypothesis H9b I separately match each GCM firm 
on size and momentum with a non-GCM, non-finance, non-utility control firm from 
the firms employed in the original control firm analysis in section 3.2.2 above. I then 
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compare their subsequent 12-month retumsý" Rmults, we presented in tables 6.6 and 6.7 
to test H9a and H9b. 
TABLE 6.6 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Month 
Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns Conditional on prior momentum 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BRARs) for my population of $45 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.0 1.1994 
and 31.12.2002. The table provides results separately for the portfolio of 635 firms with price 
momentum below 0 and the parallel portfolio made up of the 210 firms with prior price 
momentum above 0. Momentum is the prior II -month (t- 12 to t-2) average raw returns. Mean 
and median portfolio results are provided separately for the 6-month and 12-month periods 
commencing on the first day of the month immediately following the going-concern modified 
audit report release month. This table provides mean and median BHARs using a control firm 
benchmark for the two momentum based portfolios separately together with their differences. 
Control firms are selected as described in table 4.2. 
Negative Momentum (< 0) 
(n=635) 
6-month 12-month 





Mean BHAR -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.21 0.01 0.06 
t-value -2.93 -1. % -2.68 -1.92 0.03 0.45 
Median BHAR -0.19 -0.17 -0.10 -0.19 -0.09 0.02 
Wilcoxon z-value -4.53 -4.13 -2.97 -2.82 
Sign test z-value -5.00 -3.81 -3.38 -2.69 
Mann-Whitney Z 0.67 0.93 
46 Mean (median) sample firm prior II -month average monthly returns are -4.1% (-4.3%) and for the control 
firm sample -4.2% (4.4%). Since them is no statistically significant difference between the two samples my 
results am unlikely to be biased by problem relating to Poor firm matching- 
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TABLE 6.7 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Mouth Buy-and- 
hold Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Momentum 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 945 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.0 1.1994 
and 31.12.2002 adjusted for price momentum. Returns earned by delisted firms am 
represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index. The 12- 
month period reported commences on the first day of the month immediately following the 
going-concern modified audit report release month. This table provides mean and median 
BHARs derived from matching each GCM firm with a 'clean' control firm of same size and 
closest momentum. 
The table is derived on the following basis. Each GCM firm in my population is matched with 
that non-financial, non-utility, non-GCM firm with most similar size and momentum. 
Specifically, all non-financial, non-utility firms without GCM audit reports listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ are first identified with a market value of equity between 70% 
and 130% of that of the sample firm. The control firm is then selected as that firm with 
momentum closest to that of the sample firm. Momentum is prior II -month (t- 12 to t-2) 
average raw returns. 
Month Mean BHAR t-value Median BHAR Wilcoxon z-value Sign test z-value 
1 -0.04 -2.20 -0.07 -3.99 -4.45 
2 -0.04 -1.87 -0.08 -3.98 -3.58 
3 -0.05 -1.94 -0.09 -4.19 -3.65 
4 -0.07 -2.35 -0.10 -4.32 -3.23 
5 -0.10 -2.92 -0.13 -4.65 -4.20 
6 -0.12 -3.30 -0.14 -4.79 -4.75 
7 -0.15 -3.90 -0.17 -5.29 -4.88 
9 -0.16 -3.98 -0.19 -5.25 -4.95 
9 -0.17 -3.86 -0.17 -5.28 -5.30 
10 -0.23 -4.09 -0.17 -5.62 -5.37 
11 -0.25 -3.70 -0.17 -5.32 -4.61 
12 -0.23 -3.14 -0.19 -5.42 -4.54 
In table 6.6 1 find that there is no significant difference between the negative 
momentum and positive momentum portfolios and am thus unable to reject the nufl 
hypothesis Fl9a. Mean (median) 12-month BHAR fbr negative momentum GCM 
firms (n-635) is -15% (-170/*) and for positive momentum firms (n-210) is -21% 
(-19%). Similarly, to test for null hypothesis H9b using the control firm approach, my 
post-GCM drift results are unaffected. Table 6.7 show mean (median) 12-month 
BHARs are -23% (-18%), both significant at the I% level. Based on dim results 
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I reject the null hypothesis H9b and as such, the phenomenon of market underreaction 
to GCM (bad news) disclosures cannot be explained in terms of prior return 
confinuation. 
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6. Z5 Penny stocks status and the post-GCMdrift 
Despite the apparent magnitude of my reported results, many of the firms in my 
sample have low market capitalisation and, in particular, low stock prices. Returns on 
such penny stocks could well be prone to measurement problems. Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) and Ball, KotharL and Shanken (1995) suggest apparent long-term market 
overreaction may be driven by computational problems associated with the returns on 
low price "loser" stocks. To see whether such a low stock price status can explain my 
post-GCM drift I test the following hypothesis: 
HIO. - There is no difference in the refurns of GCMflrm and non-GCMflrm wA 
simUer penny stock staftm 
To test null hypothesis 10,1 match my sample firms on a one-to-one basis with firms 
with the same stock price to provide an appropriate control portfolio. Specifically, for 
each GCM firm I search in the population of non-finance, non-utility industry, non. 
GCM firms employed above for closest stock price match on the last trading day of 
the calendar month immediately following the 10-K publication date. 4' BHAR control 
firm benchmark analyses are then rerun on this basis. Table 6.9 presents the results. I 
47 This result is reinforced by noting the correlation coefficient between GCM flrm prior I I-month 
raw returns (t -- 12 to -2) and post-GCM month 12-month returns (t -I to 12) is only -0.04, not 
significantly different to zero at any conventional level. 
"I do not match on market capitalisation as this is highly correlated with stock price. Mean (median) 
sample firm stock price at the end of the going-concern month is $1.92 ($1.12), with equivalent mean 
(median) control firm stock price of $2.11 ($1.21). As there is no statistically significant difference 
between the samples, I conclude that control firm matching problems does not bias my resuItL 
134 
find 12-month mean (median) BHARs of -18% (-18%), both significant at the 1% 
level. These findings indicate that my main results of market underreaction, to GCM 
disclosures cannot be explained by any penny stock effect and therefore I reject the 
null hypothesis HIO. 49 
TABLE 6.9 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Mouth Buy-awl- 
hold Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Penny Stock Status 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 945 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concern modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 0 1.0 1.1994 
and 31.12.2002 adjusted for penny stock status. Returns earned by delisted firms am 
represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index. T'he 12- 
month period reported commences on the first day of the month immediately following the 
going-concern modified audit report release month. This table provides mean and median 
BHARs derived from matching each GCM firm with a 'clean' control firm of same price. 
IMe table is derived on the following basis. Each GCM firm in my population is matched with 
that non-financial, non-utility, non-GCM firm with most similar price. Specifically, all non- 
financial, non-utility firms without GCM audit reports listed on the NYSE, AMEX or 
NASDAQ are first identified with stock prices available at the end of the GCM month. T'he 
control firm is then selected as that firm with stock price closest to that of the sample firm. 
Month Mean BHAR t-value Median BHAR Wilcoxon z-value Sign test z-value 
1 -0.04 -1.77 -0.05 -3.45 -3.84 
2 -0.05 -2.18 -0.07 -3.67 -4.11 
3 -0.10 -2.93 -0.10 -4.42 -4.48 
4 -0.10 -3.00 -0.12 -4.65 -4.27 
5 -0.13 -3.45 -0.14 -5.25 -5.16 
6 -0.14 -3.80 -0.15 -5.56 -5.79 
7 -0.16 -3.84 -0.14 -5.09 -5.64 
8 -0.15 -3.59 -0.16 -5.24 -6.33 
9 -0.17 -3.37 -0.15 -4.85 -4.61 
10 -0.22 -3.46 -0.16 -5.09 -4.95 
11 -0.20 -3.15 -0.17 -5.36 -4.69 
12 -0.18 -2.74 -0.18 -5.57 -4.82 
49 Results are very similar to the above am if I restrict my walysis to GCM fbwd With stock price > 
$1. 
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6.2 6 Induoy explanationfor the post-GCM dr#2 
Finally, them exists a possibility that my post-GCM negative abnormal returns are 
concentrated in a particular industry also experiencing similar abnormal returns. To 
test for such an industry-specific explanation, I test the following hypothesis: 
HII: There Is no dfference In Me returns of GCMflrms and non-GCMflnm 
operating in the same Industry. 
To provide an appropriate test for HI 1,1 match each of my GCM firms on industry, 
size and book-to-market with a non-GCM control firm from the set of firms employed 
in the original control firm analysis in section 3.2.2 above. First, I identify all the 
firms at the end of the GCM month with the same industry as the GCM firm using the 
28 industry group deftitions available on Kenneth French's online data library and 
then from this set of firms, I select a firm with market value of equity between 70% 
and 130% and closest book-to-market ratio. 50 Table 6.9 presents industry adjusted 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns. After controlling for industry the 12-month mean 
(median) BHARs are -12% (-18%), both significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
my original findings of market undenvaction to GCM disclosures presented in chapter 
6 do not have an industry-specific explanation. This leads me to reject the null 
hypothesis HI 1. 
so Website address is 
bM@//mba, tuck. daMnouth. edu/p"facultv/ken. fronchMM LibMaldd 30 Ind pg[Lhtint. 
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TABLE 6.9 
First Time Going-concern Modified Audit Report Post-announcement Mouth Buy-and- 
hold Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Industry 
This table presents buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for my population of 845 non- 
finance, non-utility industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which 
published a going-concem modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 01.01.1994 
and 31.12.2002 adjusted for industry specific effects. Returns tamed by delisted firms are 
represented by the equivalent monthly return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index. The 12- 
month period reported commences on the first day of the month immediately following the 
going-concem modified audit report release month. This table provides mean and median 
BHARs derived from matching each GCM firm with a 'clean' control firm of same industry, 
size and book-to-market ratio. 
7he table is derived on the following basis. Each GCM firm in my population is matched with 
that non-financial, non-utility, non-GCM firm with most similar size and book-to-market ratio 
operating in the same industry. Specifically, all non-financial, non-utility firms without GCM 
audit reports listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ operating in the same industry as the 
GCM firm are first identified. Then from these set of firms a subset of firms is identified with 
a market value of equity between 70% and 130% of that of the sample firm. IMe control firm 
is then selected as that firm with closest book-to-market ratio to that of the sample firm. 
Month Mean BHAR t-value Median BHAR Wilcoxon z-value Sign test z-value 
1 -0.04 -2.27 -0.06 -3.51 -3.57 
2 -0.06 -2.76 -0.09 -4.41 -5.25 
3 -0.10 -3.41 -0.11 -5.44 -5.56 
4 -0.11 -3.38 -0.14 -5.50 4.76 
5 -0.12 -3.64 -0.16 -5.77 -5.45 
6 -0.13 -3.79 -0.18 -6.13 -5.45 
7 -0.14 -4.11 -0.17 -6.21 -5.80 
8 -0.14 -3.71 -0.17 . 6.11 -5.52 
9 -0.11 -2.75 -0.16 -5.76 -5.94 
10 -0.13 -2.94 -0.16 -5.76 4.97 
11 -0.14 -2.48 -0.17 -5.94 -5.59 
12 -0.12 -2.11 -0.18 -5.72 -5.25 
63. Summary 
in this chapter I explore various possible explanations for market undeffeaction to 
going-concern modified audit report disclosures. 11M idea is to see if the post-GCM 
drift is distinct from explanations/phenomena already documented in the literature. I 
test for postearnings announcement drifý size, distress risk, momentum, penny stock 
bias and industry-specific explanations for the market underreaction phenomenon. 
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Overall, I find that the post-GCM drift is distinct from all of the above-mentioned 
explanations. However, the underperformance of my sample firms is restricted to 
GCM fums with negative earnings surprise, consistent with the market focusing on 
earnings while ignoring the fWl implications of the GCM signal. In the next chapter I 
search for a limits to arbitrage explanation for the persistence of my post-GCM drift 
over the subsequent one year period. Additionally, I examine biding activities of 
different stockholder classes to explore how they change their holdings around the 
bad news event in my GCM firms. 
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CHAPTER 7 
LIMITS TO ARBITRAGE AND INVESTOR 
STOCKHOLDING ACTIMY 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that market underreaction to bad news is a very 
robust phenomenon and this post-GCM drift cannot be explained by post-eamings 
announcement drift, size, momentum or other explanations. This chapter explores two 
very interesting and important issues. 17he first issue relates to limits to arbitrage 
arguments and tests whether the post-GCM market underreaction anomaly is 
explained in this way. The concept of limits to arbitrage is important because it mope 
mtional arbitrageurs from trading and any systematic mispricing, if prevalent, is 
exposed. The second important issue investigates the trading behaviour of differmt 
classes of investors holding GCM firm stocks. Such an analysis is vital as it will 
highlight whether rational and naYve investors exhibit similar trading behaviours and 
will give us additional insights into who is actually trading at prices, as demonstrated 
in the previous two chapters, apparently inconsistent with the fiindam . On the 
condition that no arbitrage opportunities exist one expects rational investors to at 
least reduce their holdings in small distressed GCM firms in order to reduce their 
losses. Examining these issues can infom us of the circumstances when such 
inefficiencies (market underreaction to bad news) exist, uncovering evidenoe against 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 tests hypothesis H12 for the limits to 
arbitrage arguments, section 3 tests hypothesis H13 by examining the stockholding 
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patterns of different classes of investors holding GCM fim stock and section 4 
mmmari s the chapter. 
71. Market Frictions 
An increasing num of papers are now reporting results consistent with the 
minimally rational markets paradigm (Rubinstein, 2001). In this sub-section I test the 
proposition whether undeffeaction to GCM disclosures can be explained by a limits to 
arbitrage argument. To find systematic mispricing a somewhat necessary condition is 
that arbitrage is limited and thus it cannot eliminate the mispricing completely (e. g., 
De Long et al., 1990a, b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Barber, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1998). This is because if arbitrage is abundant rational investors will quickly correct 
any erroneous investment decisions made by irrational (nalve) investors and pull 
prices towards fundamental values causing the markets to function in line with the 
efficient markets hypothesis. Chan, Frankel, and Kothari (2004) point out that small 
stocks exhibit characteristics of firms with limited arbitrage and future research might 
attempt to test for mispricing in such contexts. Interestingly, my GCM context 
presents an ideal opportunity to see if arbitrage opportunities are limited as I have 
shown that thew firms are small in size (see table 5.2) and systematically undeffeact 
for a period of one year (see chapter 5). So, in order to examine a limits to arbitrage 
story I search fbr two potential explanations based on market frictions a) lack of 
trading activity, and b) high biding costs. Table 52 shows the average (median) 
GCM firm, despite its small size and extreme characteristics, hides on no fewer than 
236 (252) of the 252 trading days in the yea following the GCM month with mean 
(median) stock turnover trading levels of IM (89%). These figures indicate that my 
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GCM firms are actively traded and have reasonable tradbg volume statistics. So a 
lack of trading story is not an explanation for my anomalous results. 
Next, I turn to a potential trading costs explanation for my small size highly distressed 
GCM firms, which might cause the post-GCM drift to persist for a full year. If the 
presence of high trading costs makes it impossible for rational investors to profit from 
such an apparent arbitrage opportunity then I would expect market prices of thew 
firms to remain out of line with their fimdamental prices for a considerable period of 
time. Lesmond, Schill and Zhou (2004) in the case of momentum profits and Taffler, 
Lu, and Kausar (2004) for U. K. GCM firms, find that profit opportunities am illusory 
and after adjusting for a range of tiding costs facing an arbitrageur, no profit can be 
made. To we if similar results hold for my U. S. GCM sample firms, I test the null 
hypothesis 12. 
H12: Arbitrageurs should not be able to profltftom GCMflm underpoformance 
after adjustingfor &ansacdon costs 
To explore this hypothesis I investigate the hypothetical profit an arbitragm might be 
able to cam, after all trading costs, by exploiting any market underreaction to first- 
time going-concem news events in practice through a zero-investment strategy of 
going short by a notional $25,000 in each of my GCM stocks and long in msached 
non-GCM firms. Similar to Taffier, Lu, and Kausar (2004) 1 consider three classes of 
ti-adiiig costs; a) bid-ask spread, b) stock borrowing costs, and C) trading commissions, 
of which the first is the most significant. Table 5.2 shows the magnitude of the bid-ask 
spread percentage for my GCM &ms with mean (median) of 10.7% (9.5%) in the 
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year following the GCM announcement month. T'he equivalent mean (median) bid- 
ask spread percentage for the matched control firms for the same period is 10.4% 
(7.1%). From these percentages it seems unlikely that any significant profit can be 
earned, on average, even absent all other costs. 
Before conducting simulations for a potential arbitrage strategy it is important to 
discuss short side and trading commission costs. D'Avolio (2002) reports that 
although only 9% of stocks on the CRSP database have loan fees above 1% per 
annum these 'specials' (stocks with high lending fees) have a mean loan fee of 4.3% 
per annum. In my analysis, I use shorting costs of 4.3% for all my GCM firms below 
median market capitalisation and 1% for firms above the median market capitalisation 
figure. For commission costs I broadly follow Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou (2004), 
more specifically I use a 4% commission rate for stocks under $1.00 per share. For all 
other stocks, as my notional trading amount is greater than $20,000,1 use a 
commission rate of 0.25% per transaction. 51 
Value weighting is not appropriate for my CICM firm sample, therefore, I notionally 
short $25,000 of shares in each of my GCM firms at the end of the GCM month (t-0) 
and invest the net proceeds in the equity of the respective control firm matched on 
size and book-to-market. 52 IlIeSe positions am then maintained until t- 12 (6) when 
the process is reversed with the required number of the GCM firm shares purchased in 
the market to close the short position and the holding in the matched control firm sold. 
s' I conduct my simulations on the assumption that these stocks can be shorted. D'Avolio (2002), 
however, finds that over 50% of stocks with prices below $5 in the CRSP database are impossible to 
short. It is difficult for me to speculate how many of my GCM stocks can actually be borrowed in 
practice, nevertheless, I re-run the simulations only on GCM firms with prices -> $5 (n-70). Results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported below, strengthening my limits to arbitrage story. uI consider $25,000 to be a sufficiently small amount not likely to cause downward price press=. 
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All transactions take place at the respective bid and ask prices and take into account 
shorting and commission costs. 
If the GCM firm is delisted, subsequent monthly returns are represented by the return 
on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index. In such cam bid and ask prices are constructed 
using the respective firm's BHRR. For all the delisted firms, I first estimate the price 
by multiplying the original price at the end of GCM month (t-0) by the missing 
month's BHRR, then bid and ask prices are estimated using half the average bid-ask 
spread across all cases in the sample with available data. Where bid or ask prices are 
missing, but the stock is still trading, the respective prices are estimated as previously 
but using the original stock price in that month. 
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TABLE 7.1 
Blustrative Arbitrage Profits Earned from a Zero-investment Strategy of 
Shorting the Stocks of Firms with First Time Going-concern Modified Audit 
Reports 
'Mis table presents illustrative zero-investment strategy potential arbitrage profits based on 
shorting $25,000 of the equity of each stock in my population of 845 non-finance, non-utility 
industry firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ which published a going-concem, 
modified audit report (GCM) for the first time between 01.01.1994 and 31.12.2002 together 
with percentage returns. Mean and median portfolio results and other statistics are provided 
separately for the 6-month and 12-month investment periods commencing on the first day of 
the month immediately following the going-concern modified audit report release month. 
The table provides net arbitrage profits for the full population and their equivalent returns 
statistics separately. 
Net profits are calculated on the basis of an arbitrageur shorting $25,000 of the equity of each 
GCM firm at t=0 and investing the net proceeds in the equity of the matched control firm, 
keeping this position open for 12 (6) months then purchasing the same number of shares of 
the GCM stock in the market to close the short position and selling the holding in the control 
firm. All transactions take place at the respective bid and ask prices and take into account 
shorting and trading commission costs. Bid and ask quotations are taken from CRSP. In the 
case of missing quotations the respective prices are estimated using half of the average bid- 
ask spread for all cases with available data at that month end. Stock shorting costs are 
estimated as 4.3% per annum for firms under median market capitalisation and 1% for firms 
over the median market cap. For commission costs I use a 4% commission rate for stocks 
under $1.00 per share and 0.25% for the rest of my sample. In the case of delisted firms 
subsequent monthly returns are represented by the return on the S&P 600 Small Cap. Index 
but the respective positions are closed at t= 12 (t = 6) as for the other firms in my sample. 
Profit StmMcs ($) 
6-month 12-month 
Return Statistics (Vo) 
6-month 12-month 
Mean profit (S) -4398 4969 -0.18 -0.20 
t-value -2.21 -1.77 -2.21 -1.77 
Median profit (S) 111 1331 0.00 0.05 
Wilcoxon z-value 1.63 0.37 1.65 0.37 
Sign z-value 0.07 1.72 0.14 1.69 
Standard 
deviation($) 57773 81769 2.31 3.27 
25th percentile -12672 -14914 -0.51 -0.60 
75th percentile 9476 14296 0.38 0.5 
Table 7.1 provides the hypothetical zero-investment arbitrage profits for post-GCM 
. ods, of 6 and 12 months for my full sample. On an investment of $25,000 per firm 
mean 12-month (6-month) losses are $4,969 ($4,398); results are significant at the I% 
(I (M) level. On the other hand, the story differs somewhat for my median results: 12- 
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month (6-month) median profits are $1,331 ($111). Only the Fisher sign tea is 
significant (at the 10% level) for the 12-month result and only the Wilcoxon signed- 
rank test is significant (at the 10% level) for the 6-month result Standard deviations 
and inter-quartile ranges are also high. Table 7.1 also provides the equivalent average 
returris statistics. Based on these results it is probably more appropriate to conclude 
that the trading costs incurred in implementing such an arbitrage suittegy are likely to 
wipe out any potential profits that might apparently be earned, evidence which is 
consistent with the null hypothesis H12. Therefore, I conclude that the risk of 
investing in my GCM stocks is high and it may not be feasible for a rational investor 
to take such a risk by arbitraging such small highly distressed stocks. This implies that 
arbitrage is limited and rational investors (professional arbitrageurs) have limited 
incentives to trade in these small stocks because of high costs against those (naive) 
investors who are unable to deal rationally with the pessimistic information conveyed 
by the GCM event. This causes the prices to deviate systematically from those 
predicted under the efficient market hypothesis. The next sub-section, explicitly 
explores whether there are any potential differences in trading behavioun among 
professional and naive investors. 
7.3. Trading Activity of Different Stockholder Groups 
My results in chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that the market in aggregate underreacts to 
the bad news relating to a firm's fifture prospects conveyed by a going-concem 
opinion. To tea hypothesis H13, I explore whether institutional investm and retail 
investors exhibit similar trading biases. More specifically, I examine the stock holding 
and hiding patterns of institutions and insiders, and by deduction retail investors, in 
my GCM sample firms. Such an investigation is usefid because it will help us make 
145 
inferences about who is actually biding in these stocks, given the reasonable level of 
trading volume presented in table 5.2. If butitutional. investors do not reduce their "W 
holdings in firms with going-concem opinions then it can be speculated diet such 
biases are not limited to narve investors only. 33 
H13: There should be no dtorerence In holding patterns of various stockholder 
classes in GCM (bad new) stocks over dme, 
To test H13 I examine the holding patterns of the three classes of stockholder 
(institutions, insiders, and by deduction re-tail investors) from one year prior to one 
year after the GCM audit report publication quarter. Insider holdings data am 
available on a period-by-period basis and can be transformed into monthly holdings, 
whereas institutional holdings data are only available on a quarterly basis. Therefore, I 
conduct my analysis on a quarterly basis. Insider data are available for all my sample 
firms but institutional data are only available fbr 901 of my 945 GCM firms. Not 
every firm has data available in every month or quarter. 
I analyse stock holding data for 9 quarters (4 pre-event quarters, GCM quarter and 4 
post-event quarters) and use this data to calculate quarterly changes in holdings. These 
change in holdings statistics are then used to calculate the percentage contribution of 
. id trades, institutional trades and by deduction trades of retail investors to the 
total volume of shares traded in each quarter. Specifically, I use the following fbrmula 
to calculate the percentage contribution statistics: 
'" Recent evidence suggests that small traders (individuals) are law Sophisticated users of information, 
whereas large traders (institutions) are more informed and therefore more rational (see Bhattacharya, 
2001; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Allee, 2003; and Bhnttacharya, Black, Christensen, and 
Mergenthaler, 2004). 
% My =d AQTRHOLDU I *A VGSHROUTý / VOL, (7) 
where % TRDU = percentage contribution of market participant class j's trades to total 
trades for firm i, 1, &QTMOLDOI - absolute change in quarterly holdings in firm i by 
market participant class j, AVGSHROUTj - inum of shares outstanding calculated 
as the monthly average in that quarter for firm L VOLj - total quarterly trading 
volume for firm i, and j=I if institutional holdings, 2 if insider (board) holdings. 
TIxe above statistics are computed for all firms with available data. Where such data 
are available for both insiders and institutions, I sum the percentages to determine 
their aggregate contribution to total trading volume. Subtracting this total from 100% 
for each GCM firm enables us to deduce the percentage contribution of retail (naWe) 
investors to total trading volume. This gives us some idea of who is actually 
responsible for the majority of the trades in the shares of my GCM firms. 
Panels A and B of Table 7.2 presents the mean percentage holdings and percentage 
contribution of trades by insiders, institutions and retail investors for the 9 quarters. I 
find that institutional holdings decline from 17% in the 41h quarter prior to the GCM 
quarter to about I I% in that quarter. Any significant decline is not mm in the 4 
quarters following the GCM quarter. in contrast, insider holdings do not change 
significantly over the two year period, averaging around 15%. " 
54 To see whether my results are driven by GCM firms with infiquent holding data I only use those 
GCM firms that have both institutional and insider holding data available in all the 9 quarters under 
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Importantly, Panel B suggests that most of the trading in my GCM firms is conducted 
by retail investors. Institutions, on average, account for about 11% of total ft-ades and 
insiders about 5%. The remaining 84% of trading volume, by deduction, is accounted 
for by retail investors. There is also some evidence of an increase in trading activity 
by insiders and institutions after the GCM announcement, especially in the two 
quarters after the GCM quarter. Institutional percentage trading activity increases to 
13% and that by insiders to 6%, with institutions appearing to reduce their holdings 
slightly and, if anything, insiders increasing theirs. 
To shed additional light on the investment behaviour of my three classes of 
stockholder and test whether investors react more strongly to more acute adverse 
potential outcomes, I examine their holding patterns over time conditional on GC firm 
ex post outcomes. I expect rational investors to sell down their holdings in fms with 
more severe GC uncertainty resolutions in a timely fashion. Table 7.3 breaks down 
the institutional, insider and retail (by deduction) trading patterns depending on 
whether the GC firm in the following year enters bankruptcy or is delisted (Panel A), 
is given a finther GC opinion or is acquired (Panel B), or receives a clean audit report 
(GC withdrawn) (Panel Q. 55 
55 Using the control firm approach (table 41), mean 12-month BHAR for firms that subsequently enter 
bankruptcy or are delisted is -58% (p=0.000) (n-375), for firms that are given a finther GC opinion or 
are acquired is -7.4% (p-0.364) (n-348), and for firms that subsequently receives a clean audit report is 
86% (p-0.003) (n-122). 
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Panel A (bankruptcy or delisting) demonstrates that, on average, institutional holdings 
decline from 16.7% to 5.3% over the two year period around the OC event, whereas, 
retail holdings increase from 69.4% to 82.7%. Panel B (continuing OC or acquisition) 
also shows a similar trend with a decline in institutional holdings (from 16% to Mo) 
and an increase in retail holdings (from 69.1% to 74.6%). However, Panel C (OC 
withdrawal firms) shows no significant change in holdings over the 9 quarters for 
either institutions or retail investors. Insider holdings do not change materially in any 
panel. Overall, these results show that institutions trade rationally by ex ante reducing 
their holdings in stocks with the most adverse outcomes. However, exactly the 
opposite behaviour is observed in the case of retail investors. 
From the above analysis it seems that institutional investors an less prone to 
behavioural trading biases in the processing of this extreme bad news event in contrast 
to retail investors. 56 My evidence of stock mispricing and extended post-OC drift 
might then be explained by a limits to arbitrage argument with nalve (retail) investors 
keeping stock prices artificially high by biding inappropriately in these stocks due to 
their behavioural biases. My results do not support Taffler, Lu, and Kausar's (2004) 
speculative argument that professional investors suffer from similar error processing 
biases in their U. K. -based OC firm results. These results are inconsistent with null 
hypothesis H13 and clearly show that there is a class of investors who do not act 
rationally in this financial distress context. 
56 Although, it is also possible that institutional investors are forced to reduce their holdings in such 
small distressed stocks because of certain constraints in their investment mandates (for e. g., reduction 
of holdings due to bond downgrades or fall of stock price below a certain level etc. ) 
153 
7.4. Summary 
This chapter set out to evaluate whether profit opportunities exist to trade on the 
market underreaction to GCM anomaly. In addition, this chapter also explores the 
behaviour of various classes of GCM fm stockholder in the two year period 
surrounding the publication of going-concern modified audit report disclosures. 
The results demonstrate that high transaction costs are associated with my GCM firms 
and after adjusting for these costs it is not possible for arbitrageurs to profit from the 
post-GCM drift anomaly. A net zero-investment strategy appears to be very risky for 
rational investors. Although, these market frictions could be a Mason for the 
persistence of my strong post-GCM announcement drift, they cannot explain the 
existence of this drift in the first place, and its asymmetric nature as shown in chapter 
S. 
To explore fiirther potential reasons for market underreaction to going-concern 
modified opinions, I examine the trading patterns of different investor classes in 
response to the going-concern opinion; I find that institutional holdings in GCM firms 
decline by around 35% over the 9-quarter period centred on the GCM announcement 
quarter fiom 17% to I I%. In contrast, insider holdings do not change significantly, 
averaging around 15% throughout. By deduction, retail investors would appear to 
increase their holdings over this period in these stocks from around 69% to 74%. 
Furthermore, they account for most of the trading activity. When I analyse the trading 
activity of the three classes of stockholders based on ex post outcome, I find 
institutions, on average, reduce their holdings substantially in the GCM bankruptcy or 
delisting stock category (17% to 5%), whereas, by deduction retail investors appear to 
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increase their holdings in these stock (70% to 83%) over the 9-quarter period. Insider 
holdings do not change significantly over the two-year period surrounding the GCM 
event. On this basis, I have evidence that institutional investors am less prone to 
behavioural biases in assimilating bad news of this nature. This shows that there is a 
class of investors who do not seem to rationally incorporate the implications of bad 
news while making their investment decisions. My evidence of stock mispricing and 
extended post-GCM-drift might then be explained by a limits-to-arbitrage argument 
with naive (retail) investors, being particularly prone to behavioural bias, keeping 
stock prices artificially high by trading inappropriately in these stocks. My results do 
not support Taffier, Lu, and Kausar's (2004) speculative argument that professional 
investors suffer from similar error processing biases in their U. K. -based GCM firm 
results and are consistent with a broader set of studies that find institutional investors 
am mom informed and therefore mom rational (Grinblatt and KeloWu, 2000,2001 a, 
2001b). 
The last three chaptem of my thesis, including this one, investigate the market 
undeffeaction anomaly thoroughly in the U. S. by using going-concern audit report 
disclosures as my bad and good news events in the financial distress domain. My 
empirical findings suggest that investors undemict to GCM (bad news) disclosures 
while fully anticipate good news as highlighted by the publication of the GCM 
withdrawn audit reporL Market underreaction to bad news cannot be explained by 
post-earnings announcement drif% size, distress risk, momentum, penny stock and 
industry explanations. In the next chapter, I examine the impact of different 
bankruptcy regimes on investor response to the GCM bad news signal in the U. S. and 
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the UX. to study the informativeness of accounting information conditional on the 
local bankruptcy code of the hLsfitutional enviromnent. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE IMPACT OF BANKRUPTCY CODES AND MARKET 
RESPONSE TO GCM DISCLOSURES 
8.1. Introduction 
The ongoing debate and discussions surrounding the informativeness of the going. 
concern and other subject-to opimons date back several decades to the late 1970s 
when the Auditing Standards Committee first attempted to remove the subject-to 
opinion option, including that issued for going-concern uncertainties. Financial 
statement users responded adversely to this proposal because they believed that the 
audit opinion contained important information (Mutchler, 1985; Campbell and 
Mutchler, 1989). However, early market studies suggested that audit qualifications 
provide little or no new information to investors (e. g., Elliott, 1982; Dodd et al., 1994; 
Dopuch et al., 1986; Dopuch et al., 1987). Some authors even argued that the audit 
opinion, in particular the going-concem opinion, was merely a transformation of 
publicly available information (Mutchler, 1995; Dopuch et al, 1987). More recent 
studies, on the other hand, are consistent with the audit opinion in fhet having 
information content (Loudder et al., 1992; Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Blay and Geiger, 
2001). Despite these unresolved issues, the evidence in the literature documenting the 
value of the audit opinion to investors is relatively scarce (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In the previous chapters, I have shown that going-concern modified audit reports have 
longer-term price impact and thus have some information content. Additionally, 
Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) present similar findings for the U. K. but it seems that 
the market response in the U. K. is far more negative than what I find in the U. S. for a 
similar time-flume. 
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In this chapter, I examine the information content of the going-concern opinion issued 
by auditors in the U. S. and in the U. K. in the short and longer-run. Ilie purpose is to 
provide evidence on the effect of the interaction of local bankruptcy codes with a 
similar information signal (the auditor's going-concern opinion) indicating an increase 
in financial distress on security prices in the U. S. and the U. K.. As mentioned in 
section 2.6 of chapter 2, the U. S. is biased more towards the rights of debtors, whereas 
the U. K. is biased more towards the rights of creditors. In the U. K., the going-concern 
auditing regime under SAS 600 (APB, 1993) and SAS 130 (APB, 1994) is based on, 
and is very similar to, SAS No. 58 (AICPA, 1988a) and SAS No. 59 (AICPA, 1988b) 
with eqWvalent auditing standards and procedures. Furthermore, various studies in the 
corporate governance area point out that the U. S. and the U. K. have very similar 
capital market structures (i. e., large number of public firms, dispersed ownership, 
important role of institutional investors and managers holding significant equity 
stakes with high discretionary power etc. ) and are classified as market-centred 
systems (see e. g., Allen and Gale, 2000). This discussion points to the fact that there 
are major similarities between the U. S. and the U. K. institutional environments in this 
context and the only notable difference is in their respective bankruptcy regimes. 
Hence, a U. S. -U. K. comparison provides a natural experiment to examine how a very 
similar information cue produced by the accounting system can have differential 
information content potentially because of the strikingly different bankruptcy codes in 
these two countries. I hypothesise that, despite the relative uniformity of the auditor's 
going-concern opinion across the two countries, investors would react more adversely 
to the GCM signal in a creditor-friendly institutional environment (i. e., the U. K. ) than 
in a debtor-friendly environment (i. e., the U. S. ). 
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T'he chapter is organised as follows: section 2 presents the descriptive statistics for my 
U. S. and U. K. GCM firm smple, section 3 reports the results of the hypotheses, 
section 4 provides additional robustness tests and section 5 summarises the results. 
81. Descriptive Statistics of the U. S. and U. K. GCM Sample 
Table 8.1 Panel A provides the proportion of bankrupt firms rweiving going-concern 
modified audit reports in their last financial statements prior to entering bankruptcy 
for U. S. and U. K. GCM firms. Over the period 1995-2002, approximately 41% of all 
bankrupt firms in the U. S. received a GCM in their last 10-K prior to entering 
bankruptcy. This percentage is slightly lower in the U. K. (35'Yo), although not 
significantly so (p-0.24). Panel B of Table 8.1 slunmarises the proportions of GCM 
firms that subsequently enter bankruptcy within one year in the U. S. and U. K. Over 
the period 1995-2002, there is no significant difference between the percentage of 
U. S. firms entering bankruptcy with GCMs (169/6) and the percentage of UJL GCM 
firms entering bankruptcy (14%) (p=0.17). Although, these statistics do not differ 
significantly between debtor-friendly and creditor-friendly regimes over my sample 
time-period, on average 4.1% of U. S. firms had GCM audit reports each year, in 
contrast to 2.4% in the U. K. (p-0.00). This is consistent with the expectation that 
auditors in the U. K. may be more reluctant to issue GCMs because the implications of 


















00 e4 m 00 Z (4 4 W% 
ri rý (: ý ri . Vi -e QC CD 000Q0 
%n Q0Q-Am 
, "* in -W m 
'-I m '. 0 '. 0 -- 
a- r- 
0c40 leom% 2040 
t- 00 CYN ein 
CM ein 15l. 
0 
.i 




ll fi 24.21. 
irL 0 
Z 
i: ' e1 X. 
A <c-"» d cm 31515 
E 
Co 
ý -Z: A ... 
c -0 85 
j =, r- äg 


















fZ ýc r- 00 
1. 





so 47, cr, m qp 
4n m "o %* -- %^ lot ; V) I 
00 (4 en n ý! %D eol 
en 
;; 
C" m 04 ml 
1 C3N 0 r- r- g CD ;; r- 0 
---- e9 N 
r- -A Go* %D Wý n9 
1,191 9 ri , 190 e§ -8 9 
Table 8.2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for my U. S. and U. K. GCM firm 
samples. Based on the U. S. dollar/U. K. pound exchange rate at the GCM date, firm 
size (measured by mean market capitalisation and total assets) is similar between U. S. 
GCM firms and U. K. GCM firms (p=0.56 and p-0.91, respectively). However, U. K. 
GCM firms tend to exhibit considerably greater decline in earnings during the year of 
the GCM (CHEAR). The mean and median changes in earnings for U. K. firms am 
-38% and -45% compared to -28% and -23% for U. S. firms, respectively. I also 
observe that U. K. GCM firms tend to be more financially distressed as measured by 
PRZ with mean a of 0.89 compared with a mean of 0.80 for U. S. firms (P. O. 00). 57 
Finally, them are no significant differences between U. S. and U. K. GCM firms in 
terms of leverage, book-to-market and momentum. 
Panel B of Table 8.2 shows that 82% of U. S. GCM firms have positive equity 
compared with 76% of U. K. GCM firms; this difference in proportion is marginally 
significant (p=O. 10). On the other hand, only 2% of the U. S. GCM firms have positive 
EPS compared to 14% in the U. K. (p=0.00). U. S. GCM firms are twice as likely to 
pay a dividend (DIVID) as U. K. GCM firms (24% v 13%) (p-0-00) and also three 
times more likely to be delisted (DEAD) than U. K. GCM firms (45% v 15%) 
(p-0.00) but the percentages of U. S. and U. K. GCM firms that are acquired (ACQU) 
are similar (6% v 7%). Firms in both countries are equally likely to hire a quality 
auditor (i. e., more credible) and also have similar GCM firm percentages where a 
GCM is expectedL 
" PRZ is derived by transforming each GCM firm z-score into the respective U. S. M. K. population. 
relative z-score (PRZ) based on population z-score percentiles. Thus PRZ ranges from 0 to 1; the 
higher the score, the higher the probability of bankruptcy. This is done to make the z-scores directly 
comparable across the two countries as Alum (1968) and Taffler (1984) have different z-score scales 
and cut-off points. 
162 
Co %3 0 -0 
<0 
Gn 0 =, 
i c» 
1 
cloi Z88 IR Vi -i 11 C) 0 C: ) 0 CD 0 CD 
ý< 
uf .S v-, jo 
.. 
q ". *g L 
ý g; ý . Vi le -1: -! 9.990. l'- ;jemq c> 490cC? 8se LZ :: -a . 43 JU A c> c Co 
ro c8j5 :Z=> 12 . Z V% - CD 92. ,8h! 8 IVIR 2 Sil 58 rý ei -: r 'ä ;5 Z) 1u -0 c; dd cý G00 CD Z 9 
g 
cý ee8 
'm" 222 (D 3 en4 c:! :4 . 2: ý2 -a C r7 00 o rz 9; cý (D 9= *4 - or- Z c4 Co -v Z) E -a 
ýel «c ;ý-? 9 'E *ý -ý =- - tz 0.2 CD ýE E- CEL " 13 ý &- GA 
ä ýJ. E8t -5 9-ý E, lur»- 
1ýtý 
0 =O -, 0,8 .m0ý. 
-0 e 
00 m tag P 00 ci; e-; cý c5 r-; cý -2 ec, -. 
54 
w= --: -5 1 
L, m V% 
J. 04 ýw6r. ýýA cý wi- 00 V'b No MQ CD. ro. <5 .@AE r- 3 -e -i . ei -1 9 4) ll vi w <ý 00 00c9 
22 
Mw 
00 u 00 og 00 9 0000 
90 C) CD l:? 
., &1 -A 




to. - > 
mg 00 m 
09 -! vý Vi cý Z 
r ,0 rA 
.-8 .ý2 rq 0. -M Ion r= 
v% oo r- r- 00 E ri c-i 00 ein ein 8 -> 8-8c! 2! A, 4 9m cý 
d cý cý 
e 
r. Z1ý9 
_>x ? 0ur. 
11 LZ c? to -, Z: 0xeuEý= 
Ago rg 1 en 00 23 09 rA 00 X2 cý oooc? vý A 
l> 
12. UJ %. -2 =v m1,0-1 'E > A 
< 
20 CM 





-Z le i<1ýx9 bo -2: 
3ým 
HCO-6 













rc- kA Ss ci 66 cs C5 
l* 
04. 
go ýc 0, 
og 'e 09 -: ri vi ri ro c-i e 11,1 %0 v% CD e4 lir t- 
29 
1 





-0 c QI 
,4g1 c»3, Q. CD 1-0 
L) 00 
g3, >, ý 
wo 
0, .2 -51 
Fp 1,2 0 
r402 
,Z >% .hX 
%IM' = ii 00 U A 
.e z1,3 
>% 
ýu 11 1 
"0 1--. 19 




, Ou u a< E2 90 5 x, V-b 
4) Em . 
29 8 
CD 
83. Test of Hypotheses 
In this section, I conduct formal tests of hypotheses 14 and 15 discussed in chapter 3. 
I%e basic idea is to see if investors in the U. K. respond more adversely to the GCM 
signal than investors in the US because of the extreme differences in the underlying 
bankruptcy codes of the two regimes. For this purpose I test these null hypotheses in 
the short-run as well as longer-nm. As discussed in chapter 3 there are problems with 
short-term event studies in the GCM context (e. g. Bailey, 1982), 1 provide these 
results for completeness. Based on this premise, I test the following null hypotheses in 
short-term and longer-term in a univariate as well as a multivariate setting. 
H14: There Is a no negative mar*d reacdon to the auditor's going-concern 
modyW opinion at the dme the opinion Is announced 
HIS: The negadve market readion to Me auditor's going6concern mayW opinion 
Is no greater In the UK than In the U. S. 
L3.1. Unlyariate Resulft - Short window 
To test null hypothews 14 and 15 in the short-term in a univariate setting, table 8.3 
Pawl A presents the daily abnormal re-turns for the 21-day window, (t--10 to t-+10) 
surrounding the GCM announcement date (t-0) for both the U. S and UX firms and 
Panel B presents the CARs over the windows [-10, -2], f-1, O], (-1, +1] and [-1, +10] 
surrounding the announcement date together with mean (median) differences in 
abnormal returns. Overall, both U. S. and U. K. GCM firms experie= significant 
negative abnormal returns on the days leading up to the announcement day. Over 
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the window [-10, -2), U. S. and U. K. GCM firms experience mean (median) CARs of 
-2.0% (-3.0%) and -0.7% (-1.3%), respectively. However, these mean and median 
differences between the U. S. and U. K. firms are not significant (p-0.331 and 
p=0.279, respectively). In the days immediately surrounding the announcement day, 
U. K. firms experience mean (median) abnormal retums of -O. We (-0.2%), -3.9% (- 
0.3%) and -1.5% (-0.2%) on days -1,0 and +1, respectively. Similarly, U. S. firms 
experience -0.2% (-0.4%), -0.11% (-0.5%) and -3. Wo (-1.9%), respectively. T'hese 
results are more or less significant at the I% level. Based on these results, I reject null 
hypothesis H 14 of no abnormal retums. 
I note that the average CARs over the windows [-1,0], [-1, +11 and [-1, +101 are 
significantly more negative for U. K. firms compared to U. S. firms (p-0.002, p-0.087 
and p-0.064, respectively). However, the median CARs over the same windows are 
more significantly negative for U. S. firms compared to U. K. firms. Given what 
appears to be opposite findings for the mean mid median CARs over the days 
immediately surrounding the GCM announcement, I speculate dial, since I do not 
control for systematic differences between U. S. and U. K. firms, these particular 
findings may be driven by these differences. 
In my discussion of Table 8.2 Panel A, I noted previously that U. K. and U. S. firms 
differed significantly mainly in terms of the decline in earnings and the level of 
financial distress. I now control for these two factors and compare the CARs over the 
various event windows. Table 9.4 presents the univariate results for sub-samples of 
U. S. and U. K. firms matched on the population-relative financial disftss and change 
in eAunings measures to firther examine null hypothesis H15. After controlling fbr 
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financial distress, U. K. firms experience more negative avemge CARs than U. S. firms 
over the windows [- 1,0] and [- 1, +10]. 
TABLE 8.4 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding the GCM Announcement 
11is table presents mean (median) differences for [40, -2], [4,0], [-1, +1], and [-I, +10] 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) windows surrounding the GCM announcement date (t--O) 
relating to my population of 823 non-finance, non-utility, industry firms traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX or NASDAQ receiving first-time going-concern modified audit reports between 
01.01.1995 and 31.12.2002 in the U. S., and 127 non-finance industry firms traded on the 
London Stock Exchange or Unlisted Securities Market receiving first-time going-concern 
modified audit reports between 01.01.1995 and 31.12.2002 in the U. K.. Cumulative abnormal 
returns for each firm (CAR, ) are calculated by summing die daily abnormal returns (Aki J over 
the two-day event window [4,0] where day 0 is the relevant GCM disclosure event date. 
Abnormal returns are market-adjusted returns. The S&P 600 Small Cap. Index and FTSE Small 
Cap. Index are used as benchmark indices for the U. S. and the U. K. GCM firms respectively. 
Panel A report results matched on population relative z-score (PRZ) and Panel B report similar 
results matched on population relative change in earnings (PRCHEAR). In both the panels each 
U. K. GCM firm is matched with two U. S. GCM firms. 
Me-an difference Median difference 
CAR window (US-UK) p-value (US-UK) P-Value %<D 
Panel A: Matched on PRZ 
[-10, -2] 0.000 0.988 -0.009 
0.621 52.80 
[-I, Oj 0.031 0.040 0.008 0.102 43.20 
F11+11 0.015 0.406 . 0.004 0.907 51.20 
[-1, +10] 0.049 0.072 0.033 0.213 44.72 
Panel B: Matched on PRCHEAR 
[-10, -2] 0.005 0.816 -0.009 0.922 52.00 
[-1,0] 0.037 0.014 0.012 0.074 43.20 
0.022 0.162 0.000 0.614 49.60 
0.043 0.101 0.028 0.271 46.60 
However, the median CARs over the various windows do not differ significantly 
between the U. S. and U. K. Controlling for the change in earnings, I observe that U. K. 
firms experience more negative CARs than U. S. firms over the window [-1,0]. Again, 
there are no significant differences in median CARs between the U. S. and U. K. firms 
over the various event windows. Taken together, the overall results presented in 
Tables 9.3 and 8.4 only provide tenuous evidence that is consistent with the 
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expectation that the market reaction to the GCM is mom negative for U. K. firms than 
for U. S. firms, making it difficult for me to strongly reject null hypothesis H IS. 
&3.2 Muldwriate Resufts - Short window 
Because of the inconclusive results of my short-term univariate analysis in testing 
HIS, in this section, I run the multivariate regression model of equation (6) to 
examine whether the CARs associated with the GCM announcement differ 
significantly between the U. S. and U. K. GCM firms, controlling for other fiwwrs that 
may explain the market reaction to the GCM event I focus primarily on the CARs in 
the window [-1,0], [-1, +1] and [-1, +10] to examine whether there is an immediate 
differential market response in the U. K. versus the U. S. to the announcement of the 
GCM. In finther analyses in section 8.4 below, I explore a longer time-horizon. The 
multivariate results for all dm regressions are presented in Table 9.5. 
After controlling for other factors that might be correlated with the market's 
immediate reaction to the GCM announcement, I find that firms in the U. K. 
experience more significant negative CARs over the three event windows. Table 8.5 
shows the coefficients on the binary bankruptcy regime variable (REGIME) to be 
-0.049, -0.041 and -0.060 over the windows [-1,0], [-1, +1] and [-1, +10), 
respectively, all significant at better than the 5% level. This indicates that the CARs 
of U. K. firms are 4.9%, 4.1% and 6.0% more negative than U. S. firm CARs after 
controlling for other factors. As expected, firm size is negatively associated with the 
CARs (over [-1, +1]). In general, the coefficients on DELIST and BKT are 
significantly negative, suggesting that the market reacts more negatively to the GCM 
firms that am associated with higher bankruptcy risk at the time of the announcement 
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Consistent with expectations, there is also some evidence of incremental information 
content of audit reports issued by BIG5/BIG6 indicating, to some degree, higher 
quality, and credibility of their audits as compared to non-BIG5/BIG6 auditors. The 
remaining control variables are generally not significant The overall adj. -Rýs range 
between 1.0-3.0% and the models have significant explanatory power albeit not of 
high economic magnitude. 51 
Overall, my results consistently show that U. K. firms experience more negative 
abnormal returns compared to U. S. firms in the days around the GCM announcement 
These findings allow me to reject null hypothesis H15 in the short-run mid are 
consistent with expectations that equity market participants react more adversely to 
the GCM announcement in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime than in a debtor- 
friendly bankruptcy regime. Studies examining the information content of the 
auditor's going-concern opinion have not previously documented this finding. 
&3.3. Univariale ressdis - Long window 
Potential limitations exist to confining the event window to the days immediately 
surrounding the GCM announcement. nese issues are common to most event studies 
examining market reaction in the short-run. Important to note is the issue of 
confounding contemporaneous news releases (Bailey, 1982). Difficulties also arise in 
identifying the exact announcement date of the event and the results may vary 
depending on the length of the event window (Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen, and 
Leftwich, 1984). Hence, these measurement errors may contaminate the short-run 
analyses. To increase the power of my tests, I examine the comparative longer-term 
5' Results are also very similar when I run my short-term regressions matched on PRZ or PRCHEAR 
and interestingly the explanatory power (adjusted R-squared) of some models increases to around 10%. 
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market reaction to the GCM announcement in the U. S. and in the U. K. By observing 
post-GCM announcement returns commencing from the start of the next calendar 
month from the GCM announcement event, for a period up to twelve months beyond 
the announcement, I am biased against finding any systematic difference in 
subsequent returns. This is because any temporary, spurious differences in market 
reactions to the GCM in the U. K. and U. S. should be eliminated in the long-run. That 
is, I would not expect a significant difference in the pattern of post-GCM abnormal 
returns between the two institutional environments. However, if differences in the 
allocation of decision control rights between creditors and debtors embedded in the 
U. S. and U. K. bankruptcy regimes have an impact on the information content of the 
GCM announcement, then I would expect a systematic difference in the post-GCM 
returns of U. K. and U. S. firms. Consistent with expectations, if the GCM 
announcement has more negative implications in the creditor-biased U. K. bankruptcy 
regime compared to the debtor-biased regime in the U. S., then I would expect the 
long-term returns to be more negative for U. K. firms compared to U. S. firms. 
Chapter 5 of my thesis shows that firms receiving GCMs in the U. S. for the first-time 
continue to experience significant negative abnormal returns for up to 12 months 
subsequent to the GCM announcement Taffler, Lu, and Kausar (2004) report similar 
results for the U. K. After controlling for competing explanations for the systematic 
downward drift in abnormal returns over the one-year period, these studies conclude 
that both markets underreact to the negative implications contained in the Gcm 
opinion issued by auditors. I build on these studies by directly comparing the post. 
GCM abnormal return drift of U. S. firms to that of U. K. firms. I expect that in a 
debtor-friendly regime (like Chapter 11), an unfavourable public signal such as the 
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issuance of a GCM, which highlights a significantly increased probability of default 
will have a less negative impact on the stock price because of the less adverse 
consequences arising under the bankruptcy code of this regime if the firm fails, 
compared to a creditor-friendly regime (as in the UJL). Based on this, I predict that 
the subsequent underperformance of firms with first-time GCM audit opinion under 
the debtor-friendly U. S. regime will be of a lower magnitude Oess negative) than 
under the creditor-friendly U. K. regime. 
Table 8.6 presents the post-GCM buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) for the fidl sample 
of U. K. and U. S. GCM firms for up to 12 months after the announcement month. 59 
Ile average 12-month BHAR for U. K. firms is -31.3% compared to -19.1% for U. S. 
firms. This difference is significant (p-0.094). The median 12-month BHAR for 
U. K. firms is significantly more negative than the median 12-month BHAR for U. S. 
firms (43% v -17.8%) (p=0.007). Figure 8.1 graphs the mean buy-and-hold returns 
over the 12 months post-GCM announcement event for my U. S. and U. K. GCM 
firms. Overall, my univariate results are consistent with my expectations that the post- 
GCM drift for U. K. firms is more negative than the post-GCM drift for U. S. firms. 60 
" Extreme outliers are truncated at the I' and "0' percentiles; however, results we qualitatively shnilar 
even if I employ my unadjusted GCM sample. 
60 Qualitatively similar results are obtained when U. S. GCM firms am nuohed to UX CICM &-ms on 
the level of financial distress and changes in earnings. 
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&3.4. Multivariate resulft - Long window 
My longer-term univariate results presented in the previous section provide evidence 
that U. K. first-time GCM firms experience more negative longer-term BHARs than 
U. S. first-time GCM firms. I argue that this is mainly due to divergent bankruptcy 
codes of the two institutional environments. Although, by examining longer-term 
abnormal returns on a univariate basis I overcome the limitations of analysing short- 
term returns (see previous section) but such an analysis does not control fbr other 
explanations for this difference in BHARs across the U. K. and the U. S. Exploring this 
further in a multivariate context, I examine whether this post-GCM drift is 
significantly different for U. K. and U. S. GCM firms after controlling for other factors 
that may explain the difference in this drifL I nui the regression model of equation (6) 
for the full sample of U. S. and U. K. GCM firms-61 The key variable of interest is the 
independent variable (REGIME) which indicates the bankruptcy regime associated 
with my GCM firms (i. e., REGIN[E =I if the GCM firm is operating the U. K. and -0 
if it is in the U. S. ). The results are presented in Panel A of Table 8.7. 
For the full sample, Panel A of table 9.7 for BHAR12 (BHAR6) shows the 
bankruptcy regime dummy variable has a coefficient of -0.349 (p-0.001) (-0.311 
(p=O. OW)) suggesting that U. K. firm BHARs are 34.8% (31.1%) mom negative 
compared to U. S. firms in the one-year (6-month) period after the GCM 
amouncement, controlling for other factors. Both DELIST and BKT are significantly 
'11 Due to compounding of monthly returns, extreme observations cause serious problems in longer- 
term BHAR results. To obtain meaningful results for my OLS regressions, I use Cook's-D influence 
statistic to truncate outliers in the 6-month and 12-month BHARs. For robustness purposes, I also 
employ robust regression procedures, namely the M-estimation approach, which gives less weight to 
extreme observations but does not discard them as opposed to the least-squares method where the 
influence of a datum on the estimate increases linearly with the size of its error, confirming the non- 
robusteness of the least-squares estimate. M-estimation is implemented using iteratively reweighted 
least-squares. For details see Huber (1973,198 1). My robust regression results are qualitatively similar 
to those reported in the paper. Results are also not very different even if I run OLS regressions using 
my full GCM sample. 
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negative (-0.40 and -0.45), suggesting that firms that delist or enter bankruptcy 
experience more negative BHARs, clearly highlighting a significantly negative 
relation between stock returns, distress risk, and bankruptcy. The adj. -Rýs for my 
models are around 7% and their explanatory powers are highly significauL Overall, 
my longer-term univariate and multivariate results together provide support for my 
expectation that firms in a creditor-friendly bankruptcy regime like the U. K. will 
experience more negative post-GCM drift in abnormal returns than firms in a debtor- 
friendly bankruptcy regime like the U. S. These findings are consistent with my 
expectations, leading to the rejection of null hypothesis H15 at conventional levels. 
One possible explanation for these results is that the negative information implied by 
the GCM has more severe economic consequences for stockholders in a creditor- 




Medium-Term Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Returns Regression Results 
Ilis table presents the results of a multivariate analysis examining differences in 6-month and 
12-month buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) subsequent to the GCM announcement 
month between my population of 823 non-finance, non-utility, industry firms traded on the 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ receiving first-time going-concem modified audit reports 
between 01.01.1995 and 31.12.2002 in the U. S., and 127 non-finance industry firms traded on 
the London Stock Exchange or Unlisted Securities Market receiving first-time going-concern 
modified audit reports between 01.01.1995 and 31.12.2002 in the U. K. The dependent 
variable are 6-month and 12-month BHAR. The table provides coefficient estimates along 
with their significance levels for the following regression model: 
BHAR, - lo + 2, IREGM4E, + -X2(PRTA)i + 
X3BMi + X4M0Mi + 2,5PRCHEAR, + X6PREDGCi 
+ X7DIVIDj + 2, sPR7, + 4LNCHPR7, +; LioLNCHPRLEVi + x, IDELISTi + 
112BKTi +, %, 3AUDi +ui 
with the variable definitions given below the table. Panel A reports the results for my full 
GCM samples in the U. S. and the U. K. Panel B reports similar results matched on population 
relative z-score (PRZ) and Panel C matched on population relative change in earnings 
(PRCHEAR). Each U. K. GCM firm is matched with two U. S. GCM firm in Panel B and 
Panel C. Panel D reports similar results excluding bankrupt firms (BKT). 
Panel A: OLS regression model analysis - full sample 
Dependent variable BHAR6 
Independent variables Coefficients Sig. (p-value) 
REGIME -0.261 0.000 
























































No. of cases 900 906 
Model F-value (d. f - 13) 5.702 5.930 
IF significance (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.065 0.067 
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TABLE 8.7 - Continued 
Panel B: OLS regression model analysis - matched on PRZ 
Dependent variable BHAR6 BHAR12 
Independent variables Coefficients Sig-(P-value) Coefficients Sig. (p-value) 
REGIME -0.182 0.041 -0.399 0.004 
PRTA 0.001 0.772 0.001 0.662 
BM 0.004 0.792 0.006 0.797 
mom -0.402 0.340 -1.384 0.030 
PRCHEAR -0.001 0.428 -0.001 0.683 
PREDGC 0.008 0.919 0.027 0.819 
DIVID -0.015 0.870 0.129 0.356 
PRZ 0.255 0.197 0.437 0.147 
LNCHPRZ -0.023 0.457 -0.054 0.243 
LNCHPRLEV -0.040 0.272 -0.023 0.680 
DELIST -0.083 0.362 -0.297 0.034 
BKT -0.514 0.000 -0.737 0.000 
AUD 0.170 0.049 0.232 0.075 
Intercept -0.325 0.093 -0.459 0.119 
No. of cases 361 362 
Model F-value (d. f 13) 2.689 3.516 
F significance (p-value) 0.001 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.057 0.083 
_ 
Panel C: OIS regression model analysis - watched on PRCHEAR 
Dependent variable BHAR6 BHAR12 
Independent variables Coefficients Sig-(P-value) Coefficients Sig-(P-value) 
REGIME -0.333 0.0()0 -0.397 
0.001 
PRTA -0.002 0.249 0.003 
0.273 
BM 0.009 0.543 0.014 0.510 
mom -0.711 0.121 -1.317 0.048 
PRCHEAR 0.000 0.803 0.001 0.663 
PREDGC 0.003 0.966 0.100 0.362 
DIVID -0.080 0.390 -0.047 0.727 
PRZ 0.544 0.016 0.352 0.269 
LNCHPRZ -0.081 0.074 -0.148 
0.019 
LNCHPRLEV 0.025 0.563 0.050 0.433 
DELIST -0.150 0.100 -0.369 0.007 
BKT -0.411 0.000 -0.689 0.000 
AUD 0.135 0.109 0.164 0.199 
IntercqA -0.385 0.047 -0.394 
0.151 
No. of cases 360 361 
Model F-value (dS -13) 3.232 3.781 
F significance (p-value) 0.000 0.000 
_Adjusted 
R-squared 0.075 0.091 
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TABLE 8.7 - Continued 
Panel D: OIS regression model analysis - excluding subsequent bankrupt GCM firms 
Dependent variable BHAR6 BHAR12 
Independent variables Coefficients Sig. (pvalue) Coefficients Sig. (P-Value) 
REGIME -0.256 0.001 -0.392 0.001 
PRTA 0.000 0.930 0.002 0.444 
BM 0.005 0.686 -0.004 0.838 
mom -0.265 0.390 -0.666 0.168 
PRCHEAR 0.000 0.921 0.001 0.429 
PREDGC 0.055 0.313 0.051 0.547 
DIVID 0.063 0.296 0.138 0.140 
PRZ 0.199 0.100 0.189 0.321 
LNCHPRZ -0.028 0.193 -0.073 0.031 
LNCHPRLEV -0.021 0.399 0.002 0.964 
DELIST -0.221 0.000 -0.385 0.000 
AUD 0.044 0.457 0.127 0.171 
Intercept -0.182 0.094 -0.260 0.131 
No. of cam 768 773 
Model F-value (d. f -12) 2.478 3.529 
F significance (p-value) 0.003 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.023 0.038 
REGMIE = bankruptcy regime proxy (I if GCM firm is a U. K. firm and 0 if it is U. S. ), PRTA 
- percentile based population relative total assets, BM = book value of assets divided by 
market capitalisation at the end of the calendar month of audit report publication date, MOM 
= monthly average of prior 11-months (t-12 to t-2) raw returns, PRCHEAR - percentile 
based population relative annual change in earnings, PREDGC = GCM expectations dummy 
calculated using Mutchler (1983) for U. S. and Citron and Taffler (2001) for U. K. (I if GCM 
expected, 0 otherwise), DIVID = dividend paid dummy (I if dividend paid, 0 if nominal or 
omission), PRZ = population relative financial distress measure computed using Altman 
(1968) for U. S. firms and Taffler (1984) for U. K. firms, LNCHPRZ = natural log of change in 
population relative z-score, LNPRLEV - natural log of change in population relative 
leverage, DELIST = delisting dummy (I if the firm is delisted for performance reasons within 
one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise), BKT = bankruptcy dummy (I if the firm goes 
into bankruptcy within one year of the audit report date, 0 otherwise), AUDITOR = audit 
quality proxy dummy (I if Big5/Big6,0 otherwise), and. 4 .... 
X13 are the regression parameter 
estimates and ui is a mean zero stochastic effor term. 
M. Additional Tests 
I conduct additional analysis to see if my longer-term results are robust to alternative 
explanations. I specifically control for the level of distress risk, changes in earnings 
and firms that go bankrupt in the 12-month period subsequent to the publication of the 
GCM audit reporL 
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&4.1. Controffingfor Amess risk 
Dichev (1998) finds that firms with a higher distress risk earn reliably lower returns. 
Panel A of Table 8.2 shows that U. K. GCM firms am significantly more distressed 
than U. S. GCM firms. For example, mean (median) PRZ (population relative z-score) 
for U. K. firms is 0.88 (0.94), whereas, similar figures for U. S. firms am 0.80 (0.97). 
Both mean (median) differences are significant at the 1% level. 
To control for differences in the level of distress risk, I match each UK. GCM firm 
with two U. S. GCM firms of similar distress risk level (PRZ) and then re-run my 
longer-term regressions. The mean (median) PRZ for the matched (w-254) U. S. GCM 
sample is 0.88 (0.94), which is similar to the distress levels of UK GCM sample to 
two decimal places. The regression results are presented in Panel B of Table 8.7. As 
can be seen the results are more or less similar to my main (full) results presented in 
Panel A of the same table. The coefficient on the REGRAE variable for BHAR12 
(BHAR6) is -0.39 (-0.18), significant at better than the 5% level. Similarly, the BKT 
and DELIST variables are also highly significant with their signs in the expected 
direction. The overall model is significant and the explanatory power of the model is 
8% (6%). These results demonstrate that the abnormal return differences between the 
U. S. GCM firms and U. K. GCM firms are not due to the differences in distress levels 
at the initial GCM stage and confirm the rejection of null hypothesis H1 5. 
LAZ Controfflngforpost-earninp announcement dr(ft 
Another possible explanation for the observed differences in post-GCM drift in stock 
returns between U. S. and U. K. GCM firms could be due to the well-documented post. 
earnings announcement drift anomaly. Bernard and Thomas (1999) document that 
183 
extreme earnings smprises me followed by abnormally low stock returns. Panel A of 
Table 8.2 also confirms mean (median) differences in the earnings surprise variables 
(change in earnings (CHEAR) and population relative change in earnings 
(PRCHEAR)) between the U. S. and the U. K. GCM sample. Hence, I need to control 
for the possibility that potential systematic differences in the post-earnings 
announcement drift between the U. K. and U. S. me driving my results. 
To control for differences in the post-earnings announcement drift, I follow the some 
procedure as used in section 8.4.1 above and match each U. K. GCM firm with two 
U. S. GCM firms which experience a simila earnings change measure (PRCHEAR) 
and then re-run my longer-term regressions-62 The mean (median) PRCHEAR for 
matched (n=254) U. S. GCM sample is 24.05 (9.12), which is similar to the 
PRCHEAR of U. K. GCM firms (n-127). The mean (median) differences are highly 
insignificant demonstrating the effectiveness of my matching procedure. The 
regression results of the matched GCM sample am presented in Panel C of Table 8.7 
which again confirnts my original findings presented in section 9.3.4. The coefficient 
on the variable REGRAE for BHAR12 (BHAR6) is -0-40 (-0.33), significant at the 
1% level. The coefficients on BKT and DELIST variables are also significantly 
negative as expected. The overall model is significant and the explanatory power of 
the model is in the range of 9-9%. These results highly support the rejection of null 
hypothesis H 15. 
62 As my BHARs are derived using control fim approach matched on size and book-to-market ratio, I 
also calculate BHARs matched on size and earnings surprise ratio and then compute the differences in 
BHARs between the U. S. and U. K. GCM firms. The results are substantively similar to those presented 
in table 8.6 of this chapter. 
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After controlling for the earnings surprise, I continue to observe that U. K. GCM firm 
experience more negative BHARs than U. S. GCM- 
&43. Controffingfor subsequent bankruptcles 
It is possible that my documented results are driven by subsequent bankruptcies of the 
GCM firms. In addition to the controls for bankruptcy already implemented in my 
multivariate analyses in panel A of table 9.7,1 also eliminate those GCM firms that 
enter bankruptcy in the 12-month period subsequent to the publication of the GCM 
audit report month from my sample and re-run my longer-run tests. There are 122 
U. S. GCM firms that file for bankruptcy and 19 U. K. OCM firms that enter 
receivership, administration or creditors voluntary liquidation in the one-year period 
after the GCM announcement The regression results presented in Panel D of Table 
9.7 are consistent with the tenor of my main results The coefficient on the variable 
REGRAE for BHAR12 (BHAR6) is -0-39 (426), significant at the 1% level. These 
findings suggest that even after excluding bankrupt firms, U. K. GCM firms have more 
negative returns than the U. S. GCM firms. This is again consistent with the argument 
that the GCM announcement has more negative implications in the creditor-biased 
U. K. bankruptcy regime compared to the debtor-biased regime in the U. S., am 
leading me to reject the null hypothesis H 15. 
8.5. Summary 
This chapter addresses a very important research question regarding the interaction 
between accounting standards and legal regimes. I examine the information value to 
investors of the going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinion and compare how the 
bankruptcy code impacts on this relationship. I compare a debtor-friendly bankruptcy 
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regime such as the U. S. to a creditor-friendly bankniptcy regime such a the UJL 
Whilst the issue of the relevance of the auditor's going-concern opinion to investors 
has been studied previously in the literature, this question is riot fully resolva 
Importantly, there has been no study to date which has examined in detail the impact 
of bankniptcy codes on the value-relevance of the going-concern opinion. 
My results show that investors, both in the U. S. and in the U. K., react negatively to 
the GCM both at the time of the information release and also in the medium-term, 
clearly demonstrating that the GCM does contain new information of direct relevance 
to the capital markets. Consistent with my expectations that market reaction to a GCM 
will be more severe in a creditor-friendly regime than in a debtor-friendly regime 
because of likely greater loss to investors, both my univariate, although somewhat 
weak for short-window setting, and my multivariate results demonstrate that U. K. 
investors react more negatively than investors in the U. S. I also examine the post- 
GCM drift in abnormal returns documented in chapter 5 for the U. S. GCM sample 
and extend Taffler, Lu, and Kausar's (2004) work for the U. K. GCM firms. Again, 
consistent with my expectations, the post-GCM drift is more negative for UX. GCM 
firms than for U. S. GCM firms. The relationships between ex post events of 
bankruptcy and performance delistings (a broader measure of financial distress) are 
also as expected and highly significant Overall, the results show that the higher the 
distress risk the lower the abnormal returns and such abnormal returns are further 
significantly lower for GCM firms operating in the creditor-friendly banknqfty 
regime of the U. K. than in the debtor-friendly regime of the U. S. 
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The empirical evidence presented in this chapter is novel to the accounting literature 
and has not been documented before. These results have important implications. In 
the final chapter I summarise the findings of my thesis, discuss its implications and 
limitations, bring out its principal contribution to the academic literature and present 
suggestions for further work. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
9.1. Introduction 
This study is primarily concerned with examining the market underreaction 
hypothesis to bad and good news events in the financial distress domain. Additionafly, 
I extend my work to investigate the market underreaction phenomenon conditional on the 
underlying bankruptcy regime of the institutional environment. In undertaking this 
research, I first conducted a critical review of the literature, and then, drawing on this, 
developed fifteen testable hypotheses from my research questions. Appropriate 
empirical methodologies am then established to test the hypotheses formally adopting 
a capital market-based information assimilation perspective. The first empirical 
chapter of the thesis, chapter 5, explores longer-term market reaction to going-concem 
modified audit report disclosures (bad news) and their subsequent withdrawal (good 
news), chapters 6 and 7 conduct additional tests to search for alternative explanations 
for the market unden-eaction phenomenon to bad news and chapter 8 presents 
evidence on how divergent bankruptcy codes impact on investor response to the 
going-concern modified audit report signal in two institutional environments. 
In this final chapter of my thesis, the next section first surnmarises and discusses my 
. empirical findings along with their implications and the contributions of my 
thesis to the literature and related public policy issues. Section 3 discusses some 
limitations of my research and die final section outlines possible future developments 
of my work. 
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91. Summary, Implications of Results and Contributions 
Ile seminal market efficiency paradigm in finance is being increasingly challenged 
by evidence apparently inconsistent with its predictions. Such "anomalies" tend to 
show that the market does not fully incorporate information upon its release in an 
unbiased way. Recent literature in finance identifies two potential types of anomalous 
market reaction to news disclosures, overreaction, and underreaction. The 
overreaction phenomenon finds little empirical support but market underreaction, on 
the other hand, appears quite robust, particularly in the caw of bad news which the 
market appears to take time to process in many situations. My thesis explores these 
issues. 
TIhe first part of my thesis tests the hypothesis that if investors rationafly incorporate 
new pessimistic (optimistic) information then after controlling for risk, bad (good) 
news firms will not under- (over-) react I test this hypothesis in the ping-concern 
modified audit report disclosure domain. Going-concern opinions offer an excellent 
test of the underreaction proposition as such information releases are associated with 
acute psychological stress and where a clear distinction between bad and good news 
can easily be made by considering the parallel case of going-concern withdrawal 
events. 
Chapters 5,6, and 7 address my first empirical issue 'Does the market underreact to 
bad and good news in the financial distress domainT Research to date in this area has 
been scarce and new evidence is needed to see if investors fail to recognize the 
downside risk associated with bad news relative to good news. My GCM firm sample 
offers a very appropriate test for this issue as the implications of bad news and good 
news are very different in this key financial distress context 
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The first empirical chapter of my thesis examines the prior price behaviour and stock 
returns following first-time going-concern modified opinion audit report publication 
and its subsequent withdrawal which are fundamental, mandatory, independent, 
public-domain news events, together with the stock holding patterns and trading 
responses to this news of different classes of investor. A web-based procedure is used 
to identify my relatively large sample of 845 firms with first-time GCMs published 
from 1994 to 2002. My results demonstrate differential market reaction to such public 
domain bad (GCNO and good (GCM withdrawal) news events. I find negative stock 
price reaction following a GCM announcement lasts for a year, and is around -160/a, 
indicating clear market underreaction to this bad news event Conversely, no similar 
abnormal return pattern is found after GCM withdrawals (good news), as predicted by 
theory. Additional analyses reveal that underperformance is restricted to GCM firms 
with negative earnings surprise, consistent with the market focusing on earnings while 
ignoring the fidl implications of the GCM signal. On the other hand, I find that the 
good news about firms' future prospects, as highlighted by a withdrawn going- 
concern opinion, is correctly anticipated by the market in the period leading up to the 
next audit report publication date. 
Overall, my results cannot be explained by existing anomalies documented in the 
literature. Other issues, such as problems related to abnormal return measurement, 
generally arise in long-term studies with time horizons of three years or more (Ang 
and Zhang, 2004). Here, I restrict my analysis to the one-year longer-term time 
horizon. Similarly, a bad model problem cannot explain my results because my GCM 
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firms significantly underperform even on a raw return basis in good market 
conditions. 
Nonetheless, I find that high transaction costs associated with trading in my sample 
stocks render arbitrage opportunities unprofitable and very risky for rational investors. 
Additionally, these market frictions could be a reason for the persistence of my strong 
post-GCM announcement drift. However, they cannot explain the existence of this 
drift in the first place, and its asymmetric nature. 
Owe a researcher fails to identify any rational or systematic risk-based explanation 
for anomalous results, such as mine, there is a plethora of potential behavioural 
explanations available. I try to limit the range of behavioural stories which can be 
fitted to my findings. Taffier, Lu, and Kausar (2004) we Lee's (2001) argument that 
price discovery is a complex process to argue that because GC firms are highly 
financially distressed, their underlying fundamental value might be difficult to 
measure. This argument seems to be appealing as 44% of my OC firms are delisted in 
the first yew alone due to financial distress reasons. Similarly, Hong, Lim, and Stein 
(2000) argue that if firms are small and poorly followed then managers have less 
incentive to bring investors up-to-date quickly, consequently pessimistic information 
diffuses only gradually across the investing public. This explanation might be more 
likely when managers have some adverse private information for their firms, but in 
my going-concem context investors am essentially dealing with a fiUly available 
public-domain mandated news event. 
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However, my thesis shows that investors have problems dealing with bad news but 
not with good news. Two behavioural explanations are consistent with my results. 
The first one relates to mental accounting and investor inability to realise losses, 
Shefrin and Statman's (1985) disposition effect, drawn from Kahneman and 
Tversky's (1979) prospect theory. The second explanation, proposed by Taffler, Lu, 
and Kausar (2004), is that of market denial of the bad news conveyed by the GCM 
releases, the premise of which lies in the domains of psychoanalysis. In the 
psychoanalytic literature it is argued that this defence mechanism pushes the painfid 
thoughts or experiences out of conscious awareness because they have become too 
painful to handle consciously. Though most of the work done in this area is either 
consultancy work or action research, Obholzer and Roberts (1994) present an account 
of such work which shows that individuals working in groups, organisations or by 
themselves exhibit various patterns of defence mechanisms, denial being a most 
common one used to defend them from feeling anxious (depressive position). Also 
Brown (1997) points out that individuals and fim managers seek to preserve their 
self-esteem and ameliorate anxiety through the use of such mental defence 
mechanisms as denial, rationalisation, and self-aggrandisement. So, them is a 
possibility that investors might also be suffering from such mechanisms as opposed to 
cognitive biases and heuristics drawn on in traditional behavioural finance. This 
explanation will also be more consistent with the phenomenon of market 
underreaction being more pronounced to bad news while no abnormal response to 
good news. 
Although the above two explanations are drawn from different psychological theories, 
their message seems to be the same - bad news, as opposed to good news, is difficult 
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to digest. Importantly, no such distinction is drawn in the behavioural finance models 
of Daniel, Hershleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998), and Hong and Stein (1999). Even my empirical evidence of market 
underraction to bad news is not consistent with these models. 
An additional contribution of my thesis is to explore the trading patterns of different 
investor classes in response to the going-concern opinion. I find that institutional 
holdings in GCM firms decline by around 35% over the 9-quarter period centred on 
the GCM announcement quarter ftom. 171/6 to II%. In contrast, insider holdings do 
not change significantly, averaging around 15% throughout. By deduction, retail 
investors would appear to increase their holdings over this period in these stocks from 
around 68% to 74%. Furthermore, they account for most of the trading activity. When 
I analyse the trading activity of the three classes of stockholders based on ex post 
outcome, I find institutions substantially reduce their holdings in the GCM delisted 
and bankrupt (most likely to lead to losses) stock category (17% to 5%), whereas, by 
deduction, retail investors appear to increase their holdings in these stock (70% to 
83%) over the 9-quarter period. On this basis, I have evidence that institutional 
investors are less prone to behavioural biases in assimilating bad news of this nature. 
My evidence of stock mispricing and extended post-OC-drift might then be explained 
by a limits-to-arbitrage argument with naTve (retail) investors, being particularly prone 
to behavioural bias, keeping stock prices artificially high by trading inappropriately in 
these stocks. 
Based on my results and the growing empirical evidence (Dichev and Piotrosld, 2001; 
Taftler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; and Eisdorfer, 2004) one can specWate that such stock 
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market anomalies are likely to arise in circumstances where the firms in question are 
financially distressed and further, due to limits to arbitrage constraints investment 
from institutional (also perceived to be rational) investors is low. In such situations 
naTve (retail) investors do not appear to act rationally and misprice such firms. This 
shows that we certainly have a class of investors who are irmtional and exhibit 
behaviour which causes systematic mispricing contmry to that which the efficient 
market hypothesis suggests. 
Nevertheless, whatever the explanations for my anomalous results, I find that going. 
concern modified audit reports, indicating increased risk of financial distress, lead to 
significant market underreaction for up to a you following the bad news disclosure 
event Conversely, I do not find any evidence suggesting that the market is delayed in 
its reaction to GCM audit reports (good news) which highlight improvement in firm 
financial health, and thus clearly anticipates this good news fully. My results have 
public policy implications since I have shown that despite clear messages being 
conveyed by auditors to investors, their information is not being fidly impounded by 
the market on a timely basis leading to trades taking place at prices apparently 
inconsistent with fkir value. 
Chapter 8 of my thesis extends my work to empirically investigate the ma&et 
underreaction phenomenon conditional on the underlying bankruptcy regime of the 
institutional environment Specifically, I explore the market response to the 
information content of closely related going-concem modified audit mport disclomm 
(bad news) conditional on the underlying bankruptcy codes in vM similar 
institutional and market environments differing only in the nature of bankruptcy 
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regimes. More specifically, I work with the debtor-friendly U. S. and the creditor- 
friendly U. K. legal regimes. I hypothesise that investors in a creditor-friendly 
bankruptcy regime (the U. K. ) will react more adversely to the publication of a first- 
time going-concern modified audit report indicating increased risk of loss than do 
investors in a debtor-friendly bankruptcy regime (the U. S. ). This is because of a 
remarkable divergence across the bankruptcy codes of these two different countries 
with regard to the rights of claimholders in the event of a default on debt contracts 
(e. g., Franks et al., 1996; La Porta. et al., 1997). Ile idea is to test whether there is any 
difference in investor response to similar bad news signals highlighting financial 
distress across different institutional environments. 
The results of this pan of my thesis are presented in chapter 9 which shows that 
investors, both in the U. S. and in the U. K., react negatively to the GCM both at the 
time of the information release and also in the longer-term, clearly demonstrating that 
the GCM does contain new information of direct relevance to the capital markets. 
Consistent with my expectation that market reaction to a GCM will be more severe in 
a creditor-friendly regime than in a debtor-friendly regime, because of a likely greater 
loss to investors, both my univariate and multivariate results demonstrate that UX. 
investors react more negatively than investors in the U. S. I also examine the post- 
GCM drift in abnormal returns documented in chapter 6 for the U. S. GCM sample 
and extend Taffler, Lu, and Kausar's (2004) work for the U. K. GCM firms. Again, 
consistent with my expectations, the post-GCM drift is more negative for UJL GCM 
firms than for U. S. GCM firms. I find that, as hypothesised, investors in a creditor- 
friendly regime (the U. K. ) react more adversely, -31%, than investors in a debtor. 
friendly regime (the U. S. ), -18%, in the eight year time-period (1995-2002). 
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These findings provide new insight into the informativeness of the going-concern 
opinion to capital market participants. First, I show that investors both in the U. K. 
and in the U. S. find the going-concern modified (GCM) audit opinion to have 
informational value. There is a significant negative market reaction to the GCM 
opinion in both institutional environments around the days that it is announced. Next, 
I observe a differential market response to the GCM announcement between the U. K. 
and the U. S.. My results are robust to: (1) controls for other factors that may be 
con-elated with the market's reaction to the GCM announcement; (2) matching UJL 
mW U. S. firms on firm performance and distress levels; and (3) various time period 
horizons. Despite a battery of sensitivity tests, the tenor of my results remains the 
same. Overall, my results consistently document that U. K. firms exhibit more severe 
negative market reaction to the GCM announcement than U. S. firms. This is 
consistent with my expectations that despite the uniformity of this negative public 
signal, equity market participants will react more adversely to this signal in a creditor- 
friendly bankruptcy regime than in a debtor-friendly bankruptcy regime. 
The findings of the second part of my thesis contribute to the literature and ongoing 
discussions amongst standard-setters and regulators as follows. First, I inject 
empirical evidence into discussions surrounding the convergence of financial 
reportmg and auditing standards around the world. Underlying much of these 
discussions is an implicit notion that a single set of accounting standards will lead to 
uniform accounting and auditing practices and thus calibrate the information 
contained in financial statements across the world to provide consistent, comparable, 
relevant, mid reliable information. TIiis, in turn, will promote the efficient functioning 
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of the global capital markets. Examining the auditor's going-concern opinion across 
two major economies where this information carries very similar meanings, I show 
that its information usefulness to market participants varies with bankruptcy codes 
that assign differential claimholder rights. T'hus, these findings draw attention to the 
importance of considering differential legal regimes in discussing the harmonisation 
of accounting and auditing standards. One possible policy implication for 
international standard-setters is that they may need to consider how the different legal 
regimes across countries might interact with the global accounting standards to 
provide value-relevant accounting information to the capital markets. 
Second, I provide fixther evidence on the value of the audit opinion. I document that 
the going-concern opinion contains information that is useful to investors in pricing 
securities. 71w contribution follows because prior studies examining this research 
question present conflicting findings. 
Finally, these findings contribute to the recent growth in the stream of literature which 
examines international accounting differences (e. g., Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; 
Ball, Robin and Wu, 2003). 1 exploit a unique setting in which the accounting 
standard that prescribes the production of the accounting information (i. e., the 
auditor's going-concern opinion) is relatively constant in two different countries that 
share similar political influence and market determination of financial reporting (i. e., 
both the U. K. and U. S. are often classified together in the one group as common-law 
countries) (Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). In response to Holthausen's (2003) call 
for further refinement in the research designs of studies conducting cross-country 
comparisons, I attempt to conduct a natural experiment where fewer factors are 
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changing in order to determine which institutions are more important determinants of 
the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Overall, my thesis makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to the 
behavioural finance, market pricing, and accounting literature in the bad news 
disclosure domain. 
93. Limitsdons 
1. Since my research cases are based on firms receiving first-time going-concern 
modified audit reports (GCM cases), any conclusion about the auditors, 
disclosures should only be applied to this limited area. I have not addressed 
the different but related issue of the auditor's decision to give a GCM in the 
first PIM. 
2. In an empirical test, it is not possible to completely accept or reject the various 
coqplanations provided by the behavioural finance/psychology literatum 
because in such studies it becomes quite difficult to explicitly test a particular 
behavioural trait Only speculative conclusions can be drawn. 
3. Tests of zero abnormal returns (market efficiency) suffer from a joint. 
hypothesis problem. It is quite possible that my findings are due to lack of 
control for risk which is not adequately captured by control factors employed 
in this study. 
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4. 'Me study coven a relatively short period (1994/5 to 2002). My findings could 
hence be specific to this period and may not be applicable to other periods. 
5. This study is based on the U. S. and U. K. data only and therefore the results 
could be specific to these environments only. 
6. My study is primarily based on analysing longer-tem (up to 12-months) 
returns, excluding the event month (audit report publication month) itself. 
Such an approach biases against findin any abnormal returns. This is because 
a) the initial market reaction to the going-concern opinion event is ignored4 
and b) any temporary, spurious differences in market reactions to my going- 
concern opinion event in the U. S. and the U. K. should be eliminated in the 
long-nm. 
7. Other less serious limitations are the use of a two factor control firm approach, 
equally weighted portfolios, annual rebalancing, and use of standardised 
databases. 
9.4. Further Work 
The strong and unambiguous results of my thesis confirm die richness of the reporting 
environment I address. T"his brings together accounting and auditing issues, 
behavioural finance considerations, capital market theory, and the role of institutional 
environments on accounting information. IUse issues have crucial public policy 
implications and also shed light on investor behaviour in such circumstances. 
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Building on the results of my thesis, hirther work in each of these areas has the 
potential to contribute further to knowledge and theory development. 
For example, I have shown that market underreacts to going-concern modified audit 
report disclosures. It might be important to see how other market participants react to 
this bad news event Specifically, whether analysts, as the prime information 
intermediaries, view going-concern opinions as informationally relevant as measured 
by basic mention, earnings revisions, change in recommendation, coverage/non- 
coverage etc. A content analysis approach may well be used in exploring how the 
analyst respond to the audit report or anticipate its content. A parallel thrust could be 
to explore the market reaction to such analysts' reports. Hem the contribution to the 
literature is the linking of the analyst to the actual going-concern opinion event. 
In this thesis, I explore the impact of bankruptcy codes on the informativeness of 
accounting information in the U. S. and the U. K. Another possible extension of my 
work is to extend this work into other legal jurisdictions, including civil-law 
countries. La Porta et al. (1997) shows that common-law countries generally have the 
strongest and French civil-law countries have the weakest, legal protection of 
investors. A study along these lines can fiuther educate us on the interaction between 
accounting information and legal regimes internationally. 
Finally, another important dimension which could be pursued is to explore corporate 
governance issues for my GCM sample. There is very little that we know about how 
management mid auditors deal with such bad news reporting. There are several factors 
that could influence the disclosure behaviour of both directors and auditors. The idea 
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is to see whether a robust corporate governance structure is associated with higher 
quality going-concern uncertainty disclosures. Additionally, an intertemporal 
comparison of pre-Sarbanes Oxley and post-Sarbanes Oxley going-concern firms 
could also provide additional insights into the effectiveness of such corporate 
governance mechanisms. A capital market dimension of such issues is also necessary 
to assess how capital markets respond to these changes, only making such 
contributions richer. 
All of the above-mentioned extensions of my research are original and if pursued have 
the potential to significantly contribute further to the accounting mid finance 
literatures. The results of these studies might also provide additional guidance on 
appropriate public policy issues in a global context. 
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